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Abstract 
This research project examines the influence of the for-profit college sector on the 
2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. It is based on interviews with 
Congressional staff, college lobbyists, and higher education reporters, as well as the 
Congressional Record and advocacy materials. Findings indicate that the for-profit 
college sector was able to advance specific elements of the sector’s policy agenda using 
access and influence strategies, such as information sharing, lobbying, and political 
contributions. Findings reveal that the same members of Congress receiving the most 
political contributions from the for-profit sector were identified as those members most 
involved in the reauthorization. The main success of the sector was change to the 90/10 
Rule, and the main failure was that the final law did not include a single definition of an 
institution of higher education. Implications for research and practice were also 
discussed. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the midst of the civil rights movement, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed 
into law the Higher Education Act of 1965 in order “to strengthen the educational 
resources of our colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for students 
in postsecondary and higher education” (Pub. L. No. 89-329).  The Higher Education Act 
of 1965 (HEA) has been reauthorized and amended in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 
1992 and 1998, and most recently in 2008 as the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 
2008.  It is the major piece of federal legislation governing U.S. higher education. The 
law includes student financial aid and a variety of other programs intended to strengthen 
higher education institutions and promote access to college for students.  
The 1998 reauthorization expired on September 30, 2003 and required that the 
law’s provisions be reauthorized or amended by then or Congress would need to act to 
temporarily extend the existing provisions. A reauthorization could include changes to 
existing language, additional language and new programs, or the elimination of language. 
Congress worked for nearly five years – during the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses –  
to reauthorize and update the HEA. From 2003 until the reauthorization in 2008, 
Congress passed dozens of temporary extensions as well as legislation changing certain 
provisions in the law, while Congressional staff, Members of Congress, lobbyists, and 
college officials worked towards a final reauthorization of the HEA. Both houses of 
Congress debated, drafted, and passed legislation to finalize a bill that was signed into 
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law by President George W. Bush on August 14, 2008. This most recent reauthorization 
expires in 2013. 
Like any other policy arena, higher education has its own set of “special interest” 
groups that pay close attention to policy development and actively advocate or lobby for 
or against specific policy in legislation considered by Congress, such as HEA. During the 
decade that Congress worked to finalize this most recent reauthorization of the HEA 
many educational organizations and lobbyists, representing all types of higher education 
institutions and organizations, attempted, as in previous reauthorizations, to influence 
various provisions in the HEA.  
 This study examines how the for-profit higher education industry attempted to 
influence federal higher education policy, specifically provisions in HEA.  A for-profit 
college, which in the HEA is referred to as a “proprietary institution of higher education”  
(P.L. 110-315, Section 102) is generally understood to be an educational organization 
that is managed and governed by a private organization or corporation (National 
Conference of State Legislators, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/for-profit-
colleges-and-universities.aspx). In federal law, for-profit colleges are defined for 
purposes of their participation in federal student financial aid programs, which are 
authorized in the HEA. During the timeframe of this study, Section 102 of the HEA 
included this definition and stated that in order for the federal government to consider an 
organization as an institution of higher education for purposes of participation in federal 
financial aid programs, the institution must provide an eligible program of training to 
prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation, admits as regular 
students only persons having a certificate of graduation from a school providing 
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secondary education or the recognized equivalent of such a certificate, is legally 
authorized within the state to operate, is not a public or other nonprofit institution, is 
accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association recognized by the 
United States Secretary of Education, has been in existence for at least 2 years, and has at 
least 10 percent of the school’s revenues from sources that are not derived from federal 
financial aid funds provide by the HEA (P.L. 89–329). 
Examples of for-profit colleges are Capella University, DeVry University, 
University of Phoenix, and Kaplan University, among others, as well as many of the arts, 
bartending, and culinary schools across the country. For-profit colleges are also referred 
to as “education businesses” (Harnish 2012). 
The analysis here is based on the Congressional Record, advocacy materials, and 
federal lobbying and election contribution records, and key players in the reauthorization 
process will be interviewed to examine how the for-profit sector attempted to influence 
federal higher education legislation and the extent to which they were successful.  
 
Problem Statement 
During the decade that Congress worked to update the HEA, the lobbying 
industry grew. In 1998, spending on lobbying activities totaled $1.44 billion, of which 
more than $30 million was spent by education groups; lobbyists registered with the 
federal government totaled 10,689, of which 654 were registered lobbyists working on 
education-related issues. By 2007, spending on lobbying activities reached $281 billion, 
of which nearly $88 million was spent by education groups; 15,665 total lobbyists were 
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registered with the federal government, of which 1,691 were working on education-
related issues (Center for Responsive Politics, retrieved from www.opensecrets.org). 
Meanwhile, students attending for-profit colleges received a growing proportion 
of federal financial aid during that same time period.  For the academic school year 1997-
98, for-profit colleges received 12.2 percent of federal Pell Grants. By academic year 
2005-06, for-profit colleges received 18.6 percent of federal Pell Grants. During that 
same time period, the proportion of Pell Grant dollars at public four-year institutions 
declined from 36.4 percent to 31.6 percent (The College Board). Similar trends exist in 
campus-based aid programs, the Stafford loan programs, and the federal PLUS loan 
program.   
As the proportion of aid grew at for-profit colleges, the proportion of federal 
financial aid dispersed to public college students declined. Meanwhile higher education 
funding generally has experienced a shift within and into the system, and Tierney (2007) 
argues for-profit colleges “have tended to benefit from these developments” (p. 39). 
These changes include shifts in expenditures for higher education from governments and 
institutions to households and shifts in government subsidies for higher education from 
institutions to individuals.  
While the for-profit higher education model has existed for some time, the 
industry has expanded and grown tremendously in the past 20 years (Tierney 2007), in 
large part due to financial-aid and other higher-education policies at the state and federal 
levels.  In 2001, 766,000 students were enrolled in a for-profit college. By 2010, that 
number ballooned to 2.4 million, an increase of 225 percent. Meanwhile, during that 
same time period, enrollment grew by 31 percent at all associate or higher degree-
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granting higher education institutions (Lee 2012). During the 2000-2001 academic year, 
students attending for-profit colleges received $1.1 billion in Pell Grant assistance, and 
by the 2009-2010 academic year, students attending for-profit colleges received $7.5 
billion in Pell Grant assistance (U.S. Department of Education). From 2005 to 2010, the 
number of for-profit colleges grew from 909 institutions to 1,215 institutions, expanding 
from 20.7 percent of all institutions to 26.2 percent of all institutions (Jaschik 2011). 
According to a 2010 U.S. Senate report, in 2009, “profits at 16 of the largest for-profit 
schools totaled $2.7 billion” (Harkin). Using filing data from the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the same report stated, “The average operating profit in FY2005 
among publicly traded for-profit higher education companies was $127 million. The same 
number in FY2009 was $229 million, an increase of 81 percent. 
According to a 2009 Motley Fool stock review of ITT Educational Services, 
which offers technology-oriented undergraduate and graduate degree programs through 
its ITT Technical Institutes and Daniel Webster College, “All of these [for-profit school] 
companies are growing sales, profits, and enrollments by 20% or more… In ITT's case, 
sales grew 34% and net profit 50% year-over-year in the just completed third quarter. For 
2010, the company is expecting another 25% increase in sales and profits….For-profits 
enjoy juicy operating margins over 25%.” (http://caps.fool.com/Blogs/mfi-stock-review-
itt/298895). Shares of the Apollo Group Inc., the parent company of the University of 
Phoenix, more than doubled from 2006 to 2009 and revenue was $1.1 billion during the 
final quarter of 2009 (Golden 2009). A Forbes Magazine article described the Career 
Education Corporation, one of the large for-profit colleges, as “a company built to 
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swallow federal student assistance in the way a whale gathers up plankton” (Kruger 
2004). This growth is fueled by government funds. 
In fact, the foundation on which the for-profit college sector exists is based in the 
original Higher Education Act, which for the first time provided “direct aid to needy 
students” attending any college accredited by an entity recognized by the U.S. 
Department of Education (p. 115).  At the time, the Higher Education Act of 1965 was 
quite controversial as it was a major shift in the federal finance of higher education 
(Alexander, 1998). Chambers (1968) explained in summarizing the opposition to the Act 
of 1965 that the creation of direct aid to students would over-magnify the role of private 
education in the United States and actually contribute to the restriction of access by 
shifting the cost of higher education onto the student and their families, effectively 
reversing the common policy and practice at that time of providing access to college at 
zero or nominal cost. The public college sector also voiced concern that this shift in 
policy would over time increase tuition at untenable rates. It is interesting to note that 
perspective in current times as the debate over rising tuition, ballooning student loan 
debt, and the questions of who should pay for and who benefits from a college educated 
society intensifies. 
 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, prior to the Higher Education Act of 1965, 
Milton Friedman proposed that it was the individual who benefited from education and so 
should be central to choosing and paying for college (1955). This funding policy 
perspective and those that followed serve as the underpinning for the federal 
government’s “student choice” rationale and the practice in current higher education 
policy that funds the student, rather than the institution. This model, in which the funding 
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follows the student rather than flowing directly to the institution, led to the current 
environment, in which special interests lobby to encourage maximal participation in 
federal financial aid programs by the students who attend their institutions.  
For-profit colleges are heavily reliant on federal financial aid for their operations 
and bottom line profits (Sterling 2000; Berg 2005; Lederman 2009). The growth of 
financial aid programs, through grant and loan, have directly fueled the recent jump in 
profit margins, as well as their incentives to recruit more and more students to attend their 
institutions. Nearly all of the revenue of the for-profit college sector comes from federal 
financial aid programs. A concern about this fact created provisions in the HEA called 
the 85/15 Rule (later the 90/10 Rule), which mandated that no more than 85 percent (later 
90 percent) of a for-profit college’s revenue can come from Title IV federal student aid. 
With a majority of their revenues coming from government sources, for-profit colleges, 
therefore, are nearly completely dependent on the growth of financial aid programs for 
their revenue increases.  
For-profit colleges over the past several decades have worked to identify policies 
that inhibit growth and have sought to change those policies to enhance profits (Sterling 
2000; Tierney 2007). In addition, for-profit higher education institutions have embarked 
on academic endeavors that have traditionally belonged to non-profit higher education 
institutions, bringing them into competition for students and funding. This competition 
has also resulted in shifts in funding from public institutions to for-profit colleges. 
 The increased enrollment at for-profit colleges and the growing number of Pell 
grant recipients at for-profit colleges may be a confluence of several new realities 
including the aggressive way in which for-profit colleges recruit students who are eligible 
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for federal financial aid and the reduced enrollments of students at some state-supported 
institutions that have had to reduce their enrollments due to state budget situations 
(Lederman 2009).  Furthermore, for-profits are heavily reliant on federal financial aid for 
their operations and bottom line profits (Sterling 2000; Berg 2005; Lederman 2009). 
As the for-profit college industry grows, as these institutions receive a growing 
proportion of federal financial aid, and as these institutions become a more popular 
college choice for students from low-income families, concerns have been raised by 
policy makers, higher education policy leaders, and other stakeholders about the 
academic integrity of for-profit colleges and the value of a for-profit degree (Lederman 
2009).  These questions of academic integrity are not new concerns, as the for-profit 
higher education sector has been under close scrutiny for decades (Sperling 2000; Berg 
2005; Loonin and Devanthery 2005). Proponents of for-profit colleges have often had to 
defend themselves against the assertion that for-profit schools “are operated like 
businesses that emphasize profits at the expense of learning” (Kirp 2003).  
Furthermore, ongoing investigations and concerns about the operations of for-
profit education institutions have proliferated in recent years, especially regarding 
recruitment policies, fraud and abuse in the financial aid programs, and student loan 
default rates (Epstein 2009). Towards the beginning of the reauthorization debate, the 
Department of Education Inspector General at the time noted that “while fraud and abuse 
does occur at non-profit and public sector institutions, historically, fraud and abuse 
predominantly involves proprietary schools” (Higgins 2005), warning that rapid growth 
is a risk factor for abuse. 
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In 2008, employees of Kaplan University filed a whistleblower lawsuit accusing 
the institution of defrauding the federal government of $4 billion by enrolling unqualified 
students and padding enrollment figures (Blumenstyk 2008;). In 2009, the University of 
Phoenix settled a whistleblower lawsuit at a price of $80.5 million for “obtaining federal 
student-aid funds under false pretenses” (Blumenstyk 2009).  Increasingly the media and 
the general public have raised, issues related to student-loan burden of for-profit college 
students (Burd 2009). Burd points out that while the credit crash of 2008 led Sallie Mae 
to end their practice of offering subprime private educational loans to for-profit colleges 
students, for-profit colleges have since started offering private loans directly to students. 
Private educational loans do not carry the same terms as federal student loans, and, in a 
class action lawsuit filed in 2009, students at one for-profit allege they unwittingly took 
out private student loans that came with an 18 percent interest rate. In November 2009, 
National Public Radio’s Marketplace ran a two-part series on for-profit colleges, 
including a special focus on questionable lending and recruitment practices. The report 
raised concerns that students take out large student loans to attend institutions like the 
University of Phoenix. Many students then are unable or unwilling to pay the loans back 
–  leading to larger default rates in the for-profit sector than in the non-profit sector. 
Some students, according to the report, were even led to believe that their student loans 
were grants and were obviously surprised to learn that their “free” college education – 
that they soon learned was “despised by the academic and professional world” –  actually 
came with tens of thousands of dollars in debt (Burd 2009). In more recent months and 
years since the reauthorization, concern about loan default rates has surfaced, as well 
(Harkin 2010). 
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Questions about academic integrity and fraudulent behavior have raised important 
ethical questions for policy makers and higher education leaders.  Shifts in federal 
financial aid and related policies, as well as the parallel growth of the for-profit higher 
education and lobbying industries, raise important questions about the factors that result 
in changes in federal policies relative to the groups that benefit and are interested in such 
policy changes.   Over the last several reauthorizations, the for-profit college sector’s 
access to federal student financial aid has been a source of debate and discussion. On one 
side of the debate, policy makers and for-profit college advocates see this as a “free 
market” approach harkening back to Milton Friedman’s (1955) policy stance on the role 
of government in education. On the other side of the debate is a concern over fraud and 
abuse in the financial aid programs, which has led to a number of provisions in law that 
restrict, or at the very least monitor, access to federal financial aid funding by for-profit 
colleges.  
 
Research Question 
It is important that we understand the ways in which for-profit colleges access and 
influence elected officials who in turn write and pass federal legislation that affects how 
federal financial aid is dispersed and the amount of federal financial aid made available to 
students.  Given the limited research on for-profit higher education institutions and the 
uncertainty in the current literature about how interest-groups exactly influence the 
federal policy process, this project provides insights on how higher education policy is 
shaped. 
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The question driving this research: To what extent did for-profit higher education 
interest-groups influence policy discussions about and changes to the most recent 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? To answer the question, I developed a set of 
probing questions to ascertain the specific policy agenda items that for-profit education, 
as a special interest-group, was most concerned about during the development of 
reauthorization legislation, with the aim of understanding what methods for-profit 
education used to place their policy items on the reauthorization agenda, and determining 
the effectiveness of for-profit education in advancing its preferred policy agenda. The 
probing questions are: Which organizations and individuals were most involved in setting 
the policy agenda for the discussion, development and passage of the legislation that 
resulted in the 2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? What policy issues did 
the for-profit education special interest-group attempt to place on the agenda of the 
Higher Education Act reauthorization? How did the for-profit education special interest-
group attempt to influence policy makers during the 2008 reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act? In what ways was the for-profit education special interest-group 
successful in its influence of the final legislation that resulted in the 2008 reauthorization 
of the Higher Education Act? In what ways was the for-profit education special interest-
group not successful in its influence of the final legislation that resulted in the 2008 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
Methodological Overview 
The “lobbying as legislative subsidy” theory serves as the framework for this 
investigation (Hall and Deardorff, 2006). The theory encompasses the fundamentals of 
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the policy process, including issue definition, agenda setting, and influence, but goes 
further by suggesting that lobbying subsidizes the limited resources of specific legislators 
– namely those legislators who already sympathize with a special interest-group’s policy 
agenda.  
This study applies qualitative analysis to answer the above questions. Data for the 
study were derived from documents and interviews from a specific setting (the House 
Education and Workforce Committee), about a set period in time (the reauthorization of 
the HEA during the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses). Utilizing Miles and Huberman’s (1994) 
components of qualitative analysis, the analysis includes data reduction, data display, and 
conclusion drawing and verification. 
 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the issue, problem statement, research 
questions to be answered, and the method used to answer the questions. Chapter 2 
reviews the literature related to interest-groups and influence, as well as the role of higher 
education as an interest-group.  Chapter 3 presents the studies conceptual framework and 
explains the method and research design employed to answer the research questions. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings, and Chapter 5 provides a discussion and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
A review of political science literature provides an appropriate framework for the 
understanding of and inquiry into how the higher education community, as an organized 
group, attempts to influence policy at the federal level, and the extent to which the higher 
education community is effective at accomplishing its goals to affect federal policies.  
The following sections specifically explore interest-groups and their influence. 
It is important to mention, however, that the study of interest-groups and their 
influence is somewhat problematic (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  While some research 
has suggested that groups are at the heart of the political system (Bauer, Poole, and 
Dexter 1963; Milbrath 1963; Dexter 1969; Baumgartner, et al 2009), other research has 
suggested groups are insignificant in the political process (Schlozman and Tierney 1981; 
Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin 2012).  As Arnold (1982) suggests, this area of study 
was theory-rich but data-poor for a period of time.  The development of interest-group 
and lobbying theories has not been without some major differences and divergences that 
over time have led to conflicting and changing theories and models for testing them. As 
described in previous literature reviews (e.g. Baumgartner and Leech 1996), the 
development of interest-group, influence, and lobbying tactic theories in political science 
scholarship has been imprecise and incomplete.  Some political science researchers 
contend that this imprecision, compounded by a willingness of some political scientists to 
overgeneralize, has led to the creation of sets of conflicting theories. Baumgartner and 
Leech (1996) also suggest that one explanation for this conflict may be the use of cross-
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sectional rather than longitudinal models in the study of interest-group, influence, and 
lobbying-tactics theory.  Twenty years ago, Arnold (1982) argued that data collection 
required to study interest-groups had been expensive and difficult, which contributed to 
gaps, imprecision, and conflicting theories.  
A review of relevant literature shows, in general, a great deal of consensus during 
the 1940s and 1950s about the importance and role of group influence in the political 
process.  During the 1950s and 1960s, some findings suggested that groups had little 
influence over decision-making, resulting in a lull in the study of interest-group influence 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Then in the 1980s and into the 1990s, the study of the influence 
of interest-groups experienced a resurgence. The following sections review the 
development of political science theory as it relates to groups and influence, exploring the 
concepts of groups, lobbying, and influence (including political action committees), 
while synthesizing the various theories, models, and the types of evidence used to test the 
various perspectives on interest-group influence and lobbying activities. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of higher education as an interest-group. 
 
Interest groups 
At the foundation of interest-group and lobbying theories is the notion of a 
“group.” Arthur Bentley (1908), the founder of modern group theory in politics, 
suggested that groups organize to further a common interest or set of common interests.  
As Bentley stated, “there is no group without its interest.  An interest, as the term will be 
used in this work, is the equivalent of a group…The group and the interest are not 
separate” (p. 211).  The goals of the group are of common interest, and everyone in the 
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group benefits from the accomplishment of the goals (Olson 1965).  Jack Walker (1983) 
suggests that “mutually reinforcing factors” cause the rise of groups, while Truman 
(1962) suggests that groups are created during “social upheaval.” In addition, the creation 
of federal government programs has created sets of supportive or oppositional groups that 
exist to influence those who make decisions about these programs and to protect the 
interests that benefit from these government programs. Leech, et al. (2005) refers to the 
“magnet” of government activity that pulls groups to become active. Recent studies of the 
federal government, have shown that there has not only been a growth of government, but 
also growth in the number of distinct policy areas in which the federal government has 
become involved (Baumgartner, Jones, & McLeod 2002). In their study of groups, Leech, 
et al. (2005) found that growth of government leads to incentives for groups to mobilize, 
whether in support or opposition of policy issues. 
Over time, several similar terms have emerged that all refer to this same concept 
of “group” in the context of interaction with the government, including pressure group, 
interest-group, lobbying group, and advocacy group. While these terms refer to the same 
concept, researchers have also suggested various classifications of groups.  For example, 
in his study of lobbyists in Oklahoma, Patterson (1963) developed six classifications: 
business interests, farm interests, labor interests, professional interests, governmental 
interests, and other interests (such as religious groups, civic groups, and demographic 
groups). Each of these interest-groups works to advance a set of common interests and 
goals in order to influence decision makers. 
Regardless of classification, any group that makes an assertion to or attempts to 
influence a government institution becomes a “political interest-group” (Truman, 1962).  
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When the group is successful in its influence and accomplishes its goal, its interests 
prevail over those of other groups and individuals, which causes conflict (Crane 1960; 
Hacker 1962; Latham 1952).  Inherent in conflict is the notion of power.  A group that 
attempts to influence government must be able to wield power. Without power, the group 
would not be able to advance its interests. Ziegler (1964), like others, suggests that group 
power is “the ability to get what one wishes out of politics” (p. iv).  Dahl (1957) explains 
the measure of a group’s power as the difference between a specific outcome had the 
group taken action or had the group not taken any action.   
A number of studies have measured a group’s political power and effectiveness 
by looking at the number of successes compared to the number of actions taken. (Dahl 
1957; Francis 1962; March 1957). Longley (1967) identified five factors of group 
effectiveness: potentialities (factors such as the group’s societal standing and the nature 
of the governmental institutions), its relation to other groups, its goals, it maximization of 
capacities, and its tactics. In his study on interest-group interaction, he focused on the 
patterns of interaction between interest-groups and found that groups with ongoing 
alliances with other groups develop strength in their efforts, while those groups that are 
often in conflict and do not have alliances are not as successful or effective in reaching 
their goals. 
Early group theory suggested inherent power and effectiveness of interest-groups, 
contending that an elected official’s vote on a particular issue and his or her “ideas, 
principles, prejudices, programs, precepts, slogans, and preachments” (Latham, 1952, p. 
390) all correspond to and are influenced by those of the dominant group among his or 
her constituencies. Early observations such as this assumed relatively powerful influence 
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of groups on legislative decision-making, and interest-groups were considered to be at 
“the core of the political system” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996, p. 1). Studies 
investigating the phenomenon of interest-groups and their influence through collective 
action dominated 1950s and 1960s political science studies.  
In 1965, however, Mancur Olson brought a new approach to group theory and 
challenged the notion that interest-groups – in particular, large interest-groups – act on 
behalf of a common good or interest. He argued that individuals act collectively, as part 
of a group, for the benefit of private interests or goods, rather than the collective or 
“common” good. Olson introduced a distinction between private goods and collective 
goods and argued that this distinction was critical to understanding the mobilization of 
interest-groups and the resulting influence. Olson’s work was a point of departure in 
political science research at the time, demonstrating that not all groups had equal access 
to influence. Olson showed that the group system favored those with resources and that 
economically disadvantaged groups that worked for a common good could not overcome 
the obstacles to mobilize their members, as other groups could. This assertion led the 
political science field down a new path to examine a more focused set of ideas pertaining 
to internal dynamics of group influence, such as mobilization and campaign 
contributions, rather than external dynamics such as the process of influence of decision 
makers (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  
Olson’s work, combined with studies during the same time period that showed the 
relative ineffectiveness of interest-groups and their attempts and success in influencing 
decision makers in the legislative process, led to a quiet period throughout the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. A resurgence in the late 1970s occurred after the Federal Election 
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Campaign Act of 1971 and subsequent amendments were signed into law. The federal 
law required increased disclosure of financial contributions for federal campaigns, and 
the 1974 amendments placed legal limits on federal campaign contributions and created 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which was charged with enforcing the law.  
These new public disclosure requirements and a federal agency to collect and store this 
information created new opportunities for political scientists to gather and study large 
data sets on groups, and reinvigorated the study of interest-group influence and their 
external activities, such as lobbying. 
 
Interest-group Lobbying 
Lobbying has been identified as an important element in the external activities of 
interest-groups and in the legislative process. In fact, as Eulau (1964) put it so eloquently, 
“American politics is inconceivable without interest-groups, and interest-groups are 
inconceivable without lobbying. Without lobbying, interest-groups could not perform the 
function of interest articulation that is required for the maintenance of the American 
political system as we know it…” (p. 27). 
Lobbying can have several meanings, but for the purposes of this paper lobbying 
refers to one type of strategy aimed at a government entity that interest-groups employ in 
order to influence a policy maker’s decision-making on a particular policy issue.  As 
Milbrath (1963) explains, there are four “boundaries” that help to define the term 
“lobbying.” First, lobbying applies only to governmental decision-making, and not to the 
decision-making of private organizations or corporations. Second, lobbying occurs when 
there is intent to influence. Third, in the act of lobbying, there is an intermediary actor – a 
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lobbyist – attempting to influence on behalf of citizens or a group of citizens. Individual 
citizens are not considered “lobbyists.”  Finally, Milbrath, says that lobbying requires 
communication of information, specifically communication that intends to influence.  
There are many contexts in which lobbying can occur, such as in state government, local 
government, and the Executive Branch, among others.  For purposes of this paper, 
lobbying will refer specifically to the attempt to influence the Congressional legislative 
process.  Lobbying can occur at various stages in the legislative process, and interest-
group lobbying activities include involvement in the formulation of bills to create or 
amend laws, participation in Congressional committee hearings and markups, and finally 
attempts to influence floor action and conference committee negotiations (Wright 1996).   
Also, for the purposes of this analysis, another term that will be useful to define 
for this paper is “lobbyist” – which will simply refer to the person who attempts on behalf 
of an interest-group to influence the decision-making of a policy maker on a particular 
policy issue. A lobbyist may engage directly in the activities listed above and in some 
instances engage the interest-group’s national spokesperson, president, or a regular 
member to participate in these activities. An interest-group and their lobbyists can direct 
their efforts to gain access and to influence at three types of elected officials: those who 
already support the group’s position, those who do not support the group’s position, or 
those who do not yet have a known position (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). Scholars 
have studied the various ways in which interest-groups try to access and influence these 
types of legislators (including sharing strategic information or making campaign 
contributions) and the extent to which interest-groups are successful. 
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Early perspectives on lobbying explored this activity in a variety of ways. Some 
political scientists, recognizing that group process is important to the democratic 
decision-making process in the United States, explored lobbying as an aspect of group 
process  (e.g. Bentley 1908; Truman 1951), as discussed above. Scholars such as Stephen 
K. Bailey (1950) and Earl Latham (1952) explored lobbying as a part of the decision 
process for a single bill or particular issue through case studies. Other scholars, such as 
Philip Taft (1964), examined lobbying through the changing behavior of group process in 
politics due to changes in structures and behavior of groups –  both specific groups and 
types of groups. 
In addition to political scientists’ interest in the lobbying process, Congress has 
also taken an interest in the form of investigations of lobbying activities. The first 
Congressional investigations of lobbying took place in 1913 (Tompkins 1956), and 
continue to this day, as in the now-infamous activities of lobbyist Jack Abramoff, which 
came to light in 2006.  The first federal legislation regulating lobbying activities –  the 
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act –  passed Congress in 1946 as part of the 
Congressional Reorganization Act.  This legislation required for the first time that 
lobbyists be required to register and to report income and expenditures, and included 
criminal penalties for noncompliance. Since 1946, there have been several lobbying 
reform efforts, including in 1992 and in 2007. 
Early studies exploring the impact of lobbying attempted to create models in order 
to analyze the lobbying elements of the group process in legislative influence. For 
example, Milbrath (1960) suggested that a communications model could help explain the 
role of lobbying in attempts by interest-groups to influence legislative decision-making. 
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In his interview of more than 100 lobbyists and 38 people in Congress, Milbrath 
attempted to construct a framework for how lobbying fits into the legislative decision-
making process as a whole. Milbrath argued that legislators, like everyone else, have a set 
of predispositions that influence their willingness to receive certain kinds of information 
– a “perceptual screen” – that allows some information through and stops other 
information. Lobbyists and interest-groups therefore cannot rely solely on access to a 
decision maker, but they must also be able to present information in a way that can pass 
through the “perceptual screens” of the decision makers they are attempting to influence.  
Milbrath found that, in order for lobbyists to break through this screen, they used 
three types of communication: facts, arguments, and power. He found that lobbyists and 
interest-groups use facts to explain how a certain action will affect the group. The facts, 
however, are complemented by a set of arguments in support of the group’s position that 
help to explain why a particular position is the right one.  Finally, lobbyists and groups 
attempt to communicate power – both overt, such as campaign contributions and the 
“power of the voting polls,” and subtle, such as grassroots letter-writing campaigns that 
engage the elected officials’ constituents and coalition building with other like-minded 
groups. In his interviews, Milbrath also found three types of communication tactics 
present in lobbying activities: 1) direct personal communication between the lobbyist and 
member of Congress or staff, 2) communication through intermediaries, and 3) attempts 
to keep communication channels open. Direct communication includes presentations of 
arguments and research, as well as testimony at official Congressional committee 
hearings. Communication through intermediaries may involve strategies that include a 
decision-maker’s constituencies or personal friends through letter-writing campaigns, 
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public relations campaigns, and the publication of voting records. Attempts to keep 
communication channels open may include hosting fundraisers, contributing political 
campaign money, or volunteering to work on a political campaign, or collaborating with 
other groups to build a coalition on a particular issue. 
Whereas Milbrath’s work found that interest-groups, via lobbyists, prefer face-to- 
face communication of facts and arguments, his research also suggested that the growth 
of lobbying creates competition for the time and attention of members of Congress, 
requiring that groups find access to decision makers through intermediaries and develop 
ways to communicate the interests of a particular group. The model of lobbying as 
communication, which received some criticism for being too simplistic (e.g. Eulau 1964), 
was an initial attempt to build a foundation for an understanding of the significance of 
information in the lobbying process.  The body of political science research in this area 
built and improved upon the notion of lobbying as communication.  
For example, a study examining the communication flow in the Michigan House of 
Representatives found that interest-groups who want to influence the legislative process 
need to affect the flow of information to the elected official (Porter 1974). Porter found 
that due, to the need for information and the short time frame in which elected officials 
need relevant information and advice, those groups or individuals who can provide 
information can influence legislative decisions. His study supported previous work, such 
as Milbrath’s, that found personal presentations, providing research and data, and 
attending committee hearings are the best ways to provide information and attempt to 
influence the legislative process. It can be difficult for an interest-group to reach all 
members of a legislative body, and Porter’s work showed that intermediaries, such as 
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“expert” legislators who are members of the legislative body and may have already have 
specific knowledge or interest about the policy issue, can communicate and translate 
information and positions to other members of the legislative body through a process 
called the two-step flow of communication. In fact, the presence of an expert appears to 
make influencing the legislative process less complicated, because these expert 
legislators can serve as important access points for interest-group lobbying tactics. 
While some groups and lobbying efforts may be focused on presenting facts and 
arguments to members of Congress, as well as using expert legislators as access points, 
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963), in their 10-year study of foreign trade policy created new 
points of departure for the study of the structure and process of interest-group influence 
on politics on a number of fronts. First, their study showed that the relationship between 
economic self-interest and an issue position advocated by an interest-group is weak 
enough to suggest that other factors, in addition to or more than any economic self-
interest, may influence a policy position of an interest-group.  Their study also showed 
that those affected by a policy issue are more likely to take action in the political process 
through letter writing or other demonstration of opinion if they are expecting to lose 
something, rather than gain, due to any changes in policy. Their study revealed the social 
process of decision-making in the legislative process. For example, interest-groups are 
more likely to communicate with decision makers who agree with them, rather than 
“enemies.” One of the reasons for this phenomenon is the lack of resources. Groups 
concentrate on their friends and engage in public relations activities that show their 
support for their “friends” rather than exerting pressure on enemies. And, finally, the 
study showed how the Congressional process permits legislators to decide what 
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communication they hear from which groups. The views of elected officials, therefore, 
are formed by existing loyalties and previous commitments, suggesting that decision-
makers are more in control of the influence of lobbying and interest-groups than subject 
to the attempts to influence. Studies of the U.S. Senate (Matthews, 1960) and of interest-
groups (Zeigler, 1964) revealed similar findings. Matthews argued that most lobbying of 
U.S. Senators was directed at those “already convinced” about a position on a certain 
issue. In his studies of interest-groups in the 1960s, Zeigler found a lobbyist’s ability to 
influence “depends more upon the degree to which legislators agree with the professed 
ideals of the group…than upon the ability of the lobbyist to manipulate or persuade” (p. 
267-268).  Meanwhile, Milbrath (1963) argued in his study of lobbyist in Washington 
that lobbying has relatively little influence on the policy process and that lobbying mostly 
only affects the legislative process when the issue is specialized in nature and affects a 
small part of the population.  Dexter (1969, p. 63) in his study of group representation by 
lobbyists in Washington argued that “most lobbyists, most of the time, act to reinforce, 
strengthen, aid, and reassure congressmen and their staff who tend to be on their side.” 
Much of the research in the 1960s resulted in a shared view among political scientists that 
interest-groups and their lobbyists were mere “service bureaus” – sources of information 
– for elected officials that already shared similar views with the interest-group on a 
certain policy issue.  This “path of least resistance” was explained by Hayes (1981) as 
necessary for interest-groups to maintain and attract members. Hayes argued that it was 
more important for interest-groups to access friendly members of Congress than to “win” 
an issue. He explains, “groups that pressure or antagonize policymakers may forfeit 
access and thus lose the symbolic benefits of being consulted” (p. 86). 
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Though political science research in the late 1950s and 1960s suggested that the 
lobbying strategies of interest-groups had little substantive influence over the legislative 
process, beginning in the late 1970s there was a resurgence in interest among political 
scientists to study the relevancy of interest-groups. Despite findings that rejected the 
influence of pressure groups on the political process, a growing group of researchers 
began to suggest that there was a lack of understanding about the role of interest-groups 
in the Congressional process. In addition, the growth of interest-group presence in 
Washington, the signing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 into law and 
other Congressional concerns about the influence of lobbying, and the increasingly 
competitive nature of campaigns that led to the growth of campaign contributions through 
political action committees (PAC’s), revealed a need to find a better explanation for the 
role of the interest-group beyond the notion of the “service bureau.” For example, 
Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) argued that while earlier studies such as Milbrath 
(1960) and Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) suggested that interest-groups did not achieve 
influence through pressure, there was no attempt to provide an explanation for how 
groups achieve access and influence or the targets and tactics of their access and 
influence. Studies in the 1980s and 1990s attempted to do just that. 
 
Access and Influence 
As Wright (1996) suggests, “access is absolutely critical to any successful 
lobbying campaign and, along with influence, is one the principal objectives of organized 
interests” (p. 76).  Interest-groups and lobbyists attempt to access and influence decision 
makers in order to expand the coalition of members of Congress who support their policy 
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position and to shape the content of a legislative proposal as it moves through the 
Congressional process (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). Wright, in his explanation of access 
and influence, acknowledges the ambiguity of these two terms. In fact, different 
researchers have developed different definitions for access, sometimes blurring one term 
into the other. Some researchers have simply defined access as establishing contact with a 
member of Congress or a Congressional staff member, and have measured this definition 
of access by the number of meetings or number of minutes with a certain Congressional 
office (Berry 1984; Langbein 1986). Makielski (1980) defined access in four ways: 1) 
convincing a decision maker to listen to facts and arguments, 2) developing a “regular 
relationship” with a decision maker to exchange information, 3) becoming 
“institutionalized” into the policy process, and 4) gaining “influence”.  Hansen (1991) 
suggests that access is “a close working relationship between members of Congress and 
privileged outsiders” (p. 22). Schlozman and Tierney (1986) argue that the ideas of 
access and influence are not “fully separable” (p. 165).  In his explanation of this 
relationship between access and influence, Wright suggests a continuum to capture the 
relationship between the two concepts of access and influence. On one end of the 
continuum is “no access” and at the other end is “influence.”  A group or lobbyist has no 
access to communicate with a decision maker – either by failed attempts or by choice.  In 
this instance, a group may have no reason to be associated with a specific policy maker, 
or the group may be “perceived as unreliable or untrustworthy” (Wright, p. 77). In the 
middle of the continuum is “access,” which can be achieved at two levels – through 
positioning or messaging. At the positioning level, interest-groups and lobbyists establish 
connections in a very general sense and do not attempt to influence support or opposition 
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to a policy issue, but rather the intent is simply to form good relationships.  Milbrath 
originally explained this kind of activity in his studies that showed lobbying activities as 
means to keep communication channels open.   
The next step on Wright’s continuum – access at the messaging level – suggests 
that an interest-group or lobbyist is able to now share facts and arguments about specific 
legislation issues meant to gain the support of the policy maker. This second level of 
lobbying is a relatively small part of the overall process (Birnbaum 1992). Birnbaum 
argues that most of a lobbyist’s time is spent obtaining access through networking and 
“learning the lay of the legislative landscape” (p. 25).   
The final point on Wright’s access-influence continuum is influence. Influence 
can either maintain and reinforce a legislator’s position on a policy issue or change the 
direction of a legislator’s position.  This explanation of influence explains the difference 
between influence and access. Access simply suggests that an interest-group or lobbyist 
may be “in a position to affect legislator’s beliefs, not that beliefs have actually been 
altered, maintained, or reinforced” (Wright, p. 81). Wright argues that the difficulty in 
measuring and discerning beliefs has made the study of influence challenging, and that 
researchers have relied instead on measuring access- a relatively more tangible 
measurement. This difficulty seems to have contributed to the contradictions and gaps in 
theories of group influence in relation to the Congressional process. 
The idea that interest-groups and lobbyists will attempt to influence a change in a 
policy maker’s position to align with the interest-group on a particular issue runs counter 
to the interest-group models discussed earlier in this paper, such as Bauer, Pool, and 
Dexter. In fact, in 1994 Austen-Smith and Wright challenged earlier studies that had 
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suggested that legislators only hear from interest-groups that support their positions, and 
therefore have little influence over the legislative process. Referring to the dominant 
findings in the 1960s, Austen-Smith and Wright state: “These conclusions leave us 
wondering why it is that groups bother to lobby at all. If the impact of lobbying on 
legislation is negligible, if groups seldom attempt to persuade legislators, and if the flow 
information from groups to representatives is imperfect and distorted, it is surprising 
indeed that we observe the trends in heightened group activity that are so prevalent 
today” (p. 42). 
In their study of a U.S. Supreme Court nomination in 1987, Austen-Smith and 
Wright found that interest-groups lobbied both supportive and oppositional legislators, 
and had considerable influence in changing the minds of legislators, not just reinforcing 
positions. In addition, they suggested that when groups lobby their “friends” they are 
being strategic and counteractive. In other words, interest-groups had to “counteract the 
influence that influence of opposing groups who lobbied the same Senators” (1994, p. 
42). In their study of how interest-groups decide whom to lobby in Congress, Hojnacki 
and Kimball (1998) found that interest-groups first lobby those members on committees 
of jurisdiction who are friendly to their policy position on an issue. Those members of 
Congress then in turn lobby their colleagues. Studies have found that groups attempt to 
persuade decision makers not only to take a certain position, but also to participate 
actively and work in support of the group (Hall and Wayman 1990; Scheier and Gross 
1993).  Hojnacki and Kimball also found that those interest-groups with more resources, 
especially those that have an affiliated PAC’s, are better able and more likely to expand 
beyond those members friendly to their positions and reach out to undecided committee 
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members and even those legislators who are oppositional to their policy positions, 
especially when groups have existing and strong support in other Congressional districts, 
in the form of lobbying and grassroots engagement of an elected official’s constituents 
(1998, 1999, and 2001).   
In terms of “counteractive lobbying,” as developed by Austen-Smith and Wright 
(1994), Hojnacki and Kimball (1999) believed their study of decisions of whom to lobby 
shows that counteractive lobbying in more prevalent at later stages in the legislative 
process and that groups strategically target their friends who serve on committees of 
jurisdiction towards the beginning of the legislative process in order to influence early 
drafts of legislative language and to counter unfriendly amendments that may occur 
further down the process. 
In their study of the Labor-Air Carriers Committee and the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States, Constain and Constain (1981) argued that studies of the 
1950s and 1960s “emphasized a narrow spectrum of group activity, leading to a 
potentially serious understatement of group influence” (p. 270). Merely focusing on 
communications, interaction, and power as measures of influence led to findings that 
“proved” the ineffectiveness of groups. Constain and Constain argued that interest-
groups, as aggregators of various policy demands, narrow the number of policy options 
and therefore the alternatives presented to Congress. An important activity of interest-
groups is then to resolve conflict about an issue, making it more likely that Congress will 
take on the issue. Constain and Constain argued that scholars in the 1940s and 1950s 
incorporated this notion of interest-group as aggregator, only for the scholars of the 1960s 
to drop this measure of influence and to focus on communication as influence. For 
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example, Almond and Powell (1980) argued a “four-point typology” that well describes 
interest-group actions studied in the 1940s and 1950s: influential interest-groups 
aggregate by mobilizing resources, combining all of their demands into a smaller set of 
policy alternatives, bargaining, and forming coalitions. Other studies of that time period 
studied the narrowing of policy alternatives. Riggs (1950) coined to term “catalytic 
groups” to describe the framework in which negotiation, bargaining, and compromise on 
a specific policy issue took place, where the interest-groups serving as a “gate-keeper” on 
issue positions. A number of studies during that time noted the extent to which groups 
worked to reduce conflict and disagreement and work towards cooperation on a specific 
policy issue (e.g. Bailey, 1950; Eldersveld, 1958; Garceau, 1958; Gross, 1953), while 
building alliances among different interest-groups (e.g. Berry 1977; Cherington and 
Gillen 1962; McCune 1956; Riggs 1950).   
These strategies of coalition building and issue compromise seem to be important 
and influential parts of the policy making process. Scholars recognized the need to further 
consider these ideas, and studies in the 1970s began to once again incorporate these 
phenomena. In fact, studies by Price (1978) and Hayes (1978) found that the higher the 
level of the conflict, the less likely it is that Congress will act on a particular issue.  In her 
study of how interest-group lobbying affected policy outcomes related to consideration of 
a bill in a U.S. House of Representative committee, Evans (1996) found that conflict 
among coalition groups negatively affected their ability to influence.  The interest-groups 
tried to resolve conflict and come to consensus on policy before speaking with committee 
staff. When the groups could not come to agreement before lobbying committee staff, the 
groups then attempted to use committee staff to resolve differences in policy positions.  
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The findings of this study also indicated that when there is no conflict among interest-
groups, interest-groups are most likely to influence policy decisions in their direction, 
which seems to have important implications for differences in how organized and 
unorganized groups influence policy. These studies suggest the important role of interest-
groups as policy aggregators and the need to understand how the interest-group process 
works and influences the political process.  
In his study of the lobbying activities of the National Education Association 
during the spring and summer of 1977, Richard Smith (1984) argued that the 
interpretation process by a member of Congress is an important variable in policy 
formation – both through direct interpretation as well as indirect interpretation through 
“cue taking” of other legislators’ positions.  In addition, he suggested that two other 
variables affect a member’s position on an issue: personal understanding of how a certain 
position will help them accomplish their own goals and their public explanation of the 
position and issue to their constituencies.  Members of Congress, Smith argues, seek 
information and develop interpretations about different positions until they find a position 
that will yield a “good enough” outcome. Interest-groups, therefore, work to provide 
information to help “construct interpretations” for members of Congress. Interest-groups 
present various pieces of information in various ways.  These “presentations” can be 
easily manipulated considering that it is assumed that opposing groups are advocating 
different interpretations. Smith argues that not all presentations are susceptible to 
manipulation given that there may be high levels of historical agreement between the 
member of Congress and a particular interest-group. The ability of an interest-group to 
develop the desired interpretation depends on the level of “resource advantage” – both 
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quality and quantity and the time available for any advocacy efforts needed. As Kingdon 
(1973) has argued, much more time is needed to persuade or communicate with those 
members of Congress that have not historically or regularly been supportive of an 
interest-group’s position, and members of Congress are much more likely to pay attention 
to those interest-groups with which they have historically agreed. Hojancki and Kimball 
(1998) found that a slower legislative process allows for more time to influence members 
through direct lobbying.  
The findings from Smith’s study also established that variance in an interest-
group’s ability to influence depends on aspects over which they have little control, 
including the legislative situations in which policy issues are considered, such as changes 
to the original policy proposal included in amendments, motions to recommit, conference 
reports, and presidential vetoes.  Smith argued that interest-group influence, therefore, 
could be “both substantial and fragile,” depending on the legislative situation.  Smith’s 
study demonstrates how fragile the process can be, and, therefore, the difficult nature of 
successfully influencing the process once it has progressed to the point of floor 
consideration, conference committee, or presidential veto override.  Interest-group 
influence tends to be most evident and strongest in Congressional committees where 
there is less public focus on the policy process (Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and 
Kimball 1999; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Wright 1990). Interest-groups attempt to 
influence the chairs and ranking members of the committee of jurisdiction – those 
members that hold the most power and influence over the committee of jurisdiction and 
set the policy agenda that will be considered by Congress (Austen-Smith and Wright 
1994; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Kingdon 1989; Rothenberg 1991; Wright 1990). 
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Other studies have suggested that the ability of an interest-group to influence the 
Congressional process may also be affected by other factors that contribute to the 
legislative decision-making process.  Similar to Smith’s explanation of factors 
influencing the decision-making process, Fenno (1973) explained that a legislator’s 
decisions are motivated by reelection, good public policy, and his or her own ability to 
influence the process within Congress. In order to get re-elected, a member of Congress 
has to make or help make good policy, and in order to accomplish good policy he or she 
must be able to influence the process. Hall (1992) developed a model by which to 
measure a legislator’s influence using surveys administered to Congressional staff that 
explains the relationship between a legislator’s beliefs and legislative outcomes. The 
instrument, however, does not measure influence of outside interest-groups.   
Hansen (1991) argues that when interest-groups can provide political intelligence 
about constituents that could affect elections, a legislator is more willing to consider the 
interest-group’s policy issues and arguments.  One way in which groups deliver this 
information to members of Congress is through grassroots mobilization.  Grassroots 
activities, such as letter writing campaigns, phone calls, and similar activities, provide 
electoral information to members of Congress through their constituencies (Wright 
1996). This kind of mobilization also can create an opportunity for interest-groups to 
counter the status quo of a policy position (Evans 1996). As these new interests become 
involved in the process, changes in policy can occur, including changes in the policy 
positions of a member of Congress that are more in line with those of the interest-group. 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Goldstein (1999) argues that an explosion of citizen 
communication through grassroots mobilization provides information to voters and 
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legislators as a way to influence elections or the outcome of specific pieces of legislation.  
Hojnacki and Kimball (1999) found that interest-groups are more likely to engage in a 
combination of grassroots campaigns and direct lobbying to influence policy than using 
one tactic over the other. Depending on the target of their tactics and the target’s policy 
position, groups will utilize grassroots, direct lobbying, or a combination in order to 
access and influence a decision maker. 
The ability of a legislator to influence the legislative process requires knowledge 
of the policy issues, as well as knowledge of the politics of alternative decisions and 
competing ideas (Truman, 1951). In addition, Wright (1996) argues that the legislator has 
to have knowledge about the legislative process, such as how other members of Congress 
will respond to a specific position on a policy issue. A legislator’s ideology, in addition to 
the legislator’s knowledge, may also affect an interest-group’s ability to influence the 
Congressional process (Jackson and Kingdon 1992). All of these “uncertainties” as 
Wright refers to them, are opportunities for interest-groups to provide information, 
reduce “uncertainty”, and therefore influence the legislative process. In his investigations 
of how Washington works, Hendrick Smith (1988) found that legislators acknowledge 
this important relationship of information exchange, and some hold the belief that some 
lobbyists are sometimes more informed about a specific policy issue than members of 
Congress and their staff. In fact, some lobbyists feel that their job can be to serve as an 
extension of a member’s legislative staff (Smith 1988).  
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Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy 
Hall and Deardorff (2006) build on Smith’s (1988) concept and argue a model of 
“lobbying as legislative subsidy” rather than the traditional exchange or persuasion 
models discussed above. In a legislative-subsidy process interest-groups provide allies 
with information, political intelligence, and legislative labor in order to achieve shared 
goals.  The sharing of information and the value of legislative labor have been discussed.   
The lobbyist or interest-group is, therefore, seen as an extension of the elected official’s 
legislative staff. Hall and Deardorff developed a set of assumptions about this theory 
based on earlier studies by other researchers. First, a legislator, in order to have influence, 
has to work at being influential (e.g. Evans 1991; Hall 1996; Wawro 2000). Second, a 
legislator’s resources are scarce (e.g. Salisbury and Shepsle 1981). Third, legislators care 
about influencing more than one policy at a time (e.g. Evans 1989; Fenno 1973). Fourth, 
legislators prioritize some policy issues over other issues (e.g. Hall 1996; Sinclair 1989). 
And, finally, lobbyists are specialists, who focus on a few issues, especially compared to 
legislators, who pay attention to many issues (e.g. Esterling 2004). Hall and Deardorff 
explain it best: “lobbyists freely but selectively provide labor, policy information, and 
political intelligence to likeminded but resource-constrained legislators” (p. 75). 
Political Action Committees (PAC’s) 
Hall and Deardorff (2006) also acknowledge the role of moneyed interests in the 
influence process by hypothesizing that PAC contributions “indirectly facilitate the 
process of subsidizing legislators by buying access” (p. 80). They suggest the need to 
further understand the consequences of this kind of access. In their legislative subsidy 
model, they hypothesize that one of the consequences is an opportunity for a lobbyist to 
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offer assistance rather than to ask for something, such as a vote on a specific piece of 
legislation. This legislative subsidy suggests that the use of money to buy access works 
best, and perhaps only, when legislators and interest-groups share a position on an issue 
and have a common objective. 
Influence over the legislative process can be at least partially understood through 
the investigation of moneyed interests. In this mutual exchange, members of Congress 
benefit from financial and political support from interest-groups, and in return these 
groups expect access and influence.  A growing body of research including hundreds of 
case studies, surveys, and quantitative studies of PAC contributions grew directly out of 
the signing into law of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its subsequent 
amendments, which, among other provisions, required the reporting of such 
contributions, creating a vast amount of new data for researchers to study. The two most 
common frameworks by which to measure PAC influences are an electoral model and a 
legislative model (Wright 1996). In the electoral model, it is assumed that voters need 
information to make electoral voting decisions and a member of Congress spends money, 
raised through PAC contributions, to communicate that information to voters. In the 
legislative model, it is assumed that in exchange for financial contributions, members of 
Congress promise to support certain legislation, to vote a certain way, or to take a 
specific position on a policy issue. 
There has been a considerable number of studies of PAC contributions in relation 
to “roll call voting,” also known as floor votes.  These studies have found various levels 
of influence through PAC contributions. Wright (1985) found relatively little influence of 
PAC contributions on legislators’ voting behavior on specific pieces of legislation. He 
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found that only when other variables such as party affiliation are weak do PAC 
contributions seem important.  Wright argues that because PAC contributions are 
cultivated and made at the grassroots level in the Congressperson’s district by local 
constituencies and because attempts to influence the legislative process tend to be made 
in Washington by professional lobbyists, there are disconnection and paradox in the 
relationship between PAC contributions and legislative influence, particularly in the 
voting decisions of legislators. Wright claims, however, that this evidence does not mean 
that PAC’s do not matter, especially as PAC’s have grown in number and size and as 
members of Congress increasingly spend a larger amount of time in political fundraising 
activities. In fact, Hojnacki and Kimball (2001) found that those entities with PAC’s are 
able to contact and perhaps access and influence more elected officials due to the 
organization’s ability to organize constituencies effectively in a number of Congressional 
districts. 
In their studies of Congressional committees, Hall and Wayman (1990) found that 
moneyed interest-groups are more likely to affect committee decision-making processes 
than floor votes, and that what is most likely to be affected is the legislative involvement 
of a member of Congress, not his or her vote. They also found evidence that members are 
more influenced by organized business interests than by unorganized voters. Their 
findings underscore Wright’s claim that though there seems to be little connection 
between PAC contributions and floor votes, there may be influence in the committee 
process, amendment development, and access. 
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Higher Education as an Interest Group 
A review of political science literature reveals a framework in which to consider 
how higher education as an interest-group attempts to influence federal policy through 
the lobbying process. Group theory illustrates how higher education as a group advances 
a set of special interests, while influence theory helps us understand how and to what 
extent higher education influences federal policy. The following sections of this paper 
will examine what the higher education lobby is, its structure, and its influence.  
 
The Higher Education Lobby 
What or who is the higher education lobby?  There is not one higher education 
lobby but rather several higher education lobbies, that together are referred to as “the 
Community” (Hannah, 1996). At the core, are six presidential associations, also known as 
the “Big Six”: the American Council on Education (ACE), founded in 1918 in reaction to 
the need to protect academia from drastic reductions in enrollment during World War I; 
the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC), founded in 1920 (originally 
as the American Association of Junior Colleges) as the primary advocacy organization 
for the nation’s two-year colleges; the American Association of State Colleges and 
Universities (AASCU), founded in 1961 to represent public colleges not represented by 
AACC and the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU), including 
comprehensive state systems, former teacher’s colleges, and regional institutions; the 
Association of American Universities (AAU), founded in 1900 as an exclusive 
association for the nation’s premier research universities; the National Association of 
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Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU), developed from the Association of 
American Colleges (AAC), which was founded in 1915 for small liberal arts colleges, 
now the primary advocate for private, independent higher education institutions; and, the 
Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU), founded in 1887 as the 
Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations (AACES), later 
called the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges 
(NASULGC) until 2009, and today representing the nation’s public flagship universities 
and land-grant colleges. While not all of the associations originally had offices based in 
Washington, these six associations are all now located in the nation’s capital, have full-
time government relations staff, and are considered the main “higher education lobby” 
representing the interests of non-profit, public, private, two-year, four-year, research, and 
liberal arts institutions with ACE as the “umbrella organization” (Cook 1998; Murray 
1976). In her study of the Big Six, Cook (1998) found that the members of these 
associations believe that federal relations activities needed to be a major focus of the 
association’s activities. 
In addition to the Big Six, there are so-called “satellite lobbies” (Cook 1998; King 
1975; Murray 1976;), such as the Council of Graduate Schools (CGS) and the 
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), and peripheral lobbies, 
representing individual institutions or systems, small associations, functional, discipline 
organizations, occupational groups, and special task organizations (King 1975; Murray 
1976; Cook 1998). In addition, there are advisory committees, panels, and institutes that 
influence federal policy and programs, such as the recent Commission on the Future of 
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Higher Education, commissioned by Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings, the 
Project on Student Debt, and various think tanks.  
Increasingly the for-profit higher education lobby, which has traditionally not 
been viewed as part of the Washington higher education community, has attempted to 
influence federal policy over the past few decades.  The for-profit higher education sector 
is composed of proprietary schools that either have one owner or a board with a profit 
motive and no external accountability (Cook 1998). These schools number in the 
thousands and are on the rise. The Career College Association (CCA) is viewed as their 
umbrella organization with more than 1,400 members (www.career.org).  Some of their 
members, as well as CCA, are members of ACE.  Colleges, however, must be accredited 
to be members of ACE; therefore, many of CCA’s members are not ACE members 
(Cook 1998).  According to CCA’s website (www.career.org), CCA member institutions 
“cover the full gamut of postsecondary education: from short-term certificate and 
diploma programs, to two- and four-year associate and baccalaureate degrees, to masters 
and doctoral programs.” Most CCA member institutions participate in Title IV federal 
student financial aid programs, meaning that the institution is licensed by the state in 
which it is located, accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting body, and approved 
by the U.S. Department of Education. 
In his book about the higher education associations in Washington, Hawkins 
(1992) uses the term “associationalism” to describe the nature of the higher education 
lobby. Hawkins suggests that the term encompasses and celebrates the diversity and 
traditional autonomy of U.S. higher education. The term of “associationalism” implies 
that the higher education lobby is able to speak with one voice when it can or needs to, 
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and acknowledges that individual associations remain autonomous from other 
organizations and government, but not isolated. 
 
The Structure of the Higher Education Lobby 
As described above, some research has been done to explain what the higher 
education lobby is. In addition, there have been a few attempts to explain the structural 
nature of the lobby.  For example, Murray suggests a “cluster concept” for understanding 
the higher education lobby and further argues that this cluster concept “suggests the 
higher education lobby is characterized politically as an extremely non-coordinated, 
decentralized, and fragmented set of organizations” with “no single spokesperson” (p. 85-
86). The higher education lobby is made up of several distinct organizations with 
memberships representing institutions and individuals with different, and sometimes 
conflicting, interests and priorities, and so Murray argues that the lobby has an anti-
political ideology that is “unwilling (or unable) to form viable coalitions internally or 
externally with other lobbies” (p. 86).  In fact, Heyns (1973) refers to the higher 
education lobby as a loose confederation with “vested interests and specialized concerns” 
(p. 95). The lobby, therefore, is often unable to coordinate together, much less coordinate 
with other lobbies outside of higher education.  
In addition to suffering from isolation and competing interests and priorities, the 
higher education lobby has been known not to form “permanent stable coalitions” with 
other groups, such as business or labor. An analysis above of political science theory 
suggested that building such coalitions led to a greater number of successes in attempts to 
influence the policy process. The higher education lobby has even shied away from 
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lasting coalitions with K-12 education lobbies – the lobby with which some would 
assume higher education would have the most in common. For example, in 1969, higher 
education joined with elementary and secondary education lobbies to form the 
“Emergency Committee for Full Funding of Education Programs” which sought to 
counter cuts to education funding by tying education aid to a specific formula (Murray 
1976), but the higher education lobby pulled out of the Committee in the early 1970s due 
to their discomfort with “overt political pressures” that were “much too aggressive” for 
academia (p. 89).  
These structural characteristics of the higher education lobby are coupled with an 
ideological characteristic that has affected the structure of the lobby, which Murray refers 
to as “traditionalism.” Traditionalism in higher education has meant that academia has 
been not only apolitical, but also anti-political, viewing political involvement as 
undignified. The belief underlying this traditionalism is the notion that higher education 
is a public good with broader social value than other groups lobbying at the federal level. 
Higher education historically has not needed to make its case through political statements 
and lobbying efforts in order to grow and continue to thrive. In addition, the consultative 
nature of higher education, rather than a negotiative style, has created a more passive 
relationship between academia and government (King 1975). A consultative relationship 
implies that government officials ask for the views of higher education on specific issues, 
but that these views are not viewed as a critical or significant part of the decision-making 
and policy process. Murray argued in 1976 that this consultative nature, rather than 
negotiative, would continue to be the norm for several reasons, including an apparent 
belief within higher education that this passive approach is appropriate simply due to the 
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number and diversity of college campuses in the United States. The rhetorical question 
underlying this assertion is if higher education has done so well, why lobby for more? 
Finally, Murray argued that a consultative arrangement would continue due to the 
seeming agreement among the major higher education associations that “aggressive 
negotiation” resulting in short-term wins were not as valuable as a longer-term strategy of 
“patient service and quiet lobbying” (p. 91). 
King (1975) argued, however, that this passive approach and hands-off attitude 
began to change in the 1970s with a new generation of people running the government 
relations offices of associations and at individual institutions.  Meanwhile, in his review 
of the higher education lobbies of the 1970s, Murray (1976) suggested that major 
research universities would maintain a passive approach, while smaller community 
colleges and independent schools would become more active and political. He further 
contended that while there would be a movement to form a more centralized, political 
lobby for higher education in Washington, there may also be further fragmentation of 
higher education to lobby and advocate for their own constituencies as pressure mounted 
to expand federal higher education programs resulting in more competition for these 
resources.  
Murray (1976), in his work on the structure of the higher education lobby, 
explained a “shifting lobby” phenomenon that compounds the lobby’s fragmentation 
whereby, in addition to the association lobbying activities, individual colleges and state 
systems may also employ full-time staff, part-time staff, or lobbying consultants who 
either work in Washington or commute to Washington to lobby on behalf of the 
institution or system. His identification of this phenomenon suggests that not only is the 
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main higher education lobby decentralized, but so too are the various and multiple 
lobbies representing hundreds of higher education institutions across the country.  In one 
of the most comprehensive studies of the higher education lobby, Cook (1998) 
investigated the proliferation, organization, and growth of the higher education lobby – 
including and beyond the major higher education associations. Her study, which included 
a survey of college presidents, examined how higher education as a group organizes 
itself, the satisfaction level of presidents with their higher education lobby, and how the 
structure of the higher education lobby affects lobbying strategies. She found that while 
many college presidents choose to hire institution-specific “lobbyists” and government 
relations staff, college Presidents expect that federal relations activities be a priority of 
their professional higher education association, and for the most part, found the lobbying 
and advocacy efforts of the higher education lobby to be effective. Presidents counted on 
the Washington higher education lobby to follow Congressional actions impacting higher 
education and to advocate on broad higher education policy issues, while their individual 
and system lobbyists were to focus more on advocacy on behalf of individual institutional 
needs, such as Congressional earmarks.  While more lobbyists are doing more and 
different kinds of lobbying on behalf of higher education institutions, Cook’s research 
shows that “more is not necessarily better” (p. 87), nor more effective. Rather, lobbying 
strategies and activities are more important than sheer numbers in affecting policy, which 
will be explored more in the next section of this paper. 
The non-profit higher education community not only struggles within a 
decentralized structure with a large number of individuals and associations advocating 
with sometimes different voices, but it also must compete at the federal level with the 
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propriety sector. In fact, the non-profit and for-profit higher education communities have 
what some have deemed an “adversarial relationship” (Cook 1998). Cook in her study of 
the federal higher education lobby suggests “ACE has clearly chosen to keep the 
proprietary schools outside its umbrella” (p. 84). Hannah (1996) referred to the for-profit 
sector as “a stepchild within the traditional higher education community” (p. 519). As 
described below, this relationship has affected the activities and influence of the higher 
education lobby. 
 
The Activities of the Higher Education Lobby 
Despite a fragmented structure, it is clear that the non-profit higher education 
lobby is active and part of the federal policy process. But, what is it that the higher 
education lobby does? In his survey of education interest-groups in the United States, 
Adam (1975) noted education interest-groups “each represent a consensus of attitudes 
and opinions about education among sizeable numbers of American citizens, and their 
objectives cover a wide range of education issues. They are consequently forced to study 
the power structure of their national education system, and to move it when power 
moves” (p. 166).  He goes on to say that “in Washington D.C., there is a powerful lobby 
devoted to influencing national policies on higher education…The large contribution of 
the Federal Government to the maintenance of universities and colleges has caused the 
higher education lobby to devote most of its resources to work in the national capital (p. 
168).” Adam seems to suggest that the existence of federal programs that provide 
resources that benefit colleges and universities has resulted in the rise of the higher 
education lobby.  
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Others have made similar arguments about higher education as an interest-group. 
Murray (1976) argues that higher education became a “central participant and contestant 
for national resources” (p. 79) starting with the G.I. Bill, which has resulted in “increased 
higher education involvement with government” (p. 79-80). Murray notes, however, that 
for higher education associations in Washington, the primary activity is not lobbying, but 
rather research and production of issue papers, annual meetings for their members and 
conferences that bring attention to current national and international higher education 
policy issues, and external relations activities with other associations (p. 81). In fact, 
lobbying cannot be the primary activity of the higher education associations because of 
the tax status of these non-profit entities (Cook 1998). Beyond any legal restrictions on 
lobbying activities, Hawkins’ (1992) argues that the higher education associations are 
ambivalent towards lobbying.  This ambivalence may result from a contradiction between 
the main issues for which the higher education lobbies: 1) maximizing federal aid (in the 
form of student financial aid, direct institutional aid authorized through the HEA, 
competitive grant dollars for research, and direct aid to institutions through earmarks in 
federal appropriations), and 2) minimizing federal regulations. Despite increasing federal 
investment in higher education in the form of student financial aid and research, Hawkins 
contends that associations continue to grapple with their roles as “lobbyists” and how 
lobbying affects academia’s autonomy. If the higher education lobby seeks federal 
support, and, in fact, advocates for financial support, will institutional autonomy be 
affected?  How can the higher education lobby balance the goal of avoiding federal 
regulations and oversight with lobbying efforts that advocate for additional federal 
support?  
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Recent studies of the activities of the Washington higher education lobby have 
focused on the tactics and role of the lobby throughout a specific reauthorization process 
of the HEA (e.g. Cook 1998; Hannah 1996; Gladieux & Wolanin 1976). The 
reauthorization process of the HEA is a helpful and interesting framework within which 
to study the Washington lobby given the various provisions that affect various sectors of 
higher education. It includes not only funding for student financial aid, but also 
provisions related to regulations and oversight of institutions. In their study of the 1972 
amendments to HEA, Gladieux and Wolanin (1976) explained the context in which the 
federal higher education policy process takes place.  In their assessment they suggest that 
the higher education policy process is “incremental in three senses: It occurs within the 
limits of a slowly evolving political culture; it is built on and related to existing policy; 
and, it draws from existing policy models” (p. 257). This context, therefore, affects the 
activities of the lobby and is not all that different from other sectors attempting to 
influence federal policy. Gladieux and Wolanin (1976) also suggest a framework that 
takes into consideration the “skills and intentions” (p. 257) of various players in the 
process, as well as the political environment, which contribute to the direction of the 
process and the specific policy outcomes.  These considerations are important elements in 
the decisions about lobbying activity that are made by the higher education lobby, as well 
as the ability of the higher education lobby to influence federal policy. 
In her analysis of the higher education lobby, Cook (1998) examined the variety 
of activities and “techniques” that the the lobby employed after the 1994 mid-term 
election, in which Republicans –  in an historic moment –  took over both the House and 
the Senate promising to fulfill their “Contract with America.”  The higher education 
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lobby had to adjust their activities in order to have influence with this new majority. In 
her analysis she examined political advertising, protests and demonstrations on college 
campuses, constituent contacts by college and university presidents, grassroots lobbying, 
electoral involvement, coalition building, and Political Action Committees (PAC’s). Her 
study of the lobby’s activities revealed that “higher education expanded its lobbying 
practices not only in intensity but also in the array of techniques utilized…” (p. 170). 
 
Influence of the Higher Education Lobby 
In addition to analyzing the activities of the higher education lobby, many of the 
same studies have also attempted to show how the structure and activities of the 
Washington higher education lobby contribute to its ability, or inability, to influence 
federal policy, particularly in regards to amendments to the HEA (e.g. Cook 1998; 
Hannah 1996; Gladieux & Wolanin 1976). For example, Gladieux and Wolanin’s study 
of the 1972 amendments revealed the ways in which the higher education lobby was 
criticized for their lack of good policy analysis and failure to work together in an 
effective way to accomplish their goals. In 1972, while the higher education lobby was 
lobbying to have Congress provide direct federal aid to institutions rather than directly to 
students, Congress planned to “let the students make their own choices in the marketplace 
of postsecondary education” (Gladieux and Wolanin, 1976, p. 225) by awarding Pell 
Grants directly to students. In addition to this big defeat suffered by the higher education 
lobby that still reverberates throughout federal higher education policy circles, another 
Washington lobbying was becoming increasingly influential: the for-profit higher 
education lobby.  While the traditional higher education lobby was unable to influence 
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Congress in their direction, this newer lobby representing the for-profit sector was 
successful in influencing Congress to make the proprietary sector eligible for 
participation in the federal student aid programs. In fact, the 1972 HEA amendments 
changed the term “higher education” to “postsecondary” in order to make eligible every 
type of institution, including community colleges and for-profit institutions. These two 
changes during the 1972 amendment process – providing financial aid directly to students 
rather than institutions and making eligible for-profit colleges for participation in federal 
student financial-aid programs – were seen as embarrassing losses for the higher 
education lobby and arguably still affect the influence of the higher education lobby 
today. In fact, when it comes to the influence of the for-profit higher education lobby, 
some have described it as the “most sophisticated at lobbying” among the higher 
education groups, as Waldman did in his case study of the National Service Bill (1995, 
p.138). Their influence can be traced to the 1972 amendments.  
In her study of the 1992 HEA amendments, Hannah’s (1996) findings supported 
Wolanin and Gladieux’s framework describing an incremental process that is affected by 
the political environment and skills and intentions of the major actors. In her analysis, 
Hannah suggested that the 1992 amendments did not result in “the consensus necessary 
to support significant reform” called for by Congressional leadership to reinstate HEA’s 
original purpose to provide student aid to the neediest students (p. 523). While the higher 
education lobby was able to build agreement around some issues affecting the 1992 
amendments, they utilized a “consensus strategy” that slowed the lobby’s ability to 
respond to timely Congressional needs. In addition, while the lobby chose to remain 
silent on key issues on which they could not come to agreement, it also became 
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fragmented on a key policy issue concerning the federal student financial aid needs 
analysis formula, leaving a vast space in which other groups could attempt to influence, 
including the newly formed Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance 
(ACSFA). This group was seen as more responsive and helpful than the traditional higher 
education lobby and therefore was able to be more influential during the 1992 
amendment process. Hannah suggests that “the higher education community was 
fragmented by self-interest and turf” (p. 523), leading to the inability of “unified action” 
to provide meaningful reforms. Instead, the 1992 amendments were viewed as “a 
disappointment” that “paved the way for much greater federal regulation of academic 
quality” (Hannah, 1999, p. 524). In a 2003 report in the Chronicle of Higher Education 
that summarized all of the reauthorizations, Burd explained how during the 1992 
reauthorization, with reports of “fly-by-night” for-profit colleges, some lawmakers failed 
at an attempt to  get rid of for-profit college participate in all federal student aid programs 
(2003a). 
In Cook’s (1998) case study of the higher education lobby in the aftermath of the 
1994 Republican takeover of Congress, she found that higher education adjusted its 
traditional lobbying activities and deemed the 104
th
 Congress – the first Congress after 
the election – as a success due to its ability to handle the advocacy process in spite of the 
dramatic shift in the political environment for higher education. The 104
th
 Congress 
considered and passed legislation on higher education issues such as student financial aid 
funding, direct lending, national service, affirmative action, and research funding. In each 
of these areas, the higher education lobby felt it could celebrate victories in either holding 
back unfavorable policies or advancing favorable policies. 
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In the years to follow, the traditional higher education lobby and the for-profit-
college lobby began to further distance themselves from one another. In 2002, the Career 
College Association announced it would no longer belong to the American Council on 
Education, claiming “an inability to agree on key goals for the coming reauthorization” 
(Borrego 2002) and calling ACE more of a liability than an asset. The chief lobbyist at 
ACE, Terry Hartle, was quoted in the article as saying that CCA has very “effective 
lobbyists.” 
 
For-Profit Higher Education and the Federal Government 
 While much of the higher education literature on the topic of policy influence has 
focused on the traditional higher education lobby rather than the for-profit higher 
education lobby, there is increasing interest about the influence of the for-profit higher 
education sector. The for-profit higher education sector is composed of proprietary 
schools that either have one owner or a board with a profit motive. Some proprietary 
schools are owned by parent companies that are publicly traded.  Most literature related 
to the for-profit sector has focused on the growth of the for-profit sector in relation to the 
“marketplace” of higher education (Ortmann 2002; Kirp 2003), the reputation of the for-
profit sector (Kelly 2001), and for-profit institutions as competitors to the more 
traditional non-profit higher education model (Bailey, Badway, and Gumport, Tuff 2002; 
Ruch 2003). There is little work on the relationship between the for-profit sector and the 
federal government, particularly the ways in which the for-profit sector attempts to 
influence federal higher education policy.  
52 
 
 
 
The relationship between for-profit colleges and the federal government centers 
on regulations and access to federal financial aid. Most proprietary college do not have 
government relations staff, as compared to their non-profit colleagues, but rather employ 
lobbyists who attempt to influence Congress to reduce regulatory burden and increase 
access to federal financial aid (Tierney 2007). For-profit colleges generally believe that 
they are the “object of unfair burden and regulation” (p. 158), but those regulations – 
provisions included in the HEA –  grew out of Congress’s desire to minimize fraud and 
abuse in the federal financial aid programs. 
Some of the existing literature related to for-profit higher education and the 
federal government focuses on the accreditation process for purpose of participation in 
Title IV, that is, federal student financial aid (Sperling 2000; Berg 2005; Tierney 2007). 
In order to participate in Title IV programs, higher education institutions must have 
accreditation from an accrediting body recognized by the U.S. Department of Education. 
For-profit colleges rely on federal financial aid as a revenue source, and so many for-
profit colleges have sought accreditation – both regional and national accreditation. In 
fact, the “father” of the for-profit college movement, John Sperling, details his strategy in 
his autobiography Rebel with a Cause (2000) to legitimize the for-profit college model by 
lobbying elected officials on issues related to accreditation in building what would 
become the University of Phoenix. He characterizes any concern with the practices of 
for-profit colleges and their motives as a fear of change on the part of traditional higher 
education administrators.  When for-profit colleges could not obtain regional 
accreditation in the 1970s and 1980s, the national accreditation process was created to 
allow for-profit colleges access to federal financial aid – whether or not they were able to 
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receive regional accreditation (the accreditation of traditional higher education 
institutions). In recent years, some for-profit colleges have been able to secure both 
national and regional accreditation.  
While the literature may be sparse in terms of the for-profit-college sector as a 
special interest group and the influence of the for-profit college sector in Washington 
D.C., there has considerable media coverage during the recent decade in the higher 
education press about the relationship between the for-profit higher education sector and 
the federal government. Leading up to and during process of the reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act, several reporters covered the for-profit-college sector’s role in the 
process. As early as September of 2003, one reporter wrote an article, For-Profit 
College’s Want a Little Respect, summarizing some of the ways in which the sector 
would begin to promote its agenda in the reauthorization process and how past negative 
publicity that haunted the sector during the last reauthorization had begun to fade as the 
next reauthorization process was gearing up (Burd 2003).  During that same time, another 
reporter wrote a piece explaining how Congressman Buck McKeon, the House 
Republican in charge of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the reauthorization,  had 
introduced legislation, as a placeholder for use during the larger reauthorization, that 
would make transferring credits easier for for-profit colleges students, citing the 
unfairness towards the for-profit sector (Farrell 2003). This article was one of the first 
hints of the group’s reauthorization agenda. 
Throughout 2004, media coverage focused on “lawmakers gearing up to rewrite 
policies on federal student aid, a crucial source of revenue for the [for-profit college] 
industry” (Blumenstyk 2004), the efforts of for-profit-college lobbyists to remove 
54 
 
 
 
restrictions, such as the 90/10 Rule (Burd 2004a), for-profit college spending on 
campaign contributions (Burd 2004b), and how President Bush, on his 2004 campaign 
trail mentioned reducing regulations on for-profit colleges (Brainard, Burd, and Fischer 
2004). 
Fraud and abuse in the for-profit-college sector has been a regular theme in the 
coverage of for-profit colleges, including lawsuits for the misuse of federal funds to 
whistleblower cases. In 2005, the “fraud and abuse”-related coverage went beyond the 
higher education trades when “60 Minutes” ran an exposé on the problems at the time in 
the proprietary sector. Congress held hearings and the for-profit-college sector organized 
a “pre-emptive public-relations campaign” to mitigate any effects from the coverage, 
which include radio ads and Congressional visits (Blumenstyk 2005). During the 
Congressional hearing on the class-action lawsuits highlighted in the “60 Minutes” piece, 
higher education press reported that for-profit-college sector lobbyists argued that policy 
makers should not create policy based on anecdote, but rather on data (Burd 2005a). This 
media coverage and media and Congressional investigation occurred in the months 
leading up to Congress’s first attempt at a HEA reauthorization, which was already two 
years into debate. While the original draft of the bill contained several provisions that 
were favorable to the for-profit-college sector, by the time legislation passed out of the 
subcommittee and full committee, the for-profit-college sector provisions were amended 
out or substantially diluted, including provisions related to Single Definition, the 90/10 
Rule, and transfer of credit policies (Burd 2005b; Burd 2005c; Bollag 2005). Meanwhile 
on the Senate side, policy makers sought more of a “middle-ground” when drafting for-
profit-college sector provisions in their HEA reauthorization bill (Field 2005). As 
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lawsuits continued to plague the for-profit-college sector in 2006, higher education media 
covered the allegations and proceedings (Burd 2006). Meanwhile, while the House 
passed a bill, Congress did not pass a final HEA reauthorization and the 2006 mid-term 
election turned the U.S. House of Representatives from Republican majority to 
Democratic majority, jeopardizing the attempts of for-profit-colleges to move their 
agenda forward in the new Congress that would begin in January of 2007 (Brainard, 
Burd, & Field 2006). 
With a new Congress in charge, the for-profit college sector also reconsidered its 
leadership as part of its strategic efforts when it announced the hiring of a Democrat with 
ties to Congress, Harris N Miller, who called himself a “coalition-builder” (Blumenstyk 
2007). Also in 2007, the issues of most concern to for-profit colleges were also among 
the most controversial, created much debate, and were widely covered in the higher 
education media outlets. For example, the Chronicle of Higher Education ran opinion 
pieces on one of the issues up for debate, Transfer of Credit, authored by representatives 
on both sides of the issue – Barmak Nassirian (2007) and Harris N. Miller (2007). 
Nassirian made the argument that colleges should decide their transfer of credit policies, 
not Congress, while Miller argued that new legislation would end bias against proprietary 
schools. 
One year after the 2006 elections, the House committee began to debate 
legislation that would ultimately pass and be signed into law in 2008 (Field 2007). Initial 
versions of this round of legislation were seen as favorable to the for-profit-college 
sector, and passed the House Education committee with changes to the 90/10 Rule,  but 
with a surprise amendment that the for-profit colleges would be left to fight during the 
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bill’s consideration by the full House of Representatives later in 2008 (Field 2007). The 
higher education media continued to cover the issues of greatest concern to the for-profit 
sector, the 90/10 Rule and Cohort Default Rate, into 2008 as Congress wrapped up and 
passed final legislation, including several articles that described the back and forth 
compromises, efforts to influence policy makers, and the support by the for-profit-college 
sector for the legislation that would ultimately pass (Field 2008a; Field 2008b; Field 
2008c; Field 2008d; Field 2008e). Among them an article titled: “A Bill that Took 
Longer than a Bachelor’s Degree” (Field 2008f).  The media also covered the political 
campaign contribution efforts of the for-profits. In one article, the Chronicle of Higher 
Education reported on an email message sent by the president of a for-profit college 
advertising a fund-raising event for Congressman Buck McKeon. The article (Selingo 
2008) included the short, but to the point email message the president sent out to “dozens 
of people”:  
“Tip O’Neill stated that campaign contributions are the mother’s milk to politics. 
In a period of highly charge political activity…your involvement in the political 
process is absolutely critical. I have learned during the past 30 years that 
although the student is our client, the government is our customer – the one who 
pays the bills.” 
In recent years since the reauthorization was signed in to law and a new 
Democratic White House intent on stricter regulations for the sector was elected, higher 
education reporters have covered reports on fraud and abuse, high debt loads incurred by 
students who received high-pressure sales pitches to attend, but not necessarily to 
complete at for-profit college (Burd 2009), and attempts to create stricter regulations for 
57 
 
 
 
the sector (Lederman 2009), among other issues. Reporters began to question the ratio of 
enrollments to how well served for-profit colleges students were (Lederman 2009). In 
2010, the National Consumer Law Center issued a report on the “booming” for-profit-
college sector, recent lawsuits related to the sector, and disproportionate debt and default 
rates of students who attend for-profit colleges (Loonin 2010). By mid-2010, the White 
House’s attempts to institute a rule called “gainful employment,” which would “cut off 
federal student aid to for-profit programs whose graduates carry high debt-to-income 
loads,” were receiving strong criticism and intense lobbying from the for-profit-college 
sector (Blumenstyk and Field 2010).  Congressional hearings covered by the higher 
education media and in regards to the gainful employment issue featured for-profit-
college lobbyists and their concerns (Gonzalez 2010).  
In 2011, the New York Times ran a couple of articles critical of the for-profit 
college sector lawsuits (Education, 2011, p. A28; Lewin 2011). A U.S. Government 
Accountability Office report released in 2011 was covered widely in the higher education 
press explaining a new investigation implicating the for-profit sector in unsavory, if not 
illegal behavior (Fain 2011). By 2012, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) had released a 
report seemingly encouraged by broader media reports about these issues, which were 
widely covered in the higher education media. The report summarized, through the use of 
numbers and statistics, the perceived problems stemming from the for-profit college 
sector (Lee 2012). 
Conclusion 
A review of literature reveals interesting areas ripe for investigation. The political 
science literature has shown that special interest-groups attempt to influence elected 
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officials on specific policy issues through lobbying activities. The literature is not 
conclusive about how exactly the access, influence, and persuasion takes place and 
translates into policy changes. Continued efforts, however, to investigate and reveal the 
various opportunities for access, influence, and persuasion by special interest-groups 
would be beneficial in the higher education policy arena for practice and theory.  
The literature about the influence of higher education as a special interest-group 
that attempts to influence policy also reveals opportunities to better understand how 
higher education can more effectively access, influence, and persuade policymakers. 
While several models and theories are discussed above, Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) 
“lobbying as legislative subsidy” model serves as an appropriate means to investigate 
how higher education special interest-group, through lobbyists, access, influence, and 
persuade policy makers to make policy changes. The theory is most appropriate because 
of the theory’s ability to not only offer a means for investigation that assumes what other 
theories have already proven, but the theory also offers what other theories have failed to 
fully recognize and apply – that access, influence, and persuasion are core to the 
interaction between lobbyists and legislators that have a shared agenda, and that they take 
place when there is a transmission of legislative information, intelligence, and labor. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 For this study, I employed a qualitative research design guided by Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) approach that includes interviews and review and analysis of 
documents. I chose this design in order to examine how for-profit education influenced 
the 2008 reauthorization of the HEA through the analysis of data collected from a 
specific setting (the House Education and Workforce Committee)  about a set period in 
time (the reauthorization of the HEA during the 109
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses). Hall and 
Deardorff’s (2006) theory of lobbying as legislative subsidy serves as the framework for 
this study. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
I utilized the theory of “lobbying as legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff, 
2006) as the theoretical framework for addressing the research question: To what extent 
did for-profit higher education interest-groups influence policy discussions about and 
changes to the most recent reauthorization of the Higher Education Act?  Lobbying as 
legislative subsidy derives from the field of political science and was developed to 
investigate public policymaking at the federal level to help explain the phenomena of 
access and influence.  This model provides a context for the ways in which special 
interest-groups may have attempted to influence the outcome of the 2008 reauthorization 
of the HEA through lobbying efforts, not only, by contributing to political campaigns, but 
also by providing information and policy ideas to the staff of the House Education and 
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Workforce Committee and staff of the members of the House Education and Workforce 
Committee. The theory encompasses the related fundamentals of the policy process that 
include issue definition, agenda setting, and influence, but goes further by suggesting that 
lobbying subsidizes the limited resources of specific legislators – specifically those 
legislators who already sympathize with a special interest-group’s policy agenda.  
In this investigation, the processes of issue definition, agenda setting, and 
influence were important to answering the research question.  The utilization of the 
theory of lobbying as legislative subsidy as the theoretical framework, however, more 
specifically calls attention to the role of for-profit college lobbyists in influencing a 
specific set of legislators in the writing of legislation to reauthorize the HEA.  As Hall 
and Deardorff (2006) explain in their work on lobbying as legislative subsidy, the theory 
assumes that the legislators being influenced are involved and participating in the 
legislative process, the legislators have limited time and resources, the legislators care 
about more than one issue at a time, the legislators prioritize some issues over others, and 
the lobbyists are specialists.  In sum, the theory proposes that an attempt to lobby a 
specific legislator provides a subsidy to the limited resources of legislators who already 
are supportive of a special interest-group’s policy agenda.  
Figure 1 provides an illustration of how this theory explains the influence process. 
The theory assumes that the lobbyist/special-interest group and the legislator have a 
shared policy objective and this shared policy objective is demonstrated when the special 
interest-group, often through the use of a lobbyist, gains access to a legislator through 
PAC contributions.  The same special interest-group, often through the use of a lobbyist, 
persuades a legislator through legislative subsidy. The combination of access and  
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for Persuasion and Legislative Subsidy 
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persuasion ultimately turns a shared policy objective into legislative action that occurs 
during the legislative process. 
 
Lobbyist/Special Interest-Group 
As Milbrath (1963) explains, the intermediary actor in lobbying is the lobbyist. A 
lobbyist works on behalf of a special-interest group. This part of the model explains one 
of the actors in the process. For purposes of this study, the lobbyist/special interest-group 
represents the for-profit-college sector and is assumed to have an agenda that advances a 
shared policy objective. 
 
Shared Policy Objective 
As Hall and Deardorff (2006) explain in their model, a shared policy objective 
between the lobbyist/special-interest group and the legislator is a critical piece to a policy 
agenda or item moving forward in the legislative process. This framework shows that the 
shared policy objective is reached and advanced through access to and influence of a 
legislator. 
 
Access and PAC Contributions 
PAC contributions are a way to gain access to legislators in order to advocate for 
and advance a shared policy agenda. Hall and Wyman (1990) found in their studies that 
lobbyists and special interest groups are able to access and influence legislators with PAC 
contributions mostly at committee-level votes, rather than full floor votes. This study 
63 
 
 
 
focuses on committee-level access and influence. In addition to access and influence, the 
special-interest group and lobbyists provide legislative subsidy to further persuade action 
and involvement in the legislative process that will move along the shared policy 
objective (Hall and Deardorff 2006). 
 
Persuasion and Legislative Subsidy 
 Access alone is not enough to advance the shared policy objective. This model 
shows how persuasion and legislative subsidy by lobbyists/special-interest groups are 
critical to the process (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Congressional offices have limited 
resources and are busy (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981) and are handling a large number of 
issues at any given time (Hall 1996; Sinclair 1989). Meanwhile lobbyists/special-interest 
groups are experts in a single area and can commit larger amounts of time and energy to a 
given topic (Esterling 2004) – a shared policy objective, for example. It is in this situation 
that lobbyists are able to persuade by providing legislative subsidy through political 
intelligence, data, and information that supports the advancement of a shared policy 
objective through the legislative process. 
 
Legislative Process and Action 
Once the legislator and the lobbyist/special-interest group have come to 
agreement on the policy objective, it must move through the legislative process, including 
committee debate and passage, floor consideration and vote, and if successful, final 
passage and signing into law. This framework allows for the study of this part of the 
process. 
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Methodology 
I chose a qualitative research method guided by Miles and Huberman’s (1994) 
approach for this investigation for an in-depth examination of how for-profit education 
lobbyists attempted to access legislators and to influence the 2008 reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act. 
 
Setting 
The focal setting for this study is the U.S. House of Representatives, specifically 
the committee that has jurisdiction over the reauthorization of the HEA. The HEA 
includes a variety of provisions affecting U.S. higher education, specifically the law 
overseeing federal financial aid. The committee of jurisdiction was known as the House 
Committee on Education and the Workforce during the first two-thirds of the time period 
under investigation (the 108
th  
 [2003-2004] and 109
th
 [2005-2006] Congresses) and as the 
House Education and Labor Committee during the 110
th
 Congress (2007-2008). The 
committee was renamed on January 4, 2007, when Congress switched from a Republican 
majority to a Democratic majority following the 2006 mid-term elections.  To avoid 
confusion, this paper will refer to the committee of jurisdiction as the House Committee 
on Education and the Workforce. 
The time period under investigation is 2003-2008, during the 108
th
-110
th
 
Congresses. During that set period of time, the House Committee on Education and the 
Workforce members and staff were actively working to reauthorize the HEA. The 1998 
reauthorization of the HEA had expired in 2003.  From 2003-2008 Congress passed 
“extensions” and various other pieces of related legislation before passing a final and 
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comprehensive reauthorization in 2008. During that time period, various lobbyists and 
lobbying organizations representing a variety of special interest-groups attempted to 
influence the legislation that was ultimately signed into law. 
During the 108
th
 and 110
th
 Congresses, the House Committee on Education and 
the Workforce had 49 members (22 Democrats and 27 Republicans during the 108
th
 and 
27 Democrats and 22 Republicans during the 110
th
) and during the 109
th
 Congress it had 
47 members (21 Democrats and 26 Republicans).  John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) served as 
the Chairman of the Committee during the 108
th
 and part of the 109
th
 Congresses before 
he was named as Majority Leader of the House of Representatives in 2006. His total 
tenure as Chairman spanned 2001-2006. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-California) 
served as Chairman for the remainder of the 109
th
 Congress. George Miller (D- 
California) took over as Chairman at the start of the 110
th
 Congress –  when Congress 
became a Democratic majority. George Miller had served as Ranking Minority Member 
before becoming Chairman since 2001. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon then became 
Ranking Minority Member for the 110
th
 Congress.  The committee is also composed of 
several subcommittees. The subcommittee that had jurisdiction over the HEA during the 
108
th
-110
th
 Congresses was the Higher Education, Lifelong Learning, and 
Competitiveness Subcommittee. 
Both the Chairman and the Ranking Member employ separate sets of 
Congressional staff who work on behalf of the majority party and minority party 
members of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce. These staff are 
known as “committee staff.” Majority committee staff outnumber minority committee 
staff because of resources made available. In addition to committee staff, each member of 
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the House Committee on Education and the Workforce has staff in his or her personal 
offices who are assigned to work on issues that come before the committee, including 
staff who worked directly on the reauthorization of the HEA. In sum, approximately 60 
House staff members at any one time were in some way responsible for ushering the 
HEA through the U.S. House of Representatives. Some of those approximately 60 staff 
were more involved in the process than others. This investigation will focus more 
specifically on committee staff and those personal office staff who were actively involved 
and lobbied by special interest-groups. While staff do not vote or speak “on the record” 
during the legislative process, they are responsible for the drafting of legislation. They 
also meet with lobbyists and each other on behalf of their bosses. 
 
Institutional Research Approval Process 
This study required Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval at the University 
of Minnesota. I submitted an application to the IRB on February10, 2010 requesting 
approval of the study. The IRB granted approval on February 19, 2010.   The study was 
exempt from full review under federal guidelines due to the nature of the research. A 
copy of the approval letter is contained in Appendix F. 
 
Data Collection 
 I collected and analyzed lobbying materials, campaign finance reports, federal 
lobbying reports, and the Congressional Record, and I interviewed with key participants 
in the reauthorization of the HEA, including Congressional staff, higher education 
lobbyists, and media representatives.   Data were collected from documentary evidence, 
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including lobbying materials, the Congressional Record, and campaign finance reports, 
as well as federal lobbying reports dated during the 108
th
-110
th
 Congresses (January 1, 
2003-December 31, 2008) and relevant to the reauthorization of the HEA.   
Campaign finance reports, federal lobbying reports, and the Congressional 
Record are public records and were accessed through official federal websites. Some 
lobbying materials were available on publicly accessible websites. Other lobbying 
materials were accessed through individuals who worked on the reauthorization or who 
were interviewed.  Data collected from these information sources were used to address 
the overall research question, as well as to determine what policy issues were placed on 
the agenda, how a given for-profit higher education special interest-group attempted to 
influence the process, and the extent to which the special interest-group was successful. 
Data collected from campaign finance reports were used to reveal which lobbyists might 
have had more access to which legislators. Data collected from lobbying materials, 
lobbying reports, and the Congressional Record were used to reveal the ways in which 
and the extent to which lobbyists provided a legislative subsidy to legislators. Data 
collected from the interviews were used to answer the overall research question, as well 
as to determine which interest-groups were most influential, what policy issues were 
placed on the agenda, how the for-profit higher education special interest-group 
attempted to influence the process, and the extent to which the special interest was 
successful.  
Figure 2 illustrates how the theoretical framework guided the data collection in 
order to answer the research questions.  Data from campaign finance reports, lobbying 
reports, and interviews were used to provide evidence about the extent to which there was 
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access. Data from special interest-group/lobbyists’ lobbying materials and interviews 
were used to provide evidence about the extent to which there was persuasion. Data from 
the Congressional Record were used to provide evidence about the extent to which there 
was legislative action based on access and persuasion.  
Data collected from interviews were based on information related to the 
experiences and perspectives of professionals who worked on the reauthorization during 
the 108
th
-110
th
 Congresses (January 1, 2003-December 31, 2008). I developed four 
different interview protocols for the groups of participants (Congressional staff, lobbyists 
for for-profit colleges, lobbyists for non-profit colleges, and reporters) in order to 
ascertain their experiences of being influenced, attempting to influence, and observing 
influence. I relied on public documents, the Congressional Record, newspaper articles, 
related websites, and personal experience as a Congressional aide and as a federal 
lobbyist to identify possible interviewees. The sample of interviewees was criterion-
based (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 1998) and interviewees were asked to participate in this 
research based on the role they played in the most recent reauthorization of the HEA: 1) 
House Education and Labor Committee staff during the 108
th
 -110th Congresses; 2) staff 
of House Education and Labor Committee members during the 108
th
 -110th Congresses; 
3) national higher education association employees in federal relations during the 108
th
 -
110th Congresses; 4) federal lobbyists whose clients were higher education associations 
or institutions during the 108
th
 -110th Congresses; or 5) reporters for higher education  
publications during the 108
th
 -110th Congresses. I attempted to identify interviewees with 
a diversity of political perspectives. Nearly 50 potential interviewees were identified and 
were invited to participate in this project. All interviewees signed the consent form prior 
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to participation. Interviewees were classified by their roles in the most recent 
reauthorization of the HEA. Some interviewees had more than one role over the course of 
the reauthorization.  
I developed data collection and interview protocols based on Frank 
Baumgartner’s investigation of agenda-setting and influence of lobbyists 
(http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_Documentation/protocol.html; 
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_Documentation/search_guidelines.pdf). The interview protocols 
were developed to collect information to identify the organizations and individuals who 
attempted to influence the legislation, to determine the policy issues on the agenda, and 
how special interest-groups attempted to influence the legislation, and to evaluate the 
extent to which they were or were not successful. Interview and data-collection protocols 
appear in Appendices A-D. 
 
Data Analysis 
 The data analysis for this investigation was based in qualitative methods (Yin 
1994) in order to allow themes and categories to emerge from the data through the lens of 
“lobbying as legislative subsidy” model. The qualitative analysis served as the method 
for analyzing data through a content analysis of information found in records and 
interviews.  
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Figure 2: Data Collection 
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Elements of qualitative methods guided data analysis in three stages. The first 
stage was the recording of interviews and the reviewing and coding of data collected 
from lobbying materials, campaign finance reports, lobbying reports, and the 
Congressional Record. Data collected from lobbying materials were coded by the names 
of the special interest-group and the policy issue placed on the agenda. Data collected 
from campaign finance and lobbying reports were organized by special interest-group 
and individuals making contributions or lobbying, legislators receiving contributions or 
being targets of lobbying activity, and total dollars spent on campaign contributions and 
lobbying activities.  Data collected from the Congressional Record were organized by 
type (i.e. Congressional testimony, Member statements, and bills), policy issue, and 
whether any changes were made to policy.   
The second stage was the sorting of coded data into groups based on the research 
questions. For example, any dollar figure related to political campaign contributions was 
sorted under the research question related to how special interest-groups attempted to 
access specific legislators in order to influence the reauthorization. For example, any 
changes to legislation were sorted under the research question related to whether special 
interest-groups were successful or not. Interviewees’ responses were then categorized by 
research question and grouped together by common themes and responses.  
The third stage identified categories of common themes across the data collected 
and grouped them together to explain who attempted to influence what policies, how 
those special interests attempted to influence policy, and the extent of influence. When 
reviewing the dominance of themes in the interviews, I considered those mentioned by 
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one-third (n=11) of the respondents were considered primary. Themes mentioned fewer 
than 11 times but more than 3 times were considered secondary. A theme mentioned 3 or 
fewer times was considered a less-dominant theme.   
No causal conclusions will be drawn. Data collected from interviews were used as 
evidence to infer connections between document analysis of lobbying efforts and the final 
legislation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 This chapter presents the findings of the study. The study examines how and the 
extent to which the for-profit higher education industry has attempted to influence federal 
higher education policy, specifically provisions in the most recent reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act (HEA) in 2008.  I analyzed and synthesized data from the 
Congressional Record, advocacy materials, and federal lobbying and election 
contribution records. I also interviewed key players in the reauthorization process in 
order to understand how the for-profit higher education sector attempted to influence 
federal higher education legislation and the extent to which they were successful. 
Participants in the interviews included seven lobbyists representing the non-profit sector, 
six lobbyists representing the for-profit sector, nine Democratic Congressional staffers, 
seven Republican Congressional staffers, and four higher education reporters. I 
conducted a total of 33 interviews.  
The findings address the overall research question: to what extent did for-profit 
higher education interest-groups influence policy discussions about and changes to the 
2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? To answer the research question, I 
developed a set of guiding questions to ascertain the specific policy agenda items that for-
profit education, as a special interest-group, were most concerned about during the 
development of reauthorization legislation, to understand what methods for-profit 
education used to place their policy items on the reauthorization agenda, and to determine 
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the effectiveness of for-profit education in advancing its preferred policy agenda. The 
questions are: 
1. What policy issues did the for-profit education special interest-group 
attempt to place on the agenda of the Higher Education Act 
reauthorization?   
2. Which organizations and individuals were most involved in the for-
profit college policy agenda for the discussion, development and 
passage of the legislation that resulted in the 2008 reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act?  
3. How did the for-profit education special interest-group attempt to 
influence policy makers during the 2008 reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act?  
4. In what ways was the for-profit education special interest-group 
successful in its influence of the final legislation that resulted in the 
2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act?  
5. In what ways was the for-profit education special interest-group not 
successful in its influence of the final legislation that resulted in the 
2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
In order to answer the five guiding questions, I derived data from interviews and 
the Congressional Record and federal lobbying and election contribution records as 
evidence of connections between lobbying efforts and the final legislation. The guiding 
questions serve as a way to organize the reporting of the findings. Figures in this chapter 
summarize findings from the interviews and advocacy materials in regards to the policy 
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issues raised by the for-profit higher education sector, and present and summarize 
findings from the interviews and federal lobbying and election contribution records to 
show the strategies and arguments used. Information from the interviews and content 
from the Congressional Record show the extent to which for-profit higher education 
sector was successful in advancing their agenda. Quotes from participant interviews, 
which are formatted in italics, are used to demonstrate findings throughout this chapter 
and are stated verbatim, except in cases where information could be used to identify a 
study participant. In those cases, identifying information was removed. Throughout the 
presentation of findings, the notation, “n=” indicates the number of mentions by 
interview participants. 
This study examines only primary themes in response to the guiding questions. 
Secondary themes and other responses are left for subsequent analysis. 
 
The For-Profit Higher Education Policy Agenda 
What policy issues did the for-profit education special interest-group attempt to place on 
the agenda of the Higher Education Act reauthorization? 
 
 
The first guiding question sought to find out what policy issues the for-profit 
education special-interest group attempted to place on the HEA reauthorization agenda. 
To answer this question, I collected data from advocacy materials and other literature 
created by the for-profit sector and used during the 108
th
-110
th 
Congresses to advance 
their policy agenda for the reauthorization of the HEA. I also used data from interviews 
with key players. When asked what policy issues were on the for-profit college sector 
agenda for the reauthorization of the HEA, the interview participants mentioned a total of 
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13 policy issues, five of which emerged as primary themes, two as secondary themes, and 
six as less prominent.  
The first of the five primary themes is the 90/10 Rule (n=30), which is the 
requirement that for-profit institutions generate at least 10 percent of their revenues from 
non-federal funding. The second primary theme is Single Definition (n=19), which is the 
policy idea that all institutions of higher education should be defined in the same way 
regardless of whether they are non-profit or for-profit. The third primary theme is the 50-
Percent Rules (n=15), which are the requirements that in order to participate in federal 
financial aid programs an institution must offer a certain percentage of their courses in 
person rather than through correspondence and a certain percentage of students must be 
enrolled in in-person courses rather than correspondence courses. The fourth primary 
theme is the Cohort Default Rate (n=12), which is the measurement of how many 
students have defaulted on their federal student loans within a certain time period. The 
fifth and final, primary theme is Transfer of Credit (n=11), which include policies 
regarding whether and how receiving institutions allow the transfer of course credit from 
sending institutions.   
These five primary policy themes confirmed what one for-profit lobbyist stated 
when asked what the for-profit colleges’ policy agenda items were: “We had an agenda 
of four or five issues that we cared a lot about… A couple of the issues got resolved 
essentially along the way. Others were fought right down to the very end.” 
The same for-profit lobbyist went on to list the policy issues that emerged as the five 
primary themes listed above –  90/10 Rule, Single Definition, the 50-Percent Rules, 
Cohort Default Rate and Transfer of Credit. Another for-profit lobbyist explained that 
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while there were other issues of concern, they knew they needed to prioritize and focus 
their agenda: 
“We had a lot of other things that we cared about, but like everybody else we had 
to have our priorities. If you ask for everything you get nothing. So in the areas in 
which we were focused, which was increasing federal financial aid and getting 
some relief on 90/10 and making sure that the Cohort Default Rate change didn't 
become a huge impediment to quality schools continuing to operate, we came out 
fine. Did we care about other things in the bill? Sure. But at the end of the day 
you've got to pick your battles otherwise you're not going to get anything done.”  
All of the primary themes, except for Transfer of Credit, related to the eligibility 
of for-profit colleges to participate in the federal financial aid programs authorized in 
Title IV of the HEA.  As one non-profit-college lobbyist explained, “Speaking generally, 
they [for-profit colleges] would like as few regulations, few limitations on the amount of 
funding they can get from federal programs.”  
One for-profit-college lobbyist summarized the policy issues of most importance 
to the sector as those that put “restrictions on our [for-profit college] sector that could be 
problematic.” All of the primary policy issues identified were in some way or another 
policy issues that restricted the for-profit-college sector from conducting their business in 
a way that the sector as a whole deemed necessary. 
Other interviewees also summarized the overall agenda of the for-profit-college 
sector as trying to address restrictions on the ability of for-profit colleges to continue and 
expand their access to federal aid programs: “There's a business model that they are 
trying to sustain that is hampered by some of the federal regulations, and I think that 
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their goal is to simply expand their reach as far as they possibly can in federal aid 
programs.” One reporter noted a similar idea that the for-profit-college agenda was 
related to their access to federal aid: “They are very much thriving based on access to 
federal funds and virtually everything flows around continued access to that money.”  
A non-profit-college-lobbyist had a slightly different perspective, emphasizing the 
for-profit-college desire not only to access federal funds, but also to maximize federal 
funds that would be directed to the for-profit sector. “Their aim in the Higher Education 
Act reauthorization was to preserve everything that they had and maximize to the extent 
they could.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist suggested that the for-profit-college policy 
agenda was inherently an agenda for the non-profit-college sector to oppose: “They were 
advancing Single Definition, mandatory Transfer of Credit policy, and there was 90/10, 
Cohort Default Rate. They had a series of things they wanted. And everything they 
wanted they could count on us being diametrically opposed.” This view seems to suggest 
that the policy issue of interest to the for-profit-college sector was also of interest to the 
non-profit-college sector, but for different reasons. The for-profit-college sector sought to 
ease their restrictions, while the non-profit-college sector seemed to be more supportive 
of keeping those restrictions in place. 
The following sections analyze the five primary themes including the 90/10 Rule, 
Single Definition, the 50-Percent Rules, Cohort Default Rate, and Transfer of Credit. 
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90/10 Rule 
 The 90/10 Rule is a provision within Section 102 of the HEA that requires that in 
order to be considered an institution of higher education, proprietary schools must obtain 
at least 10 percent of the school’s revenue from non-Title IV funds, which provide 
federal student financial aid to students attending colleges accredited by an agency 
recognized by the U.S. Department of Education (P.L. 105244). The 90/10 Rule, which 
was implemented by the 1998 HEA Amendments (P.L. 105244), replaced its 
predecessor, the 85/15 Rule, which was authorized by the 1992 HEA Amendments (P.L. 
102-235: CRS, 2005) and specified the same policy but with an 85/15 distribution. The 
90/10 Rule is one of the provisions in the HEA that restricts access to federal student 
financial aid. If an institution is in violation of the 90/10 Rule, they risk losing access to 
funds authorized in Title IV of the HEA, including federal Pell Grants and participation 
in the federal student loan program. 
 Thirty of the 33 interviewees mentioned the 90/10 Rule as a policy agenda item 
for the for-profit colleges during the reauthorization of the HEA, including seven non-
profit-college lobbyists, five for-profit-college lobbyists, eight Democratic Congressional 
staffers, seven Republican Congressional staffers, and three reporters. In the 110
th
 
Congress advocacy materials for the Career College Association (CCA), which the 
organization publicized on their website, the 90/10 Rule is included as a priority for the 
reauthorization. These materials were used as handouts for meetings with members of 
Congress and Congressional staff and in talking points. The section on the 90/10 Rule 
states: 
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“The Career College Association (CCA) supports language that moves the 90-10 
rule to the Program Participation Agreement section of the Higher Education Act, 
making it an issue of administrative capability rather than institutional eligibility, 
and making the rule applicable to all postsecondary education institutions. Also, it 
is critically important that the statute specify some of the types of funds that may 
be counted towards demonstrating compliance with the rule, including funds from 
non-Title IV sources that students use to pay for tuition and fees, as long as the 
institution can reasonably demonstrate that such funds did not come from Title 
IV. These would include institutional matching funds for Title IV programs such 
as, SEOG; funds from education saving plans; funds for non-Title IV eligible 
programs; institutional aid in the form of tuition discounts based upon academic 
achievement or financial need; and revenue from activities necessary for the 
education and training of the students, such as restaurants, clinics, and hair 
salons” (Career College Association 110th Congress HEA Priorities 2008). 
During the 108
th
 and 109
th
 Congresses, the CCA similarly advocated for the 
revision of the 90/10 Rule and that it be applied to all institutions that participate in Title 
IV (Career College Association Annual Report 2006). 
A Republican Congressional staffer, in explaining that the for-profit-college 
sector focused their policy agenda on the 90/10 Rule in 2006 after Democrats took 
control of Congress from Republicans, said: “…historically, Democrats are not a fan of 
the for-profit sector, so they (the for-profit colleges) narrowed their asks; 90/10 became 
the big provision.” Another Republican Congressional staffer confirmed how important 
the 90/10 Rule was to the for-profit-college sector: 
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“I can tell you this: their agenda never changes. It doesn't matter what year 
you're doing the reauthorization. Again, it's because we have special rules that 
apply to them that all relate to how student aid gets funneled into the system and 
most of those are things that we – in the inside circle – called the 90/10 rules that 
impact them greatly when you change amounts of money that's available and how 
90/10 then applies to them. That was a huge issue for them again because aid 
amounts were going to go up and that has a significant impact on how they 
account for money and whether they comply or don't comply with these rules that 
govern basic financing rules at the institutions. I remember people coming in and 
carrying on about 90/10 repeatedly and being concerned about how it was going 
to impact their institutions, whether or not they were going to have to raise tuition 
as to not violate 90/10. But again, that is nothing new. That is an issue people 
have been debating and fighting since 90/10 was put into law.” 
One Republican Congressional staffer explained that the for-profit colleges 
focused on the 90/10 Rule because they needed the policy to be modified in order for the 
sector to grow. With fewer restrictions on the revenue ratio, the sector could access more 
federal financial aid, which would contribute to their ability to grow: “It was a time of 
massive growth in the student loan industry and in the career college industry. So there 
was a sense that the 90/10 Rule was restricting their ability to grow as aggressively as 
they wanted.” 
Lobbyists also explained how the for-profit-college interest in the 90/10 Rule is 
connected to access to federal financial aid. While the non-profit-college and for-profit-
college perspective on this is different, the policy-change implication is the same: any 
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loosening of the 90/10 Rule means for-profit colleges have more access to student 
financial aid. As one non-profit-college lobbyist explained: 
“They [for-profit colleges] were actually perpetuating the falsehood that the 
90/10 Rule applies to individual students rather than institutions. They told people 
on the [Capitol] Hill that they couldn't enroll students who had to rely on 100 
percent of aid because of the 90/10 Rule. So they clearly wanted that. They clearly 
want to derive 100 percent of their money from federal financial aid.” 
From the perspective of a for-profit-college lobbyist: 
“On 90/10 it was to get more relief from the 90/10 because the flip side of the 
90/10 issue is that every time you get more federal aid, at least lower cost 
institutions are in danger of running afoul of the 90/10 Rule, because the students 
are bringing more federal aid with them and pushing past the 90 percent level.”  
Several interview participants mentioned that the 90/10 Rule, and some of the 
other policy agenda items, created conflict among the staff who worked for members of 
Congress on the education committee.  One Congressional Democratic staff noted: 
“I find it fascinating that you're focusing on the for-profits because when I think 
back on the reauthorization, I don't think of them [the for-profit colleges] at all 
and I know – now that you've reminded me – it was a big deal and it caused a lot 
of confrontation talking to one of the staffers. Perhaps in part because there are 
not as many big for-profit schools in [Congressman's state] as other parts of the 
country, it was not a priority for our office and it was just more of a bother more 
than anything.” 
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Another Democratic staffer, provided insight into how these varying opinions on an issue 
like the 90/10 Rule get resolved: 
“Opinions about those issues [the 90/10 Rule] did not necessarily fall along 
traditional party lines. We were tasked in looking for a compromise that worked 
not only across party lines but within our own committee and our own party. We 
had some members [of Congress] that strongly supported going as far as getting 
rid (of the 90/10 Rule) and others who wanted to find the middle.” 
The same Congressional staffer went on to explain how various policy-change proposals 
are considered and various perspectives are weighed in order to develop final policy 
language, specifically in this example, for the 90/10 Rule: 
“With 90/10 the balance was on recognizing some of the changes in business 
practice while upholding the base integrity of the measure. There were some 
proposals that were put on the table to allow for some things to be counted that 
just walked away from the integrity of the measure. To allow for candy bars to be 
sold at the vending machine on campus to count and that clearly was not the 
intent of the measure. But at the same time to allow cash receipts from 
institutional loans to be counted in a certain way seemed to uphold the private 
capital in a way (even though it was done through the university) that it could be 
counted as long as it was not double counted. So it couldn't be profits from 
federal student aid laundered through institutional aid. So it was finding those 
balances and making sure that the integrity and that the 10 percent is really non-
federal aid and not just a re-circulating of funds.” 
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Another Democratic staffer explained that some offices did not weigh in on issues 
such as the 90/10 Rule because they deferred to Chairman George Miller on politically-
sensitive issues. Some of the issues related to the for-profit-college sector were deemed 
politically sensitive because of the issue itself or because of the players involved. 
“There were issues that we did not weigh in on very heavily because some of 
those issues [90/10] were very delicate. Those would be issues that we'd defer 
more to the Chairman, because the Chairman was also trying to balance the 
[requests of the for-profit] colleges, as well as [the effect of policy changes on] 
the students.” 
While there were efforts to find a compromise for policy changes to the 90/10 
Rule, one Republican Congressional staffer explained that some Congressional offices 
just wanted to get rid of the rule altogether. This view was in line with the efforts and 
preference of the for-profit-college sector: 
“When I was at the Department of Education, we proposed just repealing it 
because it's a bizarre rule and just didn't make any sense at all. Shouldn't we have 
been looking at graduation rates and job placement rates as a way to measure 
how schools are serving their students rather than trying to calculate these 
numbers that nobody could understand? I even came to it with my own personal 
bias, because I thought the rules were stupid, and I just thought we should just 
blow them up because I saw firsthand how they do not work. And they accomplish 
nothing except run up costs for people in the program to figure out how to 
manage within the numbers. We just wanted to get rid of them, but we knew that 
wasn't going to fly. Too many people were wedded to keeping these rules in place. 
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Had the Bush Administration still been there they would have blown this up. They 
would have gotten rid of it and said it didn't makes sense to have this kind of 
rule.” 
 
Single Definition 
 Single Definition refers to a proposal to amend current law to combine the two 
separate definitions of “institution of higher education” found in Title I of the HEA in 
sections 101 and 102 (20 U.S.C. 1001, 1002).  Section 101 defines an institution of 
higher education for purposes other than Title IV of the Act (which authorizes federal 
financial aid) and does not include proprietary institutions.  Section 102 defines an 
institution of higher education for purposes of participation in Title IV of the Act and 
does include proprietary institutions. A Single Definition would erase distinctions 
between not-for-profit and for-profit institutions of higher education. Erasing the 
distinction would also potentially provide access to other federal funding and 
opportunities, such as other titles of the HEA, specifically Title III and IV, which provide 
funding to Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Hispanic Serving 
Institutions; provide access to federal research dollars authorized through various federal 
agencies; and affect current tax code related to institutions of higher education. 
 Nineteen of the 33 interviews mentioned Single Definition as a policy issue on the 
for-profit-college agenda, including five non-profit-college lobbyists, three for-profit-
college lobbyists, five Democratic Congressional staff, four Republican Congressional 
staff, and two reporters.  CCA materials from 2006 confirm that the modification of 
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Single Definition was a policy agenda item for the for-profit colleges (2006, Career 
College Association Annual Report).  As one reporter explained: 
“Generally they were looking for acknowledgment of equal status. The whole 
push for Single Definition was part of a much longer campaign that they are still 
fighting every day to be seen as legitimate. There's a really remarkable, and in 
some ways understandable, inferiority complex in that sector if we're spending all 
this time debating what they should be called.” 
A Republican staffer mentioned that while it was an important issue for the for-
profit colleges, there was a difference in terms of the priority level within the sector, and 
that it was not the most important issue for the sector. 
“The issue was different for different groups of the for-profit education 
community. You had individual institutions, more or less the University of 
Phoenix, advocating for equal representation under the definition of an institution 
of higher education. The Career College Association, which is the member-based 
trade association for most of the for-profit institutions (however not 
representative of the University of Phoenix, because they were not a member of 
the Career College Association at that time), was advocating for a Single 
Definition, but it wasn't their number-one issue.” 
Several other participants also noted that Single Definition was not the most important 
issue for the non-profits and that over time, other issues became more important: 
“There was a lot of talk about the definition of higher education and whether 
there should be a Single Definition for all institutions. But by the 110th Congress 
that issue fell to the wayside in favor of other issues.  The attention was focused 
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more on the other issues rather than Single Definition. They focused their 
lobbying efforts.” 
One reporter suggested that while Single Definition was symbolically important, other 
policy issues had more financial impact and therefore rose higher on their agenda: 
“Single Definition was probably symbolically the most important thing they were 
looking for, but they probably knew they weren't going to get that and made a lot 
of noise about that. But what we heard most about were things that involved 
money. They could say, ‘Oh, we lost on single definition but we got this other 
stuff’ that they probably cared more about. I think the Single Definition was really 
about image and status, and [what was] much more important are the things that 
[have] long-term importance. But from a day-to-day operational standpoint, they 
really have to worry about Wall Street.” 
A Republican Congressional staffer explained how a Single Definition 
compromise provision, rather than the full policy proposal from the for-profit-college 
sector, had been included in Republican versions of the reauthorization bill during the 
108
th
 and 109
th
 Congresses: 
“We had in previous Congresses included provisions in past bills, HR 609 and 
HR 4137, that were compromises of Single Definition because, even within our 
caucus, there were some concerns from Mr. Castle [R-Delaware] and a little bit 
from Ehlers [R-Michigan], [regarding] the impact of Single Definition. We did 
have compromise proposals. But it came down to these are their top issues; these 
are the things we thought we could negotiate and move forward.” 
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The same Republican staffer explained the for-profit-college sector’s shift away from 
Single Definition as a strategic decision due to the fact that Democrats took over the 
majority from the Republicans in the midst of the reauthorization process: 
“By the time we actually got into moving the reauthorization, Single Definition 
had totally fallen off the train. So by the last Congress, Single Definition had 
really fallen off because the proprietary schools themselves felt like they were on 
the defensive, because, historically, Democrats are not fans of the for-profit 
sector, so they narrowed their asks.”  
While the for-profit college sector continued to include the Single Definition policy issue 
on their agenda, it became less politically feasible, and therefore, a lesser priority. 
 
The 50-Percent Rules 
 The 50-Percent Rules were provisions in Section 102 of Title I of the HEA. They 
state that if an institution offers more than 50 percent or more of its coursework by 
correspondence – which was also understood to include online courses – or if 50 percent 
of its students were enrolled in correspondence courses, then it was not considered an 
institution of higher education for purposes of participating in the federal student 
financial aid programs authorized by Title IV of the HEA (Pub. L. No. 105-244). 
According to the advocacy materials of the for-profit higher education sector, the sector 
was advocating for the repeal of the 50-Percent Rules, allowing institutions that offered 
more than 50 percent of their courses online and institutions with more than 50 percent of 
their students enrolled in online courses to participate in federal financial aid programs 
(Career College Association 2006). 
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 Fifteen of the 33 interview participants indicated that the for-profit-college 
sector’s policy agenda included modifying the 50-Percent Rules affecting the offering of 
online courses. They included three non-profit lobbyists, three for-profit lobbyists, four 
Democratic Congressional staffers, and five Republican Congressional staffers. The 2006 
Annual Report of the CCA noted that the 50-Percent Rules had been eliminated in the 
budget reconciliation bill passed that year, indicating that the policy issue was of 
importance to them. As one Democratic staffer indicated: 
“… if you go way back, the biggest issue at the time for them [the for-profit 
colleges] was the lifting of the 50-Percent Rules. Then after they were able to get 
that done, it was 90/10 and a Single Definition. Which at some point, I think they 
just kind of gave up and said let's just work on the 90/10 Rule.” 
Another Democratic staffer emphasized that the 50-Percent Rules were important 
to the sector because so many of them offered online courses. “It is not an insignificant 
chunk of them [colleges] that are online, but not all of them are for-profit.”  Several 
interviewees indicated that the repeal of the 50-Percent Rules was not just an agenda item 
for the for-profit-college sector, but also important to the non-profit-college sector 
because of the growth of online education for all of higher education: “Distance 
education is an interesting one because the non-profits wanted to repeal the 50-Percent 
Rules just as much as the for-profits” [For-profit-college lobbyist]. A Republican staffer 
explained that community colleges, in particular, were also interested in changes to 
policies affecting online education: 
“They [for-profit colleges] were also concerned about distance education. But 
that's not just a for-profit issue. Community colleges and others also cared a lot 
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about making sure that those students who enrolled in distance education got a 
relatively fair share of student aid dollars and that they got apportioned between 
on-campus and online programs. Making sure that the online programs were 
eligible for money because we had distance education rules that caused a lot of 
confusion and people weren't sure what programs were eligible and what weren't. 
For-profits are the biggest users of online programs and wanted to make sure 
they were eligible for financial aid just like their campus programs.” 
The growth of online education across both sectors removed some of the political 
resistance by the non-profit-college sector to this for-profit-college sector policy agenda 
item. 
A Republican staffer explained that changes to the 50-Percent Rules were of 
particular interest to those for-profit colleges that had online programs: 
“The 50-Percent Rule was a little bit different in the sense that not all for-profit 
colleges do online education. So I'm trying to think back to who was really 
pushing it. Your big online schools – Capella, Kaplan, Phoenix – all were 
supportive of that [modifying or repealing the 50-Percent Rules]. I cannot 
remember if CCA was involved. I don't know how much they weighed in.”  
In explaining that the 50-Percent Rules were an important policy agenda item for 
the for-profit-college sector, several of the interview participants talked about why the 
provisions in the HEA pertaining to online education needed to be modified. One for-
profit-college lobbyist talked about how the 50-Percent Rules that were being applied to 
online courses were outdated and not relevant to modern course delivery. 
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“The 50-Percent Rules that limited the number of students that you could have in 
correspondence programs. And, correspondence programs had come to be 
interpreted to include online [courses]. Now, nobody knew a thing about online in 
the early 1990s when these restrictions on correspondence schools were created. 
So we thought the 50-Percent Rules were outmoded and ill-suited to deal with 
online [courses] and should be either repealed or not applied to online [courses]. 
There was a lot of debate that we took part in about, okay, well, we don't want to 
just open up the floodgates.  We were willing to have some quality requirements 
that would be applicable to truly online programs. We thought they ought to 
really look to the accrediting agencies to come up with that and there was a lot of 
back and forth about what that ought to be. But that was basically our position on 
online- get rid of the 50-Percent Rules as they related to online [courses]. 
Outmoded, stifling innovation, stifling a delivery system that could improve 
access. Come up with something else to ensure quality and integrity.”  
Another for-profit-college lobbyist mentioned that online courses as a newer form 
of course delivery was a reason for why the repeal of the 50-Percent Rules issue was on 
the for-profit agenda: “Distance education has come a long way. But even when we 
started this process eight or nine, ten years ago it was still a new concept. It was up and 
coming.” Other interview participants echoed the idea that online education was a new 
course delivery system that should not have the restrictions as prescribed by the 50-
Percent Rules: 
“The Department of Education had done a number of studies to show that the 50-
Percent Rules were arbitrary [and] that distance education was a good thing. 
92 
 
 
 
That it opened up access to students that wouldn't otherwise access, and non-
traditional students. We thought of it as modernizing higher education. That was 
a policy change that we legitimately thought was good. We weren't putting it in 
[legislation] because someone asked us to put it in kind of thing.” [Republican 
Congressional staffer] 
Others mentioned the challenges that students experienced in accessing a college 
degree. One Republican Congressional explained that modifications to the 50-Percent 
Rules would be important for enhancing student access to higher education: 
“Specific to 50-Percent Rules, we talked to students from these institutions that 
had challenges trying to receive access to programs that were provided at a 
distance because of some of the limitations that were set up by the statute.”  
 
Cohort Default Rate 
 Cohort Default Rate refers to the percentage of a college’s borrowers who go into 
default on certain loans within a certain time period after going into repayment 
(www.ed.gov). These rates are published by the U.S. Department of Education once per 
year. From 1998-2008 Section 435(l) of the HEA included a 270-day threshold for 
delinquent federal student loans to be considered in default (www.finaid.org).  Before the 
270-day threshold, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
changed the definition of a default on federal education loans from a delinquency of 120 
days to 180 days. The 1998 reauthorization of the HEA changed the 180-day threshold to 
270 days. Under the law prior to the amendments made by the 2008 reauthorization of the 
HEA, the cohort default rate was defined as the percentage of borrowers entering 
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repayment in one fiscal year who default by the end of the following fiscal year – March 
31, 2011. This is commonly known as the 2-year default rate, and the U.S. Department of 
Education has a set of regulations regarding this statute (34 CFR 682.200(b)). 
 Twelve of the 33 interview participants mentioned the Cohort Default Rate issue 
as an agenda item of the for-profit colleges, including two non-profit-college lobbyists, 
two for-profit-college lobbyists, four Democratic Congressional staffers, two Republican 
Congressional staffers, and two reporters. One Democratic Congressional staffer 
explained that the for-profit-college sector likely would have preferred that it not be an 
issue up for discussion during the reauthorization: “They wanted us to not touch anything 
related to Cohort Default Rate because they thought it [a change] would negatively affect 
them.” 
An interesting finding that emerged in the interviews is that, while the other 
identified for-profit-college policy issues were understood to be proactive policy issues 
for the for-profit-college sector, the Cohort Default Rate was seen as a reactive policy 
issue.  In fact, the Cohort Default Rate did not show up in advocacy materials or CCA list 
of priorities for the reauthorization, indicating that this issue was something that may 
have been prompted by another entity’s agenda. Several interviewees noted the reactive 
nature of this particular policy issue: “When an amendment was offered up in committee 
by Representative  [D-Arizona] on the Cohort Default Rate, that became one of their 
issues that they were trying to fight” [Democratic Congressional staff]. The same 
Democratic staffer went on to say: “Certainly I don't think they anticipated a Cohort 
Default Rate fight, but they certainly got it.” One non-profit-college lobbyist described 
this reactive stance the for-profit-college sector was forced to take: 
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“90/10, Single Definition, and Transfer of Credit were affirmative priorities of the 
for-profit sector, which, frankly, they put on the agenda. They wanted to brush 
[the Cohort Default Rate issue] under the rug until [Congressman Tim] Bishop 
[D-New York] pounced on them and put something out there that they then had to 
defuse.” 
If this was a policy issue that the for-profit colleges were reacting to, the question 
becomes: who put the issue on the agenda?  According to the interviewees, the effort to 
move from a 2-year to a 3-year Cohort Default Rate (with penalties as steep as becoming 
ineligible to participate in the Title IV student financial aid institutions for those 
institutions whose default rates were higher than the threshold) was a joint effort that 
originated outside of Congress with a group of non-profit-college lobbyists. The change 
in the Cohort Default Rate policy was then championed within Congress by two 
Democrats on the House Education Committee: Congressmen Tim Bishop (D-New York) 
and Raul Grijalva (D-Arizona). According to the non-profit-college lobbyist who helped 
to craft this issue: 
“In working with my colleagues in putting forth efforts to visit offices and talk to 
them, we came up with a notion from reading the Department of Education 
Inspector General's report from 2003 on the Cohort Default Rate about how 
certain sectors were avoiding their borrowers who defaulted. So we worked with 
a couple of the [Congressional] offices to try to get the period that default 
information is collected extended.” 
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A Democratic Congressional staffer had the following recollection about how the Cohort 
Default Rate became a policy issue of debate during the reauthorization and noted that 
the for-profit-college sector was on the defense with this issue rather than the offense: 
“The Cohort Default Rate changes came from a concern, I think, really largely 
from on the Hill, here on the House side. Mr. Bishop [D-New York] and Mr. 
Grijalva [D-Arizona] were greatly concerned that the default picture looked very 
different in a two-year versus three-year measurement. And, shouldn't we be 
looking at this three-year measurement? They [the for-profits] were defensive 
about that change.”  
A non-profit-college lobbyist engaged in the Cohort Default Rate issue and its rise 
on the policy agenda for the reauthorization described the involvement of the non-profit-
college sector as an attempt to strengthen the measure.  The change towards 
strengthening the measure was viewed as something for the for-profit-college sector to 
defend against: 
“We were trying to strengthen the Cohort Default Rate measure that Congress 
had in place to track the effectiveness of an institution that gets federal [student 
financial] aid. We played a little offense there and attempted to expand a window 
in which colleges are evaluated against their cohort default rate.  They [the for-
profit-college sector] were actually playing pretty substantial defense on. They 
had a lot of concern about the cohort default rate. I think the reason was that… 
I'm of the belief that…the current window allows them to fudge a lot to hold those 
borrowers who are going to default at bay just long enough to get the out of that 
2-year window. So they [are able to] hold their default rates down. So when we 
96 
 
 
 
came out with the suggestion to expand the window, they were quite concerned 
and didn't like that very much.”  
A higher education reporter explained how the Cohort Default Rate issue was 
brought in towards the end of the reauthorization debate. The reporter gave credit to “One 
Dupont,” [a reference to the address of the building where a number of higher education 
associations are officed] rather than any Member of Congress, for placing the issue on the 
agenda. 
“That was sort of thrown in there near the end.  One Dupont [Circle] came 
together and came up with this proposal to move to 3-year default rate and it got 
lobbied very heavily. They changed to a 3-year rate, but changed the threshold to 
30 percent and you wouldn't just be terminated anymore if you exceeded the 
rate.” 
Some interview participants talked about the rise of this policy issue as being 
quite a surprise. At first, some of those involved in the process were not sure what the 
proposed provision would actually do or mean for the for-profit-college sector, as one 
Republican Congressional staffer explained: 
“With regard to all of those other provisions, it was all the Career College 
Association or others [in the for-profit-college sector] trying to get changes to 
those things because those things had become problems. So with the Cohort 
Default Rate idea, that was an idea that came up from a Democratic member that 
was couched prior to the mark-up as a financial literacy measure and it ended up 
not being a financial literacy measure really at all. And it had a really 
disproportionate effect on career colleges, on community colleges, and some of 
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the Minority Serving Institutions. It took a while for us, relatively speaking, to 
understand the impact of that provision. Even though it was a bipartisan process, 
it was not something that we had discussed prior to the mark-up. When we saw it 
at the mark-up, we just didn’t have that kind of time to figure out what exactly it 
did and who it was going to affect. So that took a little while for it to sink in, as to 
what the true impact was going to be. Once it did sink in, it became known that it 
would not be helpful to people. And, we had to work through a compromise on 
that.” 
A for-profit-college lobbyist also described this issue as a last-minute policy debate and 
explained how the for-profit-college sector was taken by surprise, and attributed to a 
Member of Congress the rise of the issue on the reauthorization agenda. 
“There was one more issue that popped up at the very end. It was not an issue on 
our agenda, but it was one we had to react to and it was courtesy of our pal 
Congressman Bishop [D-NY]. He had a sort of a middle of the night amendment 
that he offered during the mark-up in November of 2007 that changed the way 
Cohort Default Rates were calculated. The amendment just went through bing-
bang. And, it was just accepted on a voice vote and it was like, ‘Whoa, what just 
happened?’ And, it turned out that that had some pretty large ramifications and 
we had to get some modifications to that amendment. And, again Chairman Miller 
[D-California] and his staff were willing to listen to our arguments. [He and his 
staff] heard our arguments and worked with us to achieve some compromises that 
we felt at the time were going to make it manageable.  In the meantime, a severe 
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recession has occurred and student loans are a form of consumer debt and 
whether that story is done yet is unknown.” 
One for-profit-college lobbyist suggested that there were many potential 
situations that could have required the sector to act in a defensive, rather than offensive 
manner, but that the Cohort Default Rate was the only one that was actually debated and 
passed in some form: 
“If you name any nutty restriction, somebody on the consumer side was proposing 
[it]. A lot of people want to put us out of business. So there were a million 
different ones out there. I mean I don't think too many of them were taken 
seriously but there were all kinds of things. The only thing that passed with most 
concern was the change in the Cohort Default Rate calculation from a 2-year 
period to a 3-year period. Even though it doesn't take effect for some time, it 
could have a deleterious effect on some schools.” 
One Republican staffer questioned whether the Cohort Default Rate measure was 
even a helpful mechanism to measure institutional quality. The staff member suggested 
that other measures would be better suited to test for quality in higher education: 
“On the Cohort Default Rate issue, I personally have mixed feelings about it. You 
can see both sides of it. If 75 percent of the students are making it [the loan 
payment], that's great. If 74 percent are, well, that's close. Even with Cohort 
Default Rate you run into the same kind of problems. We weren’t going to repeal 
the Cohort Default Rate rule, but wouldn’t we serve students better if we were 
looking at graduation rates and job placement rates and how they are actually 
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doing? But, instead we're looking at default rates. But [we] keep perpetuating it 
because no one wants to change it.” 
 
Transfer of Credit 
 The Transfer of Credit issue refers to the for-profit-college sector’s concern that 
traditional, regionally accredited, non-profit colleges seemed to be automatically and 
systematically denying credits and degrees from institutions simply because those 
institutions received accreditation from a national accreditor, rather than from a regional 
accreditor. Federal law does not mandate policies regarding the transfer of credit, and, 
until the most recent reauthorization of the HEA, had been silent on the issue of transfer 
of credit between institutions.  
The CCA printed a “Legislative Priorities for the 110th Congress” advocacy 
document and under the heading “Transfer of Credit” included the following statement: 
“CCA proposes receiving institutions be required to provide more information to 
potential students and the public about the credit transfer process. We do not 
propose to restrict academic freedom and recognize that receiving institutions 
must have some flexibility on credit transfer. CCA supports language requiring 
institutions to have and publicly disclose a detailed policy on transfer of credit 
and acceptance of degrees and to consider fairly proffered credits or degrees 
without regard to whether the institution is nationally or regionally accredited, so 
long as the accreditation is by an agency recognized by the Department of 
Education.” 
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Another CCA document developed during the 110
th
 Congress proposed: 
“Institutions should be prohibited from rejecting credits earned without examining those 
specific credits on a case-by-case basis” (CCA 110th Congress Legislative Agenda, p. 7). 
 According to advocacy materials from the 108
th
 and 109
th
 Congresses and 
interviews for this study, the CCA had advocated for a Transfer of Credit policy that 
would have required institutions to accept credits from any institution accredited by an 
accrediting agency recognized by the US Department of Education (CCA 108
th
 and 109
th
 
Congress Legislative Agenda). Such a change in Transfer of Credit policies at colleges in 
the United States would have been unprecedented involvement of the federal government 
in what had traditionally been seen as the sole role of individual higher education 
institutions.  
 Several interviewees noted the importance of the Transfer of Credit issue to the 
for-profit-college sector and to the students who attend for-profit colleges: 
“Another big issue for us was Transfer of Credit. We felt that there were unfair, 
inequitable, and inefficient barriers to students who attended for-profit schools 
that were nationally accredited from transferring their credits solely based on the 
accreditation of the school – i.e. they were regionally accredited. So therefore 
many schools, we thought, unfairly had policy or practices that denied those 
credit transfers and we wanted to do something about that in the 
reauthorization.” [For-profit-college lobbyist] 
Another for-profit-college lobbyist explained how the Transfer of Credit issue was high 
on the for-profit-college sector’s agenda list: 
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 “Number two on our list was removing barriers to students who wanted to 
transfer credits in higher education and we wanted a fix to statute for that. 
Requiring institutions to consider transfer of credits and not automatically 
require that transfer credits be denied solely on the accreditation of an 
institution.” 
A Republican Congressional staffer explained that students were being denied 
transfer simply because of their enrollment at a for-profit college, and that is why this 
issue was part of the for-profit-college agenda: “Transfer of credit was something that 
they wanted and a problem that came up in the industry where students were being 
denied transfer of credit for no other reason than they went to a proprietary school.”  
Meanwhile, a Democratic Congressional staffer noted that Transfer of Credit was 
an important priority for the for-profit-college sector because the sector stood to benefit 
financially for such a change in policy, rather than any change in transfer of credit policy 
being a benefit for the students: “They were also big on Transfer of Credit issues. So they 
also wanted something in regulation saying that no school could deny a student based on 
the accreditation agency. That would have been a boon for them.”  
A for-profit-college lobbyist mentioned the accreditation status of a school as a 
rationale for the Transfer of Credit issue being on the reauthorization agenda: 
“On Transfer of Credit we wanted to ensure that institutions didn't arbitrarily 
deny students the ability to transfer in credits simply because they were coming 
from schools that were nationally, rather than regionally, accredited. As long as 
they were accredited and been through the process and had been recognized by 
the Department of Education as a quality metric.” 
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A reporter noted that while Transfer of Credit was an important issue to the for-
profit-college sector, it was met with considerable resistance by the non-profit-college 
sector: “Obviously non-profits didn't want to be compelled to accept credits transferred 
from the for-profit institutions. That's why the language got tempered over time.”  
Meanwhile, a non-profit-college lobbyist explained why non-profit colleges did not want 
to be compelled to accept credits from another institution: 
“We believe that Transfer of Credit is a matter of absolute discretion on the part 
of the receiving institution.  There is something really weird to say to somebody 
that you make a degree out of this bag of these credits that you've never seen from 
an institution you've never heard of. It's tantamount to showing up at a Ford 
dealership with a bag of auto parts from various places that you've never heard of 
and demand to call it a Ford.” 
The same non-profit-college lobbyist opposed to this policy change proposed by the for-
profit-college sector explained that this policy agenda item was originated by the for-
profit-college sector and not by a policy maker: 
“No member of Congress gets up and says, ‘I know! Let me federalize English 
101!’ Congress doesn't operate that way. It's not sexy enough.  It's not a topic 
anyone gets too enthused about. So these are three topics [Single Definition, 
90/10 and Transfer of Credit] that in a very coordinated way they put on 
Congress's agenda.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist reflected on how and why the proprietary sector 
used Congress to advance the Transfer of Credit agenda item, in spite of the 
unprecedented nature of the federal government in Transfer of Credit.  
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“I think the proprietary schools look at it more as one might think of as single-
issue advocacy. They looked at it [the reauthorization of the HEA] and said, 
‘What are our special issues? What do we want? And, how can Congress help us 
get what we want and to make other players do what we want?’ And Transfer of 
Credit is an excellent example of that. They saw their institutions having problems 
– potentially legitimate problems – with students getting a fair shake at getting 
their credits reviewed by institutions. That is a problem that many of us would 
acknowledge exists, but we don't believe the solution is with the federal 
government. They don't have a philosophical construct for where a solution is, so 
if they can have the federal government to mandate their problems as solved they 
can go back to members and say, ‘Look what we got.’” 
Other interviewees also mentioned that, while the issue was uniquely an issue for 
the for-profit colleges, the resistance to this policy change was not general resistance to 
the for-profit colleges, but rather the resistance to changes to Transfer of Credit had more 
to do with the concern about the unprecedented role the federal government would have 
in regards to Transfer of Credit if the policy change was to be implemented:  
“Transfer of Credit was included [in the legislation] but we were having a really 
hard time and that was partially over on the Senate, because of the [role of the] 
federal government.  It wasn't as much [about opposition to] proprietary schools, 
but whether it was the federal government's role to tell schools what they can and 
cannot accept” [Republican Congressional staff]. 
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Secondary Themes 
The two secondary themes include accreditation (the process by which a college 
is recognized as a legitimate institution of higher education, notably for purposes of 
participation in federal financial aid) and funding levels for federal financial aid. And the 
least prominent themes included incentive compensation (the act of providing bonuses to 
employees for recruiting and enrolling students), the certification of private educational 
loans (the process by which a school confirms that you are attending school and are using 
the loan for education purposes), year-round Pell grants (the ability of qualified students 
to receive a second Pell grant outside of the regular academic year to attend school in the 
summer), and “teach out” (the situation in which one school takes the students of another 
school that has shut down). 
 
Individuals and Organizations 
Which organizations and individuals were most involved in the for-profit-college policy 
agenda for the discussion, development and passage of the legislation that resulted in the 
2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
 
The second guiding question sought to find out which individuals and 
organizations were involved in the policy issues of interest to the for-profit colleges 
during the HEA reauthorization process. The interview participants mentioned dozens of 
various individuals and organizations.  
For the purposes of reporting the findings, in some cases I grouped an individual 
with another individual or an individual with an organization. For example, a participant 
may have specifically mentioned a Congressional staffer by name, while another 
participant referred to the same person as “Congressman X’s staff.” In the case where a 
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staffer was referenced by his or her own name, I identified him or her as an individual 
member of Congress. Likewise, a participant may have named a specific lobbyist and 
another participant named the organization for which the lobbyist worked. In those cases, 
instead of counting those mentions as two different individuals or organizations, I treated 
them as two mentions of the same individual. If an individual was named more than three 
times, emerging as a primary or secondary theme, I did not merge that individual with an 
organization. Of the 42 individuals and organizations, nine emerged as primary, 19 
emerged as secondary, and 14 emerged as less prominent. It is also important to note that 
interview participants may not have associated an individual or organization, even an 
individual or organization for whom he or she worked, when naming individuals and 
organizations most involved in the for-profit-college issues, despite the fact that the 
individual or organization was likely very much involved. I did not impute an individual 
or organization knowing for whom the interview participant worked. The following 
sections explore the primary individuals and primary organizations. 
 
Primary Individuals  
Of the eight primary individuals and organizations named, five are references to 
individuals, including Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon (n=20), Congressman 
Robert Andrews (n=19), Congresswoman Carolyn McCarthy (n=12), Congressman Tim 
Bishop (n=11) and “for-profit-college lobbyists” (n=13).  
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Howard “Buck” McKeon (R-California) 
Howard “Buck” McKeon is a Republican member of the U.S. House of 
Representative, representing the 25
th
 Congressional District in California. During the 
timeframe of the investigation, he was a member of the House Education and Workforce 
Committee, and during a portion of the 109
th
 Congress he was Chair of the committee 
when Republicans were in the Majority and the Ranking Member when the Republicans 
were in the Minority. Twenty participants named McKeon as an individual most involved 
in for-profit-college policy issues, including six non-profit college lobbyists, five for-
profit college lobbyists, four Democratic Congressional staffers, two Republican 
Congressional staffers, and three reporters.  
Interviewees noted that McKeon took the lead on for-profit-college sector policy 
issues during the debate on the reauthorization. A Republican Congressional staffer 
explained: 
“[McKeon has] seen the good work that has come out of the for-profit schools. So 
that [the for-profit college agenda] was, for Mr. McKeon, that was one of his big 
topics. We knew we were going into a negotiation with a majority and minority 
spread that was going to be difficult for us to stop things unless they were 
exceptionally important. So this [the for-profit college policy agenda] was one of 
his top issues going in.” 
The same staffer went on to explain how McKeon’s support for the for-profit-college 
sector was commonly known among Congressional staff: “The way the negotiations all 
went, they [the Democratic staff] knew it [the for-profit college agenda] was a big deal 
for McKeon and let me do my thing and agreed with me basically.” 
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A Democratic Congressional staffer explained how Mr. McKeon was the key 
member in regards to the for-profit policy issues: “Mr. McKeon was certainly involved 
and interested in these issues. Other than Mr. McKeon, there really weren't particular 
members that I recall.” Another Democratic Congressional staffer explained that 
McKeon and John Boehner, who each at one point or another were chairs of the House 
Education and the Workforce Committee, led their Republican members in this policy 
area: “The rest of the Republican members just seemed to go along with Boehner and 
McKeon.” 
A different Democratic Congressional staffer further explained the dynamic of 
McKeon taking the lead on policy issues of concern to the for-profit-college sector 
relative to other Republican members on the House Education and Workforce 
Committee: 
“I remember McKeon taking more of the lead on this. There were other members. 
But the honest truth to how the Committee worked on the Republican side, they 
were very top down; very hierarchical. Members didn't step out of line. That was 
a no-no. And they had an insane amount of discipline with their members. 
Whatever one Member might be thinking, it didn't matter because you took the 
party line and people rarely stepped out of that. The reason why I bring it up –
because it didn't matter what they individually thought and they were actually 
staffed by the Committee staff who belonged to the most senior Member of the 
Committee. On the Democratic side, it was a little more ‘free for all.’ People had 
their own thoughts and beliefs and there was way less the idea that you had to 
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repeat what the Chairman was telling you to do. And you have your own staff and 
you think for yourself.”  
A non-profit-college lobbyist also noted this phenomenon: “They really locked down the 
full committee, Chairman Boehner and Buck McKeon, and it seemed like everyone else 
on the committee was just doing their bidding.”  
Several interviewees mentioned McKeon’s Republican political identification as a 
factor in his support for the for-profit-college sector policy issues: “On the House side, 
certainly the Republicans on the Education and Labor Committee always took the lead 
on these issues. Mr. McKeon was personally involved in all of these issues; he was 
always an advocate for for-profit education.” Another for-profit-college lobbyist 
explained how the for-profit agenda during the reauthorization process fared better under 
the leadership of McKeon and a Republican majority: “Certainly Chairman McKeon was 
helpful. On the whole we did better when the Republicans were in charge than once the 
Democrats took over.”  
And, a different for-profit-college lobbyist explained further how the role of McKeon as 
the Republican lead on for-profit-college policy issues helped to support the for-profit-
college sector agenda: “Buck McKeon, who was Chairman of the subcommittee, he and 
his staff got this [the for-profit college agenda] and were very supportive.” Other 
interviews explained how Republicans under Mr. McKeon’s leadership were generally 
supportive of the for-profit college agenda. One for-profit-college lobbyist summarized 
simply: “Most of the support came from Republicans.” 
A Republican Congressional staffer explained the strong Republican support for 
the for-profit-college agenda and the general wariness of the Democrats: 
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“Let's keep politics straight on the whole thing: I worked for the Republicans. We 
are very strong supporters of the for-profit sector and certainly have a reputation 
of supporting the for-profits, more so then our counterparts on the Democratic 
side. So I think a lot of times the for-profits came to the Republicans on the 
Education and Labor Committee looking for them to help them because they knew 
that they were going to have trouble with Democrats on the committee. Not all the 
Democrats, but certainly a lot of the Democrats were not as favorable towards 
for-profit education. So in a lot of ways we took their issues and tried to figure out 
how to make them work and still maintain what we considered the integrity of the 
program and still address issues for for-profit education for their students and try 
to get our friends on the other side of the aisle to see that there were ways we 
could do this that wouldn't open everything up to fraud and abuse. That was 
always the concern that was raised when you debated these issues in committee.” 
Another Republican Congressional staffer explained how the support from 
Republicans for the for-profit-college agenda came from an ideological set of beliefs: 
“There were certainly a lot of Republican offices [that] were receptive to their 
message. I think that comes from an ideological perspective from those offices 
who didn't draw a very smart analogy. They'd blanket say, ‘Well, it's a privatized 
education. Generally I'm for more privatization in government. They receive 
federal money so the more privatization there is, inherently, the better.’” 
A non-profit-college lobbyist explained this Republican ideology as being in alignment 
with a business model of making money: 
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“I've found that the Republican general higher education theory [is] that anyone 
making money [is] necessarily good. Literally as a function of them making 
money.  And so, the student lenders were good because they were making money. 
The for-profit colleges were good because they were making money. They didn't 
actually appear to have a deeper analysis.” 
Meanwhile, a Republican Congressional staffer suggested that non-profit-college 
lobbyists were more focused on opposing the set of for-profit-college policy priorities, 
rather than working with Republicans to find a compromise, or perhaps encouraging the 
“deeper analysis,” between the two set of viewpoints on a given issue: “Their strategy 
(non-profit higher education) at the time (during the Republican majority) was to go to 
the Democrats to get them to oppose rather than coming to us (Republicans) to come to a 
compromise.” A for-profit-college lobbyist explained the difference between the 
Republican and Democratic ideology: “On the whole the Republicans have always been 
friendlier to private-sector enterprise. And Democrats have always been somewhat 
uncomfortable with the thought that profit and education could be said in the same 
sentence.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer explained the difference in a similar way: 
“The Democrats were going to be opposed to for-profit companies who were 
going to take education and cheapen it. And Republicans, they somehow were 
more for the business side of it. These companies are making a lot of money and 
are educating people and they should be able to do what they need to do to. I 
don't really remember where it stemmed from, but, when I joined the committee 
with my boss, it was always Boehner and McKeon who were for the for-profits. It 
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was always known. When we tried the Higher Education Act reauthorization the 
first time it was just known that they were kind on the same side as them and I 
never knew their reasoning. Was it money in terms of fundraising or ideologically 
they were pro-business and they wanted them to do well?” 
This difference in support and ideology was also something that required a 
balancing act. As explained by a for-profit-college lobbyist, those involved in the 
reauthorization process had to be careful to take into consideration both sets of ideology: 
“On the Republican side, it was making sure that these issues didn't become too 
partisan. Because that could have been counterproductive too. You want to make 
sure that these issues are being dealt with on a bipartisan basis. You don't want 
the Democrats to oppose something just because the Republicans support it. And 
normally the Republicans are more supportive of our sector than the Democrats 
are but that can work to your disadvantage in a highly charged partisan 
atmosphere where the Republicans say up and the Democrats say down just as a 
matter of instinct. So we had to work with Republicans to make sure that while 
they wanted to be helpful to us that they didn't ‘over partisanize,’ if there is such a 
word, those issues and inadvertently drive Chairman Miller and other Democrats 
to oppose us just because it was a Republican position. So everything that we did 
was done in a non-partisan way and I think that was key.”  
Meanwhile, one Democratic Congressional staffer disagreed that the support of 
the for-profit-college agenda was as clear a partisan issue as many of the interviewees 
suggested: “Well, this is not a partisan thing. Both parties had members who were 
sympathetic. And it just depended. Different members would latch onto different things. 
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McKeon [a Republican] was a really big proponent of the for-profits. Rob Andrews [a 
Democrat] was [also] interested in helping for-profits.”   
Several of the participants who mentioned McKeon as a player in these issues, 
noted not only his party affiliation as a reason for his involvement in advancing the for-
profit-college agenda, but also the financial ties to the for-profit colleges as a reason that 
may have influenced his support of the for-profit-college policy agenda. A Democratic 
Congressional staffer described McKeon’s support as a combination of the result of 
ideological similarities and financial support from the for-profit colleges: 
“It was funny because most of the Republican members didn't seem to care about 
it (for-profit college issues), in all honesty. I mean McKeon cared about it and 
were on the for-profit side. Mostly a mix of getting tons of money from them and it 
was almost ideological.” 
A reporter also recalled the role of financial support in McKeon’s support of the for-
profit-college policy agenda: 
“McKeon and Boehner [were most involved in the for-profit college issues] 
because they were basically in the pockets of the for-profits. They were really 
carrying the water. In the midst of this I remember there was a “60 Minutes” 
piece on Career Education Corporation and the Democrats forced the 
Republicans to hold a hearing on the issue in which Boehner and McKeon were 
extremely defensive of the industry. They were getting hundreds of thousands of 
dollars from for-profit colleges. I think McKeon was found to have investments in 
Corinthian that he had to give up when they went public. But they were really 
carrying the water.”   
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A Democratic Congressional staffer noted a seeming correlation between McKeon’s 
policy positions and the financial support of his political campaign: “You look at 
someone like McKeon. He did get quite a bit of money from the banks and for-profit 
industries and I thought you could see a correlation of what he was supporting and 
where the dollars were coming from.”  Two non-profit-college lobbyists drew similar 
correlations between the for-profits and the financial support Mr. McKeon received from 
the for-profit colleges. One stating: “On the Republican side we had Buck McKeon. I 
don't even know who all got involved on the Republican side on the for-profit side 
because McKeon seemed seemingly bought and sold on the issues.” And the other 
concluding that the influence extended to Congress and the committee, led by Boehner 
and McKeon, as a whole: “The Congress was extremely beholden to them because it was 
a committee that was beholden to them: Buck McKeon and Boehner.”  
Several interviews also pointed out that McKeon was not just a proponent of for-
profit-college issues, but McKeon also took the lead on addressing issues related to rising 
college costs and college accountability issues. One Republican Congressional staffer 
described how these concerns resulted in a number of hearings and meetings, as well as 
process for gathering comments to help shape the reauthorization agenda: 
“We must have had twenty-something hearings, if not more. Umpteen meetings. It 
was very inclusive. We had a ton of meetings of interested folks who had a 
position or had a thought or had an idea. We put out a call for comments. We 
started the process early on [with] the FED UP [an effort to gather feedback and 
input from the public about higher education in preparation for the 
reauthorization] process. At the time it was Mr. McKeon who was chairing the 
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subcommittee. He was all about hearing what "real people" had to say, not just 
the associations and the lobbyists. This was the first time there was an attempt to 
go out to the masses. We created a website. We got about 3,000 comments on that 
thing and I read every one of them.”  
Another Republican Congressional staffer also recalled the push towards more 
accountability in higher education as an issue led by McKeon: “There were several other 
important people involved at the time. Buck McKeon, the senior Republican, who pushed 
a lot of the accountability issues.” A non-profit-college lobbyist confirmed McKeon’s 
role in addressing accountability in higher education, specifically in regards to the rising 
cost of college: “Obviously college costs was McKeon.” 
One reporter made a connection between McKeon’s concern around rising college costs 
and the for-profit-college sector: 
“I remember going in and interviewing McKeon during this period of time. Early 
on when he first came out with [the college cost] proposal and we were talking 
about college prices and I said (to him), ‘You realize that some of these for-profits 
are very expensive.’ And he said (to me), ‘No they're not’. So this willful 
ignorance over the fact of how much they were charging.  At that time I didn't 
know that McKeon had held stock in Corinthian.  And at one point Sally Stroup 
had gone from working for McKeon to being the chief lobbyist for the University 
of Phoenix and then going to the Department of Education. So there were 
different ties there as well. They (the for-profit colleges) got a free ride on the 
whole college cost debate and let the non-profits fight that battle.”  
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Robert Andrews (D-New Jersey) 
Robert Andrews is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives 
representing the First Congressional District of New Jersey. At the time of the 
investigation he was a member of the House Education and the Workforce Committee. 
Seventeen participants named him as an individual most involved in for-profit-college 
policy issues, including two non-profit-college lobbyists, five for-profit-college lobbyists, 
four Democratic Congressional staffers, three Republican Congressional staffers, and 
three reporters.  
Interviewees noted that Rob Andrews, like McKeon, was supportive of the for-
profit-college policy agenda: “I would say that on the Democratic side, that was much 
more of a challenge, but there were individual Democrats we felt were good allies.  
Certainly Congressman Rob Andrews from New Jersey was a real stalwart – was and 
is.” Another for-profit-college lobbyist noted Andrews’ support: “We also worked with 
folks who were supportive, such as Rob Andrews, on the Democratic side, and 
Congresswoman McCarthy [D-New York].” 
One reporter noted that Andrews’ position in regards to the for-profit colleges 
differed from his Democratic colleagues’. While Andrews remained consistently 
supportive of the for-profit-college agenda over time, his Democratic colleagues, in 
general, seemed to be opposed to the for-profit-college agenda during their time in the 
minority, but were less critical when Democrats became the majority. This change in the 
Democrats’ position could be attributed to having Democratic members who were 
supportive of the for-profit-college sector and needing to include that perspective in 
policymaking once they were in the majority and in charge of crafting policy changes. 
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“When they (Democrats) were in the minority they were pretty forceful in 
opposing Republican efforts to do some of these things. They (Democrats) really, 
besides Andrews and McCarthy, they were pretty united and they forced the 
Republicans to have that hearing after the 60 Minutes piece. But once the 
Democrats got control they changed their tune a bit.”  
A non-profit-college lobbyist also noted the unique nature of Andrews’ support: 
“One person who sticks out, and he was always involved from a completely 
random perspective, Rob Andrews from New Jersey. He always seemed to fall 
pretty well short of that view [a stronger regulatory approach], even when mostly 
other Democrats were headed in that direction. So that was source of 
consternation [for our organization].”  
 A Republican Congressional staffer explained how having a Democrat in support 
of the for-profit-college agenda was important to shaping the provisions related to the 
for-profit-college policy agenda. The support of Andrews ensured the for-profit-college 
agenda was included in Democratic discussions: 
“On the Democratic side, they [for-profit colleges] got a lot of help on their 
issues from Rob Andrews who also cared a lot about for-profit education and just 
wanted to make sure that they were getting a fair shake in the whole discussion 
and weren't getting left out and that their issues were getting looked at and 
addressed. Maybe you couldn't do everything that people wanted. Rob Andrews 
helped a lot when we were trying to shape these policies.” 
The same Republican Congressional staffer explained the complicated nature of 
some of the policy issues under debate during the reauthorization and how this meant that 
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some members did not pay as much attention to the issues as some other members. 
Andrews did take time to understand the issues. For those offices that opposed the for-
profit agenda, Mr. Andrews’ ability to understand and his sympathy were a two-pronged 
challenge, as one Democratic staffer explained: “The biggest challenge for us was 
probably Rob Andrews because he's a really smart guy and very sympathetic.”  
Just as some interviewees pointed to the relationship between money and 
McKeon’s interest in the for-profit-college sector positions, other interviewees, including 
a reporter, pointed to Andrews’ financial support from the for-profit-college sector and 
his support of the for-profit-college agenda: “Andrews and McCarthy have always been 
champions of the for-profit colleges. Especially Andrews who was particularly involved 
in the Cohort Default Rate issue.  And, he's gotten a decent amount of money from the 
for-profits over the years.”  Another reporter made a similar connection between funding 
and support for the for-profit-college policy agenda, and also made note that Andrews’ 
support of the for-profit colleges was not necessarily in line with the majority of his 
Democratic colleagues and that other members’ support or opposition were not always in 
line with their party: 
“Most of the Republicans, and on the Democratic side, [such as] Rob Andrews 
[D-New Jersey], has been totally in their pockets for a really long time. And 
McCarthy [D-New York] was also. But Andrews was the leading Democrat who 
was for them. And then on the opposite side, Miller [D-California] was definitely 
against them at the time. Tierney [D-Massachusetts] and Bishop [D-New York] 
were strong against. And on Republican side, Castle [R-Delaware] and people 
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like Ehlers [R-Michigan] and Upton from Michigan. There were a handful on 
each side who were not with their party on the issue.”  
A Democratic Congressional staffer also drew a relationship between Andrews’ support 
of for-profit colleges and campaign financing, and, further explained why financial 
support may have been important to him at that particular time in his political career: “I 
think a lot of them got a lot of money. I think Rob Andrews was especially looking for 
donations because he was looking to run for the Senate so he wanted friends and money 
essentially.” 
 
Carolyn McCarthy (D-New York) 
Carolyn McCarthy is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives 
representing the Fourth Congressional District of New York. Eleven participants named 
her as an individual most involved in for-profit college policy issues, including one non-
profit-college lobbyist, four for-profit-college lobbyists, three Democratic Congressional 
staffers, one Republican Congressional staffer, and two reporters.  
“They [for-profit colleges] have a relationship with her [Carolyn McCarthy]. She 
knows their schools. If they need her they call her. That's a perfect example of 
college presidents using their connections to their home members to come and try 
to get people to listen to what they need.” [Republican Congressional Staffer] 
One Democratic Congressional staffer explained the process by which the for-
profit colleges would utilize McCarthy to advance their policy agenda: 
“The basic process that I experienced with the Higher Education Act is that the 
for-profits would come to us and pitch different sets of language on 90/10, Single 
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Definition, Transfer of Credit, and some of the other peripheral issues, and, once 
we'd say no or they realized that either myself or my boss would not go with what 
they were looking for, they'd go to Rob Andrews and then Carolyn McCarthy and 
then maybe the junior members who liked getting the money from some of these 
for-profits. And once they realized that they had one of them in their pockets, 
they'd go to one of them and get it in there. And so that member's office would go 
to the committee staff to ask for it to be put in there” 
The same Democratic staffer suggested that McCarthy’s experience as a nurse may have 
influenced her support of the for-profit colleges: 
“Carolyn McCarthy I know was really in on it [the for-profit agenda] because 
they pitched it to her as a lot of the nursing schools were for-profit and she was a 
former nurse and so her big thing was access. And, I think her district in New 
York had a ton of these schools. So I think that was part of it. She also went to 
nursing school, but not the traditional route, so she identified with students who 
went for 2-year degrees.”  
 
Tim Bishop (D-New York) 
Congressman Tim Bishop is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives representing the 1
st
 Congressional District of New York. During the 
reauthorization of the HEA he served on the House Education and the Workforce 
Committee. Eleven participants named him as an individual most involved in for-profit-
college policy issues, including two non-profit-college lobbyists, four for-profit-college 
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lobbyists, two Democratic Congressional staffers, two Republican Congressional staffers, 
and one reporter. 
Unlike Democrat Rob Andrews, Congressman Tim Bishop was generally opposed 
to the policy agenda of the for-profit-college sector. Bishop’s opposition to the for-profit-
college agenda was more in line with his party. As explained by a Republican 
Congressional staffer: 
“On the Hill, first thing I'd say is the for-profit colleges have much more support 
in the House than in the Senate, by far. And among Republicans they have more 
support than they do from Democrats. In terms of particular opponent, Tim 
Bishop, who is pretty strongly opposed and a number of rank and file Democrats 
who are just uncomfortable with for-profits.” 
One for-profit-college lobbyist explained in simple terms how Bishop was one of 
the members who more strongly opposed the for-profit-college agenda than other 
Democrats:  
“Congressman Bishop was the big opponent.” The same for-profit college lobbyist 
explained how Bishop appeared to be systematically opposed to all of the policy issues 
advanced by the for-profit sector: “Congressman Bishop of New York, Tim Bishop, was 
just, it seemed like whatever we were for, he was against. 90/10 certainly, Transfer of 
Credit, he was unfriendly. And active. It wasn't just that he voted the wrong way. He was 
active.” A non-profit-college lobbyist also identified Bishop as a Member who was 
concerned with the for-profit agenda: “Tim Bishop from New York is someone who was 
always concerned about it [the for-profit college agenda].” 
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Congressman Tim Bishop, before being elected to Congress, had worked for a 
non-profit college.  Some interviewees noted this experience in reference to his concerns 
and opposition to the for-profit-college agenda, including a Democratic Congressional 
staff: 
“Since [Bishop] at the time had run a college and had been a financial-aid officer 
at a school, and he knew a lot of stuff about how budgets at universities operate. 
So knowing that, a lot of the proprietary schools would lobby [Bishop] 
specifically on those issues knowing that [Bishop] knew how colleges basically 
paid for themselves. Not so much on the for-profit side, but on the not for-profit 
side. So they thought if they could convince [Bishop] that those issues were good, 
legitimate arguments for access issues, that somehow he would go on their side 
and somehow persuade other members who weren't as educated on the higher 
education issues. So they came to talk to [Bishop] and lobby [his office] a lot. 
And then they realized that [Bishop] was probably not the person to go to try to 
get their for-profit issues put into the Higher Education Act. They went to other 
members who then agreed to do some of the stuff. So it was then [Bishop’s] kind 
of role at that point to try to combat a lot of that stuff they were trying to get at. 
So then in my job, I had to, I ended up being a go-between: [Bishop], the 
members who wanted a lot of this for-profit stuff put in the bill, and the committee 
staff.”  
A Democratic Congressional staffer, in addition to Mr. Bishop’s experience as an 
administrator at a non-profit college, also referenced his intellectual ability on policy 
issues: “Tim Bishop was one of the members – a former provost of an independent 
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college –  so he was involved in discussions at some point. He's a great member because 
he intellectualizes a lot of it and forgets the politics of it.” 
Referring to the common situation where Congressional staff are more informed 
than the member of Congress about specifics of policies, one non-profit-college lobbyist 
mentioned how Bishop himself was important to the debate regarding the for-profit-
college policy agenda: “And Tim Bishop. And I'd put him over his staff. He knows this 
stuff so well…Bishop was important, very important.” One Republican Congressional 
staffer also explained how Bishop’s personal role in the debate required the for-profit-
college lobbying effort to focus a lot of their attention on him: 
“They [the for-profit college sector] did a lot of work on Bishop because he was 
one that was really opposed, but he's also a very thoughtful member having 
worked in a school and in a financial-aid office so this was something near and 
dear to his heart. And, Miller relied on him throughout the process so they really 
worked on him through site visits and meeting after meeting after meeting. I don't 
know what was discussed in those meetings. I don't know what questions he had. I 
know he tried to get a lot of data from them.” 
One Democratic staffer explained how the lobbying process during these 
meetings with Bishop and his staff took place. The lobbying process was a catalyst for 
compromises on policy issues affecting the for-profit-college sector: 
“So for 90/10, the for-profits came to [Congressman Bishop] with all of these 
proposals about changing the way that we define 90/10 or the calculation. They 
wanted to include a lot more in the 10 percent that they could count in their non-
federal revenue for the 90/10 revenue and [Congressman Bishop] would say, ‘No, 
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that's not something [I’m] interested in.’ So they went to Andrews and McCarthy 
and got them to agree. Who then pressured committee staff to try to include this 
stuff. So it put the committee staff in a position where they had to manage two sets 
of members who didn't agree on a certain issue. So [Congressman Bishop’s staff] 
ended up having to do a lot with committee staff and Andrew and McCarthy's staff 
to eventually iron out this stuff so everyone was happy.”  
One Democratic Congressional staffer explained the role of Bishop on these for-
profit-college policy issues relative to other members: “We had members on both sides of 
the issues. We'd have Mr. Grijalva [D-Arizona] and Mr. Bishop [D-New York], and then 
we'd have Congressional Black Caucus members and freshman members on the other 
side trying to advocate for the for-profits.” 
A for-profit-college lobbyist also explained how Bishop worked closely with Mr. 
Raul Grijalva, a Democract from Arizona and his colleague on the Education and the 
Workforce Committee in opposition to the for-profit-college agenda: 
“Well, Congressman Bishop was the one who co-authored the provision with 
Representative Grijalva to go to a 3-year Cohort Default Rate, but ultimately I 
think that after the fact we were able to convince him that it had some potential 
ramifications. He had some concerns, and we probably should have gotten to him 
a little earlier in the process.”  
A non-profit-college lobbyist explained the role Bishop played in advancing the Cohort 
Default Rate as an issue: “The default rate issue was a non-issue that they [the for-profit 
college sector] wanted to brush under the rug until Bishop pounced on them and put 
something out there that they then had to defuse.”  
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A for-profit-college lobbyist explained how, over time, the for-profit-college 
lobby felt like they made progress in explaining their positions to Bishop. At first he was 
seemingly opposed to the for-profit-college agenda, but over time he seemed to be more 
willing to listen to their perspective: 
“Representative Bishop started out to be a real impediment. And he has evolved 
hugely, to where he is now someone who we are able to, not to always convince, 
[but] at least he listens to us with an open mind and sometimes we've been able to 
convince him. So we've had some real progress there.” 
 
For-profit-college lobbyists 
The for-profit-college lobbyists or lobbying firms mentioned by name included 
Jefferson Government Relations (a Washington D.C.-based public relations and lobbying 
firm that has for-profit colleges as clients), Jennifer Blum (a partner at a D.C.-based law 
firm), Nancy Broff (a lawyer for a D.C.-based law firm), Tony Podesta (a D.C.-based 
lobbyist who is also the founder and Chairman of the Podesta Group, a D.C.-based public 
relations and government relations firms), the American Association of Cosmetology 
Schools (the professional association for cosmetology schools), and Scott Fleming at 
Chartwell Education (a New York-based education consulting services company). These 
specific names were only mentioned one to three times each by interview participants, 
but because participants generically referred to “for-profit-college lobbyists,” as well as 
naming specific firms or individuals who worked on behalf of for-profit-college issues, I 
then grouped them together. Those individual for-profit-college lobbyists who were 
mentioned more than three times, of which there were two – Mark Pelesh with Corinthian 
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College and Tom Netting with Jefferson Government Relations (a D.C.-based lobbying 
firm that had for-profit colleges as clients) –  are discussed further in the section 
analyzing secondary individuals .  
Thirteen participants mentioned “for-profit-college lobbyists,” including three 
non-profit-college lobbyists, two for-profit-college lobbyists, four Democratic 
Congressional staffers, one Republican Congressional staffer, and two reporters. 
One reporter referred to the for-profit-college lobbying group as “the army of for-
profit lobbyists”. As a Democratic staffer explained: 
“I was getting pressure from some of the for-profit lobbyists. They came to visit 
us all the time, or it felt like all the time. I was put in a position of trying to push 
back on them a little bit and explain the Congressman's position, which was not 
completely against them but certainly not all the way with them.” 
 
Secondary Individuals 
Nineteen individuals or organizations emerged as secondary themes. Those eight 
individuals that emerged as secondary themes included Congressman George Miller 
(n=10), Congressman John Boehner (n=10), Congressman Mike Castle (n=8), 
Congresswoman Betty McCollum (n=4), for-profit-college lobbyist, Mark Pelesh (n=4), 
Congressman Ruben Hinojosa (n=4), and for-profit-college lobbyist, Tom Netting (n=4). 
 
George Miller (D-California) 
Congressman George Miller is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives representing the Seventh Congressional District of California. During the 
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reauthorization of the HEA he served as the Ranking Member of the House Education 
and Workforce Committee during the 108
th
 and 109
th
 Congresses. During the 110
th
 
Congress when Democrats took over the majority of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
he became the Chairman of the committee.  In other words, he was the most senior 
Democrat on the House Education Committee during the reauthorization of the HEA. 
Nine participants named him as an individual most involved in for-profit-college policy 
issues, including three non-profit-college lobbyists, five for-profit-college lobbyists, one 
Republican Congressional staffer, and one reporter. I should note that several participants 
in other parts of their interviews referred to Congressman Miller, though they may not 
have mentioned him by name as a response to this particular question. In fact, three of the 
Democratic Congressional staffers interviewed for this research investigation worked for 
Congressman Miller at some point during the reauthorization and likely considered him 
to be a key player in the debate about the for-profit policy issues, whether they mentioned 
him in response to this question, or not. 
“On the Hill, clearly the most influential guy is the Chairman. Chairman Miller 
and his staff people”[Republican Congressional staffer]. George Miller was the 
Chairman during the final phase of the reauthorization, as a for-profit-college lobbyist 
noted: “In the final process, the most involvement came from Chairman Miller's staff.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist mentioned the role of Miller’s staff and how they 
may have been more sympathetic to those who raised concerns about the for-profit sector 
agenda than Miller himself: 
“The Miller staff obviously had a significant and important role, too especially 
after the Majority flipped. It's less clear to me that that was George Miller 
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himself. They may have, the staff may have started, in our view, in a more 
sympathetic view.”  
A Democratic Congressional staffer explained the importance of the role of the 
Chairman’s position in relation to other members of the Committee. The Chairman’s 
position on issues can determinate how successful an organization may be:  
“I think the position of the Chairman is very important to whether these 
institutions are successful. And the position of the members [of the Committee]. If 
more members, such as my boss, had raised more fuss on these topics there would 
have been more success [for the for-profit-sector].”  
A Democratic staffer suggested that Miller was more supportive of the for-profit-
college sector then many may have thought: “I think Miller was a lot friendlier with the 
for- profits then they [George Miller’s staff] would have made it seem to other committee 
members.” A for-profit-college lobbyist considered Miller “open-minded” on issues of 
concern to the for-profit-college sector, despite the historical position of Democrats on 
for-profit-college issues: “We thought we had in Chairman Miller someone who was at 
least open-minded on these issues, but we also knew that historically on the Democratic 
side the sector had been pretty weak among other Democrats on the committee.”  
A for-profit-college lobbyist felt like Miller and his staff gave their agenda fair 
consideration: 
“Chairman Miller and his staff were willing to listen to our arguments. Heard 
our arguments and worked with us to achieve some compromises. We were able 
to get through working with Chairman Miller and his staff what we thought was 
an acceptable outcome (on the Cohort Default Rate).” 
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Another for-profit-college lobbyist provided a different perspective and explained 
how Miller was not always a supporter of the for-profit-college policy agenda, and how 
his position changed over time: 
“George Miller was an interesting case. Not at all supportive on 90/10. Not at all.  
Certainly not about repeal.  He and his staff would not go for repeal. Just 
wouldn't do it. However, I will say to fast forward to end of the story after he 
became Chairman and Democrats took control when the crunch came on 90/10.  
Once we moved off of repeal and the financial crisis hit, he understood a couple 
of points that we felt were very important modifications that we needed. He heard 
us on the merits, agreed with us and then hung in there and fought for the 
modifications that we were looking for. But, we had to come off repeal in order to 
get there.” 
A reporter also commented on Miller’s change in position on the policy issues on the for-
profit-college agenda over time: 
“So even like George Miller kind of caved at that point into softening, making it 
[Cohort Default Rate] softer. And later I found out that George Miller's son was 
actually lobbying for Education Management Corporation in California in the 
fight over the California Bureau. He also made a calculation, because they also 
ended up weakening 90/10 significantly. And I think he made a calculation that he 
really wanted Republican support and so he wanted it to be a bipartisan bill.” 
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John Boehner (R-Ohio) 
Congressman John Boehner is a Republican member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives representing the Eighth Congressional District of Ohio. During the 
reauthorization of the HEA he served as the Chairman of the House Education and 
Workforce Committee during the 108
th
 Congress and for a little more than half of the 
109
th
 Congress before he became the Republican Majority Leader. During the 110
th
 
Congress when Democrats took over the majority of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
he became Minority Leader of the Republican Party.  Ten participants named him as an 
individual most involved in for-profit-college policy issues, including four non-profit-
college lobbyists, three for-profit-college lobbyists, one Democratic Congressional 
staffer, and two reporters. I should note that, as with Congressman George Miller, several 
participants in other parts of their interviews referred to Congressman Boehner though 
they may not have mentioned him by name as a response to this particular question. In 
fact, three of the Republican Congressional staffers interviewed for this research 
investigation worked for Congressman Boehner at some point during the reauthorization 
and likely considered him to be a key player in the debate about the for-profit policy 
issues, whether they mentioned him by name in response to this question or not. 
Boehner’s role as Chairman during a portion of the reauthorization was seen as 
important to the for-profit-college sector’s ability to move their agenda forward, 
particularly in ensuring the policies they are asking for were included in the draft bills. As 
one for-profit-college lobbyist explained: 
“During the first four years of this saga, the Republicans were in control and they 
were generally pretty sympathetic. John Boehner was Chairman of the House 
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Education and the Workforce Committee, as it was then called.  He got these 
issues and he was generally very supportive. His staff were supportive, the 
committee staff. And of course you always want to have the Chairman on your 
side. They're the ones who are going to produce the bills and the Chairman's 
mark.” 
A Democratic staffer commented on how all of the staff for the Republican 
members of the Committee were aligned with Boehner. During the Republican majority, 
the Republican members, in general, followed Boehner’s lead on the for-profit college 
sector agenda: 
“Boehner was the Chairman and all the staff worked for him, even the 
subcommittee chairs. The staff really worked for Boehner.  No one stepped out of 
‘Boehner bounds.’ That was a no-no. You maybe did behind closed doors but 
never in front of us [Democrats].”  
Several of the interviewees, including one for-profit-college lobbyist, when mentioning 
Boehner, also alluded to the general support from the Republicans: “Congressman 
Boehner was very supportive. Most of the support came from Republicans.” 
One reporter when noting the role of Boehner also noted that there were 
Democrats who were supportive of the for-profit-college policy agenda. In fact, over 
time, the partisanship on these issues seemed to dissipate: 
“There was no question that Boehner and the then-Republican leadership were 
certainly their main avenue in. And thinking back to pre- and post-turnover of 
Congress, I will say that I was surprised how many Democrats turned out to not 
be against [the for-profit-college policy agenda]. That struck me over time. I think 
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they were able to make most of the votes party-line, but it was less partisanship on 
that issue. I remember being surprised at various points.  I think that partisanship 
had somewhat eased over time.” 
Some of the interviewees mentioned why Boehner was supportive of the for-
profit-college sector. One interviewee mentioned Boehner’s commitment to students: 
“Mr. Boehner even gets a little weepy sometimes. When he talks about the 
opportunity that these schools are giving kids that wouldn’t otherwise have the 
opportunity, whether it's rural or urban, kids just trying to pull themselves up to 
get out of those neighborhoods. That was really what it kind of all boiled down to. 
So we worked pretty closely with the sector to accomplish those goals.” 
Another interviewee, a Democratic staffer attributed Boehner’s support for the 
role of for-profit colleges in terms of business and economic development, rather than to 
students: “With Boehner as Chair, the business-oriented for-profits were very much not 
regulated and seen as the economic engines within their communities that should be 
supported and not hindered in any way by oversight or regulations.” 
Another Democratic staffer, in addition to the business orientation of the for-profit 
colleges, mentioned campaign contributions as a reason for Boehner’s support of the for-
profit college sector: 
“When I joined the committee with my boss it was always Boehner and McKeon 
who were for the for-profits. It was always known. When we tried the Higher 
Education Act reauthorization the first time it was just known that they were kind 
on the same side as them and I never knew their reasoning. Whether it money in 
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terms of fundraising or ideologically they were pro-business and they wanted 
them to do well.” 
 
Mike Castle (R-Delaware) 
Congressman Mike Castle was a Republican member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives representing the at-large Congressional District of Delaware. During the 
reauthorization of the HEA he served on the House Education and the Workforce 
Committee. Eight participants named him as an individual most involved in for-profit 
college policy issues, including two non-profit college lobbyists, one for-profit college 
lobbyist, one Democratic Congressional staffer, two Republican Congressional staffers, 
and two reporters.  
While many Republicans were generally seen as supportive of the for-profit-
college policy agenda, Castle was in some ways viewed as opposed to the for-profit-
college agenda. As one reporter explained: “I remember Castle being the Republican 
who was most against it (transfer of credit) on the Republican side. There were a handful 
on each side who were not with their party on the issue [for-profit colleges].” 
One Republican Congressional staffer described his lack of support for the for-
profit-college sector as philosophical in nature:“Mr. Castle has never been a huge fan of 
the [for-profit college] sector. I don't want to speak for him, but [he had] a philosophical 
concern about for-profits being involved in education.” A non-profit-college lobbyist 
also alluded to Castle’s philosophical position in regards to for-profit colleges:  
“I would say that Mike Castle was a pretty important person on the Republican 
side. He understood the reasons why the integrity provisions were in there and 
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philosophically why for-profit colleges shouldn't be completely dependent on 
federal programs and why they needed to be policed if they were going to be in 
there. So he was an important player.” 
The same interviewee went on to explain: “The great irony that Castle liked to point out: 
this free enterprise was being fed at the government trough. That it was, in fact, a 
government program that was sustaining these entities [for-profit colleges].”  Not 
surprisingly then, a for-profit-college lobbyist described Castle as “not very helpful.” 
Meanwhile, a Democratic Congressional staffer described him as reasonable and 
seemingly alone on the Republican side in terms of his concern for the for-profit-college 
agenda: 
“There were a couple of members. Castle, a more reasonable member on the 
committee. He had some issues with Single Definition when we tried doing the 
reauthorization the first time. I think there were a couple of other members who 
said, ‘Hey, we should take a step back and take a look at this stuff.’ But the rest of 
the Republican members just seemed to go along with Boehner and McKeon.”  
 
Betty McCollum (D-Minnesota) 
Congresswoman Betty McCollum is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives representing the Fourth Congressional District of Minnesota. During the 
reauthorization of the HEA she served on the House Education and the Workforce 
Committee. Four participants named her as an individual most involved in for-profit 
college policy issues, including one non-profit-college lobbyist, one Democratic 
134 
 
 
 
Congressional staffer, one Republican Congressional staffer, and one reporter. No for-
profit-college lobbyists mentioned her specifically in response to this question. 
McCollum was seen as playing a role in opposing the for-profit-college agenda, 
along with a few of her Congressional colleagues: “I remember some of the Democrats 
like Betty McCollum [and] Tierney [D-Massachusetts] being pretty critical [of the for-
profit-college agenda]” [reporter]. She was labeled by a reporter as “helpful” in 
opposing specific for-profit-college policy issues, most notably Single Definition: “Betty 
McCollum was very helpful on Single Definition.”  
 
Mark Pelesh 
Mark Pelesh was a for-profit-college lobbyist during the reauthorization period 
for Corinthian College, a publicly-traded set of for-profit colleges enrolling 
approximately 86,000 students. Four participants named him as an individual most 
involved in for-profit-college policy issues, including two non-profit-college lobbyists, 
one for-profit-college lobbyist, and one reporter. No Congressional staffers mentioned 
him specifically in response to this particular question. 
Pelesh was part of a group of for-profit-college lobbyists who worked together to 
advance the for-profit colleges with members of Congress and their staff: “Prior to 
(Harris Miller joining CCA) there was a group of us that worked very closely together in 
the sector. Mark Pelesh from Corinthian [and] Jennifer Blum who is in a law firm. We 
worked together to meet with members and staff to bring these issues before them, to use 
opportunities as they rose to discuss these” [For-profit-college lobbyist]. 
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Ruben Hinojosa 
Congressman Ruben Hinojosa is a Democratic member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives representing the 15th Congressional District of Texas. During the 
reauthorization of the HEA he served on the House Education and the Workforce 
Committee, and when Democrats were in the majority he served as the first Hispanic 
Chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the HEA. Four participants named 
him as an individual most involved in for-profit-college policy issues, including two non-
profit-college lobbyists, one for-profit-college lobbyist, and one Republican 
Congressional staffer. No Democratic Congressional staffers or reporters mentioned him 
specifically in response to this question. 
Mr. Hinojosa was not generally viewed by the for-profit college sector as a 
supporter of their policy agenda: “Hinojosa has been a challenge for us.” [For-profit-
college lobbyist] 
 
Tom Netting 
Tom Netting was a for-profit-college lobbyist during the period of the 
reauthorization. During the more recent reauthorization he was employed by Jefferson 
Government Relations, which among other clients, provides lobbying services for for-
profit colleges. During earlier reauthorizations he worked for the Career College 
Association and Corinthian College. 
Four participants named him as an individual most involved in for-profit-college 
policy issues, including one non-profit-college lobbyist, one Democratic Congressional 
staffer, and two reporters. No for-profit-college lobbyists mentioned him specifically in 
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response to this question. Most of the interview participants who remembered Tom 
Netting as being involved in the reauthorization on behalf of for-profit colleges could not 
remember for whom he worked.  
 
Primary Organizations 
 Of the eight primary individuals and organizations named, four are references to 
organizations, including the Career College Association (n=25), University of Phoenix 
(n=14), “for-profit colleges” (DeVry University, Education Management Corporation, 
Strayer University, Corinthian College, Career Education Corporation, Capella 
University) (n=14), and “One Dupont Circle"/traditional higher education (n=11).   
 
Career College Association 
The Career College Association (CCA), which on September 22, 2010, changed 
its name to the Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities (APSCU) 
(http://www.letsputstudentsfirst.com), is “a voluntary membership organization of 
accredited, private, postsecondary schools, institutes, colleges and universities that 
provide career-specific educational programs.” APSCU has over 1,800 members 
(http://www.career.org). From this point forward in this paper, the organization will be 
referred to as CCA, given that the interviews took place when that was the name of the 
organization. Twenty-five participants named CCA as an organization most involved in 
for-profit-college policy issues, including five non-profit-college lobbyists, three for-
profit-college lobbyists, eight Democratic Congressional staffers, six Republican 
Congressional staffers, and three reporters. When participants mentioned the Career 
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College Association (CCA), six of those participants also named the president of the 
organization, Harris Miller. 
No other individual or organization was more clearly identified as involved in the 
for-profit-college agenda as the Career College Association. As one reporter summed up: 
“Well, the Career College Association is a big voice for the for-profits. [CCA is] the 
main organization.” A Republican Congressional staffer also considered the CCA to be 
the voice for the for-profit colleges: “CCA was most involved in pushing those issues. Or 
to change the issues that would benefit them.”  
One of the benefits of CCA membership is representation in Washington D.C. on 
policy issues of concern to for-profit colleges. While the CCA had a government relations 
office staffed by several lobbyists, CCA had two main leaders who served as the most 
visible lobbyists for the CCA during the course of the reauthorization process, as one for-
profit-college lobbyist explained: 
“The Career College Association is the primary player on the career college side. 
Their lobbyist Harris Miller came actually sort of midway through the 
reauthorization process. This was a process that took four to five years from 
information gathering to HEOA bill signing. Four or five years. So Nick Glaicus 
was the head of the CCA when it started. He left. And then Harris Miller came in. 
And those two were clearly the head of the Career College Association during the 
process.” 
The CCA, as a trade association, was viewed by many as representing the voice of 
the for-profit-college sector, including by one Republican Congressional staffer: “CCA 
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was the biggest trade association involved. CCA was the one that you always went back 
to.” 
While some interviewees suggested that CCA may be viewed by many as the 
“umbrella organization,” not all of the relevant for-profit-college players are members, or 
were members, of CCA during the reauthorization. As a Republican Congressional 
staffer explained: 
“The umbrella organization in the for-profit [college] world is the Career 
College Association. And they sort of fancy themselves as the voice of for-profit 
education. I don't buy that entirely because there are a lot of important for-profit 
institutions that are not members of theirs – most notably the University of 
Phoenix, which is far and away the biggest for-profit institution. There's no one 
even close, and they are not a member of CCA and they weren't during that time. 
But they [CCA] were nonetheless the voice of the rank and file for-profits. But 
there were others that worked on their own through the legislative process 
sometimes with the CCA, sometimes not. University of Phoenix is one of them, 
Strayer is one. And, EDMC and a handful of others.” 
A Republican Congressional staffer also noted how the CCA was a lead 
organization in regards to the for-profit colleges. The staffer noted that CCA was not 
particularly effective at representing the entire for-profit-college sector, particularly at the 
onset of the reauthorization: 
“CCA always took the lead. They did represent everyone and they came in and 
tried to do it. They weren't the best lobbyists then –  maybe it's changed. What you 
find is that in the old days CCA tried to lobby on their own and they did a really 
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bad job. And then they figured out that they really needed their individual college 
presidents to be involved and talking to their individual members. And that made 
a big difference. And now you had members engage in their issues.” 
A for-profit-college lobbyist concurred with this assessment of the CCA: 
“Under the Career College Association they were certainly involved. And, as an 
umbrella organization helped to spearhead a lot of this. They weren't necessarily, 
particularly before the new leadership of Harris Miller prior to his arrival, CCA 
was not as engaged as I think they were after Harris arrived on the scene.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist, when noting the CCA’s involvement ,also made 
mention of the fundraising efforts for members of Congress and how that factor may have 
contributed to how involved they were in the reauthorization process: 
“[The] Career College Association, CCA, seems to have the greatest visibility 
and the greatest war chest that I've ever seen. To be able to make the case with 
their pocketbooks rather than with their arguments and the difference between 
them doing that, just like lenders do, in that they behave very much like lenders 
who were trying to preserve special allowances for their own bottom line best 
interest and to be weighed against what the other actors, like the [non-profit 
college] presidential associations had to offer: no PAC’s, no money , no war 
chest.” 
The same lobbyist went on to describe how this “war chest” may have factored into the 
role of the CCA during the reauthorization: 
“Others, like professional groups, may have been involved behind the scene but I 
don't think they were given anywhere near the visibility that CCA was. In fact, the 
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Republicans – when they had control of the House – invited CCA in to most of the 
meetings that only Republicans were invited to. And I sat through a number of 
meetings in Congressman McKeon's office where lenders and bankers and those 
who ‘put money on the table’ to be there were in the same room with one of us, 
two of us, from the not for-profit sector: NASFAA and AASCU. It was very 
revealing. They bought their way in. We earned our way in. That makes a big 
difference.” 
A for-profit-college lobbyist explained this relationship that CCA had with both 
Republicans and Democrats, and how that may have contrasted with the non-profit-
college sector that seemed more focused on relating to Democrats: 
“[CCA] always worked very hard to have relationships on both the Republican 
and the Democratic side of the aisle. The traditional institutions had typically 
focused on maintaining relationships with the Democrats, so when Republicans 
got control, they were caught a little flat-footed initially. But I think CCA has 
always done a good of maintaining relationships across the aisle.” 
Undoubtedly, the CCA was a strong presence on the Hill. A reporter used the 
following language to describe the CCA’s presence: “The Career College Association 
obviously came out swinging during that period of time to get those issues.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer echoed what some Congressional staff (as 
discussed later in this analysis) considered a strategy of the for-profit-college sector: 
aggressive lobbying. “The Career College Association. They were incredibly aggressive 
to the point of being obnoxious. Actually, beyond obnoxious.” 
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The University of Phoenix 
Fourteen participants named the University of Phoenix as an organization most 
involved in for-profit-college policy issues, including one non-profit-college lobbyist, 
one for-profit-college lobbyist, five Democratic Congressional staffers, five Republican 
Congressional staffers, and two reporters. The University of Phoenix is a for-profit 
institution of higher education and is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Apollo Group, 
Inc., which is publicly traded. The University of Phoenix is one of the largest universities 
in terms of enrollment – for-profit or non-profit –  in the world, with a full-time 
equivalent enrollment of about 220,000 students during the time of the reauthorization. 
While the CCA was viewed by many as an umbrella organization for the for-
profit-college sector, the University of Phoenix emerged as a significant player in the 
advancement of the for-profit-college policy agenda:  
“I heard a lot from individual institutions, [such as] the University of Phoenix, 
the Apollo Group, and larger trade associations, like the Career College 
Association, who were interested in making modifications to the eligibility 
requirements and general provisions that govern the Act in order to gain access 
to participation.”  
The University of Phoenix was not a member of the CCA and that was understood by 
most of the key staffers involved in the reauthorization, and a few of the interviewees 
made mention of this fact: 
“I don't want to say they had their own message but they always did their own 
thing – the University of Phoenix. As the 800-pound gorilla in the room they 
could afford to do that. I'm not sure that any of the other institutions could afford 
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to just be off on their own. And the University of Phoenix is not a member of 
Career College Association, so of course they have to be off doing their own 
thing.” [Republican Congressional staffer] 
One Democratic Congressional staffer recalled the University of Phoenix’s involvement 
in the for-profit-college agenda more than any other organization: “University of Phoenix 
I remember most prominently.”  
A Democratic Congressional staffer mentioned the fundraising ability of the 
founder of the University of Phoenix, inferring that the University of Phoenix’s 
involvement in the authorization process was related to the organization’s fundraising for 
members of Congress: “The University of Phoenix, the behemoth, the single biggest. The 
founder of the University of Phoenix happens to be very big donor to many, many 
members. He's a Democratic supporter.” 
 
For-profit colleges  
The “for-profit colleges” mentioned by name included DeVry University (a 
publicly traded for-profit higher education institution with approximately 80,000 
students), Education Management Corporation (EDMC) (a publicly traded for-profit 
higher education institution with approximately 158,000 students), Strayer University (a 
for-profit college with approximately 54,000 students), Corinthian Colleges (a publicly   
traded set of for-profit colleges enrolling approximately 86,000 students), Career 
Education Corporation (a set of more than eighty for-profit colleges enrolling more than 
90,000 students), and Capella University (a for-profit university owned by the publicly 
traded Capella Education Company enrolling more than 39,000 students). These specific 
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names of for-profit colleges were only mentioned one to three times each by interview 
participants, but because participants generically referred to “for-profit colleges,” as well 
as naming specific colleges, I grouped them together. In this grouping, fourteen 
participants mentioned “for-profit college colleges,” including two non-profit-college 
lobbyists, two for-profit-college lobbyists, two Democratic Congressional staffers, five 
Republican Congressional staffers, and three reporters. 
Several for-profit-college lobbyists mentioned how the for-profit-college sector, 
and each of the lobbyists within the sector, worked together during the reauthorization. 
One for-profit-college lobbyist described the evolution of this partnership: 
“It was kind of the maturation of the for-profit sector. Bigger companies were 
starting to emerge. Publicly traded for the most part, who realized that they 
shouldn't just run their government relations through their trade associations. So, 
they started to hire people like me. So we would more or less work together. So 
yes, there would be CCA, but we also had a sub-group of us who were part of a 
coalition under the auspices of the U.S. Chamber. And then we'd also just work 
together and share information and do meetings and make proposals and draft 
stuff in a kind of ad hoc informal way together. Kaplan, Capella, EDMC, DeVry. 
To one degree or another we would work together to coordinate some of our 
activities and share information.” 
Another for-profit-college lobbyist described the ad hoc nature of this group: 
“I don't operate in a vacuum. There's a whole community of other institutions or 
trade associations and folks on the Hill who are like-minded, or not. You find or 
figure out who to work with. So in my case in working on some of the issues, 
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working with the Career College Association and working with other institutions, 
informally forming little ad hoc informal coalitions of institutions.  The 
government relations folks of those institutions and working together on strategies 
is very important.” 
Another for-profit-college lobbyist explained how the group of for-profit-college 
lobbyists worked together and then began to work with the CCA after Harris Miller’s 
arrival: 
“We worked with  to some extent the Career College Association after Harris 
Miller got there. Prior to that there was a group of us that worked very closely 
together in the sector. Mark Pelesh from Corinthian and Jennifer Blum who is in 
a law firm. She represents several online institutions as well as one of the 
national accreditation agencies. The one that is now AACS. So we worked 
together to meet with members and staff to bring these issues before them, to use 
opportunities as they rose to discuss these.” 
 
Secondary Organizations 
Twelve organizations or groups of individuals emerged as a secondary theme, 
including the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC) (n=10), the 
American Association of College Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO) (n=9), 
“committee members” (n=9), the American Association of State Colleges and 
Universities (AASCU) (n=8), the National Association of Independent Colleges and 
Universities (NAICU) (n=8), the American Council on Education (n=7), Corinthian 
College (n=7), Minority Serving Institutions (n=5), Congressional Black Caucus (n=4), 
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Kaplan University (n=4), US Chamber of Commerce/business organizations (n=4), Wall 
Street/Hedge Funds (n=4). 
 
The Presidential Associations 
The American Association of Community Colleges (AACC), the American 
Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), the National Association of 
Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU), and the American Council on 
Education (ACE) are all professional organizations that represent the Presidents and other 
academic professionals of non-profit colleges and universities. With the exception of 
ACE, all of these organizations only have non-profit colleges among its membership. 
One of the groups that emerge as a primary theme and discussed earlier – “One Dupont 
Circle” – includes among its tenants or its former tenants at this address organizations 
that represent various aspects of higher education institutions, professionals who work for 
colleges and universities, and various related policy issues.  When someone refers to 
“traditional higher education,” these are among the organizations that represent 
“traditional higher education” in Washington, D.C. The two Presidential associations that 
were not named as often as those listed above and were instead less prominent, include 
the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Association of Public and Land-
grant Universities (APLU), formerly the National Association of State Universities and 
Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC). 
The non-profit-college sector, represented mainly by these Presidential 
associations, was viewed as generally opposed to the for-profit-college policy agenda: 
“All of the traditional higher education associations were opposed to most of [US 
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Department of Education] Secretary Spelling’s agenda and also opposed to a lot of 
things that we were in favor of.” [For-profit-college lobbyist] 
One Republican Congressional staffer suggested that it was “easy” for the non-
profit-college sector to be opposed to changes that would loosen regulations specifically 
for the for-profit-college sector when those same rules and regulations did not apply to 
the non-profit-college sector: 
“A lot of the One Dupont crowd up here was opposed to all of this stuff [the for-
profit-college agenda]. They didn’t think we should change any of this stuff. They 
didn't think we should change any of these things. Of course the rules don't apply 
to them and I used to tell them, ‘The rules don't apply to you. It's really easy to be 
opposed when the rules don't apply to you.’ They opposed any kind of change. 
They were opposed to all of this stuff. You've got to wonder why.”  
One Republican Congressional staffer noted that the non-profit-college sector 
appeared unwilling to shift their positions on issues, particularly those related to the for-
profit-college sector: “There's this group of higher education lobbyists at One Dupont. 
You got the sense that they were so jaded and stuck in a position.” A for-profit-college 
lobbyist described how the formal structures of the non-profit-college sector that led to 
the view of it as being “stuck” may have been an advantage to the for-profit-college 
sector: 
“One Dupont Circle has 50 years of structures and coordination and modes of 
how they function together and they are literally in the same building for the most 
part. We weren't nearly that formal. It was much more ad hoc. They are slow 
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moving. I think we were pretty nimble. We moved. We were able to figure stuff out 
and act on intelligence. We were pretty nimble. That was an advantage we had.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist noted that some organizations and individuals in 
the non-profit-college sector did not weigh in on any of the for-profit-college policy 
issues. The lack of involvement may have made a difference in the debate and the 
outcome:  
“There were some groups in the traditional higher education sector who never 
publicly engaged the issue whatsoever. And I think the most prominent of those 
groups was the financial aid administrators. I think their absence made a pretty 
big difference in the process. If we had had them as more active players we might 
have made better headway or at least not had so many roadblocks.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist suggested that One Dupont Circle was not particularly 
engaged or effective in opposing the for-profit-college policy issues. The ineffectiveness 
of the non-profit-college sector may have contributed to other organizations, such as 
student groups, to step in and help frame the reauthorization debate related to the for-
profit-college issues: 
“Most higher ed[ucation] associations – first of all they're not sufficiently 
political to identify trends or, heaven forbid, take sides. And more importantly by 
nature – because they are membership organizations that have institutions as 
members – they tend not to be process conservative. I would characterize their 
attitude throughout the years as, particularly when the Congress and the White 
House were controlled by the GOP, as fully understanding how tremendous their 
(the GOP) policies were, but you could characterize them more as conscientious 
148 
 
 
 
objectors who just didn't have the stomach to stand their ground. Throughout 
2006 it was really very clear to me that the student groups had been fed up and 
were taking a stand. I credit them for this. It was that kind of final political 
confrontation that resulted in the Democrats getting Majority status. Naturally 
those folks who had been instrumental in that electoral success were equally as 
influential in the pay-up in the back-end in terms of the policies that the Congress 
would push through. So I would credit those two organizations [the United States 
Student Association and US Public Interest group] more than One Dupont.”  
The same non-profit-college lobbyist went on to describe the non-profit-college sector’s 
lack of involvement in the process, and how the for-profit-college sectors clarity in their 
agenda may contribute to their success: “All of One Dupont sat on their hands and 
wished them [student organizations] good luck. And that's the difference between us and 
them. When the other side has friends in high places, they know what it is that they want, 
they are unanimous in what they want.”  
One for-profit-college lobbyist suggested that the non-profit-college sector was 
distracted by earmarks rather than focusing on “big policy issues:” 
“I think one of the problems that traditional higher education has – and I think 
they have some very high quality people there – is that a lot of their schools are 
more interested in earmarks than they are in big policy issues, except at a very 
high-level amount of federal funding. They are much more competitive and up 
here trying to get their multi-million dollar grant tucked into some appropriations 
bill.  They'll spend a whole hell a lot of time doing that, but do they really 
encourage their group lobbyists to really pound the halls on collective issues the 
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way we do? I think there's a tradeoff there. They don't do as much of that. 
Whereas since we're not eligible and don't go after earmarks, the sector [for-
profit-college sector] goes after collective issues. We don't get bogged down. The 
schools are very competitive trying to go up and get their own earmark in there 
and getting somebody else's out. Which is a lot of what the traditional higher 
education community does.”  
One for-profit-college lobbyist explained how she worked on some policy issues 
with the traditional sector, but not on other issues, and, how sometimes Congressional 
staff requested that the two sectors work together on issues, particularly when there was 
disagreement: 
“Depending on the issue you can work with the One Dupont Circle crowd in 
terms of compromise language that you'd shop around to Hill offices. Hill staff 
will say, ‘Okay, I'm hearing too much noise. Can you all get together and work 
something out. We want to do something but you all need to get in a room and 
work this out.’ We definitely did that.” 
The same for-profit-college lobbyist went on to explain the relationship between the 
sectors and how the two sectors have worked together on some issues: “On the other 
issues I would go to the traditional sector early on and say, ‘Okay, I know that we don't 
agree but can we talk about what's realistic?’ There are a lot of myths I think around oh 
so and so hates so and so; that sectors hate each other. The drama is not quite that. 
Everyone is very collegial. I haven't really had circumstances where I haven't been able 
to have a dialogue.”  
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The American Association of College Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO) 
The American Association of College Registrars and Admissions Officers 
(AACRAO) was mentioned nine times by interview participants. Only one other entity 
was mentioned more; the American Association of Community Colleges was mentioned 
10 times. No individual who worked for the traditional higher education associations was 
mentioned more than Barmak Nassirian, the associate executive director and the lobbyist 
for AACRAO. Nassirian was seen as a strong critic of the for-profit colleges: “There's a 
guy named Barmak Nassrian at the registrars. He used to be at least at one other higher 
ed[ucation] organization, but he is a very strong critic of for-profit colleges” 
(Republican Congressional staffer). A reporter recalled AACRAO’s specific concern 
with transfer of credit: “AACRAO, Barmak, was the main group opposing that [Transfer 
of Credit]. All of One Dupont [was] opposed, but AACRAO was particularly 
aggressive.” The same reporter went on to explain further: 
“On Transfer of Credit, I remember Barmak speaking very strongly about 
protecting the ability of the institutions to judge quality and to make their own 
determinations and to keep the integrity of their programs by not taking students 
that they didn't want. To be forced to accept credits that they didn't really think 
were the same that they were giving out.” 
One for-profit-college lobbyist described Nassirian’s criticism of the for-profit-
college sector’s Transfer of Credit issue and referenced how his influence may have been 
unusual, given that he is not employed by one of the major six Presidential associations, 
which are viewed as the main higher education lobby in Washington: 
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“On negative side, strange to say, but the Registrars, the American Association of 
Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, there's a gentleman over there, 
Barmak Nassirian, who seems to be in every reporter's rolodex and has an 
opinion about anything that happens in the western world. He was, he and 
AACRAO, were definitely on the other side of the Transfer of Credit issue.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer also mentioned Nassirian’s influence and how his 
personality may have contributed to his influence on the Transfer of Credit issue: 
“Sometimes sheer force of personality, and I'm thinking in particular someone 
like Barmak who I think most people spend very little time thinking about college 
registrars or would be surprised to know that they have their own association. But 
because Barmak is who he is, is as smart as he is, and understood the issues the 
way he did, I think he had an oversized influence in the process relative to the size 
and profile of his association simply because he is who he is.” 
 
The House Education and the Workforce Committee 
The “committee members” that were mentioned by name by nine individuals 
included Congressman Dale Kildee, Congressman Vernon Ehlers, Congressman David 
Wu, Congressman John Kline, Congressman John Tierney, Congressman Mark Souder, 
Congresswoman Susan Davis, Congressman Tom Petri, Congressman Fred Upton, and 
Congressman Raul Grijalva. Of those nine interview participants, some of the individuals 
mentioned “committee members” generically and may have then also mentioned more 
than one committee member by name, but if that particular individual was not mentioned 
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more than three times by interview participants he or she was included in this grouping of 
individuals. 
 
Minority-Serving Institutions 
Five interview participants, including one for-profit college lobbyist, two 
Democratic Congressional Staffers, and two reporters mentioned specific organizations 
and individuals that I have grouped together as “Minority Serving Institutions” (MSIs), 
including the Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Hispanic Serving 
Institutions (HSIs), the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education 
(NAFEO), and Buddy Blakey, who was a lobbyist for Minority Serving Institutions, as 
well as a for-profit college. 
In fact, several interviewees mentioned Buddy Blakey by name, who during the 
reauthorization of the HEA, was a registered lobbyist for DeVry University, among other 
clients. One Democratic Congressional staffer specifically referred to his role in the 
Cohort Default Rate issue: “Buddy Blakey. Although he didn't always do for-profit issues, 
he was interested in Cohort Default Rate, which ended up affecting for-profit colleges.” 
One reporter also mentioned how Buddy Blakey was a lobbyist for both for-profit and 
non-profit-college sector interests: 
“Buddy Blakey, he was lobbying, he used to be the lobbyist for the UNCF [United 
Negro College Fund]. By that point he wasn't. He was working for some other 
black college association, but he was also a lobbyist for DeVry. So he was the 
perfect figure for showing just how these different interests – how he could kind of 
hide behind one interest to make it seem like he was representing the rest of 
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higher education and not just the for-profits. But in reality he was also a lobbyist 
for the for-profits. He gave them a lot of credibility on that issue [Cohort Default 
Rate].” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer noted how Buddy Blakey’s lobbying efforts 
of the for-profit-college sector included attempts to partner with the non-profit-college 
sector through association with the Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
(HBCU’s): 
“The only thing I remember is that some of the for-profits would partner with the 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, like Buddy Blakey and lobby 
against Cohort Default Rate. And, it ended up being one of the biggest things they 
lobbied against. And at that point Buddy and UNCF kind of aligned with the for -
profits. We had a meeting with those offices that supported the Cohort Default 
Rate and then with the Career College Association and Buddy Blakey and the 
UNCF [United Negro College Fund]. 
Another Democratic staffer explained the political role played by Buddy Blakely in 
helping the for-profit-college sector align with the non-profit HBCU sector on the Cohort 
Default Rate, in particular: 
“Another uncomfortable conversation was having Buddy Blakey come in, who 
was part of the Historically Black Colleges and Universities community [during] 
Cohort Default Rate. Another indicator of how the for-profit sector was 
infiltrating other parts of the higher ed[ucation] community. There was definitely 
a political and policy dynamic.  As it is with any legislation when you get towards 
the end, it's rarely about the policy and it’s mostly about the politics.” 
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Congressional Black Caucus 
Four interview participants, including one for-profit college lobbyist, one 
Democratic Congressional Staffer, and two reporters mentioned the Congressional Black 
Caucus. The specific individuals mentioned as members of the Congressional Black 
Caucus (CBC) involved in the for-profit-college interests were also members of the 
House Education and the Workforce Committee, including Congressman Bobby Scott 
and Congressman Donald Payne, both of whom are Democrats. 
One Democratic Congressional staffer suggested that members of the 
Congressional Black Caucus were engaged in for-profit-college policy issues because of 
the numbers of minority students attending for-profit colleges: 
“The for-profit colleges tend to target the minority caucuses heavily, given that so 
many of their students are minority. So my boss was approached not only in his 
capacity as a Representative on the committee, but [also] because of his 
membership in the Congressional Black Caucus.  And, that is something that is 
consistent over the years with this group [the for-profit sector].” 
The same Democratic Congressional staffer explained that CBC members on the 
Education Committee worked together on certain issues, including policy issues on the 
for-profit-college agenda: 
“Many of these issues we'd work very closely with the Congressional Black 
Caucus members. The Congressional Black Caucus members who were on 
Committee together could work together. If there were overlapping interests then 
we'd work as a group supporting each to move them forward.” 
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While some of the CBC members worked together, another Democratic 
Congressional staffer explained how when not all of the Democrats were in agreement on 
a policy issue, sometimes it was CBC members organized against other members of the 
Committee. Because the CBC members were also all Democrats, this situation led to a 
focus on finding a compromise on some of the policy issues related to the for-profit-
college sector agenda, particularly on the Cohort Default Rate: 
“We'd have Mr. Grijalva and Mr. Bishop [one one side] and then we'd have CBC 
members and freshmen members on the other side trying to advocate for the for-
profits. The Chairman said, ‘Let's find a compromise. Let's not play one side or 
the other.’" 
The same staffer went on to explain how the CBC’s sympathy for the for-profit-college 
agenda affected whether the HEA legislation could move forward through the legislative 
process. Without support from key members of the CBC, the legislation could not be 
passed: “It's pretty well known that if you can't get some of the key caucuses on a piece of 
legislation then your legislation is dead. So that was one of our biggest challenges at the 
time.” 
A non-profit-college lobbyist explained that the involvement of the CBC stemmed 
from a strategy of the for-profit colleges to align their policy issues with policy issues of 
concern to minority students and populations: 
“They [the for-profit colleges] really went to the Congressional Black Caucus 
and even to the Hispanic Caucus on all of the integrity issues.  So on all of those 
issues, since reauthorization was primarily fought in the 90/10 area, Cohort 
Default Rate area, and the definition of higher education institutions, they [for-
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profit colleges] really tried to align with the institutions and groups that 
represented minority students or populations.” 
Specifically in regards to the Cohort Default Rate policy issue, a reporter explained the 
role of the CBC in the discussion: “On the Cohort Default Rate issue they managed to 
form an alliance with the Congressional Black Caucus and the Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities on Cohort Default Rate to bolster their case and to make it 
look like it wasn't just a for-profit fight.” 
One reporter explained that the for-profit colleges may have worked so closely 
with the CBC because in the previous reauthorization a member of the CBC, 
Congresswoman Maxine Waters, had been one of the for-profit college’s staunchest 
opponents. This led the for-profit-college sector to focus some of their lobbying efforts 
on other CBC members: 
“The groups that they also were particularly targeting were the Congressional 
Black Caucus, which I think they had been working. My personal theory was that, 
once Maxine Waters went against them, they worked really hard to have the 
Congressional Black Caucus on their side. A number of those lawmakers are on 
their side, or at least don’t take a position on them.” 
The same reporter went on to explain the relationship between the CBC and for-profit 
colleges: 
“I know they hired this guy Paul Bradley who had been Executive Director of the 
Congressional Black Caucus. Originally he was lobbying for Career Education 
Corporation and then in 2008 he started lobbying for the Career College 
Association and in 2009 he started lobbying for Sallie Mae.  I noticed that in 
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campaign contributions that Bradley had given to every Congressional Black 
Caucus member, except Maxine Waters.” 
 
For-profit College Strategies and Arguments 
3. How did the for-profit education special interest-group attempt to influence policy 
makers during the 2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
 
The third guiding question sought to find out what strategies and arguments the 
for-profit colleges used to advance their policy agenda. To answer this question, I 
collected data from interviews from key players and then based on some of those findings 
examined other data sources, including data on campaign contributions and data in 
lobbying materials.  The interview participants mentioned dozens of strategies and 
arguments that I organized into themes for a total of 23 strategies and a total of 17 
arguments. Of the 23 strategies, three emerged as primary, seven emerged as secondary, 
and 13 emerged as outliers. Of the 17 arguments, two emerged as primary, three emerged 
as secondary, and 12 emerged as less prominent.   
As one for-profit-college lobbyist explained, there were many strategies utilized 
in order to help make the arguments in support of the for-profit college sector’s 
reauthorization policy agenda: “I have a whole filing cabinet full of materials that were 
developed around these issues, [including] talking points, briefing papers, data 
collection, [and] testimony that I helped prepare.”  The for-profit-college sector engaged 
in a variety of strategies and as one Republican staffer explained, their strategies were not 
different from those of other special interest-groups: 
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“Whether it's the for-profit higher education sector, you could say the same thing 
about NAICU [National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities] or 
the other presidential associations. They do the exact same thing. They feel 
strongly about issues. They write proposals. They gather data. They have 
meetings. They have Hill days. They invite members to speak at their conferences. 
It's all the same thing. It's building up a relationship of trust.” 
 
Strategies 
The three primary strategies mentioned by interview participants as strategies 
used to advance the for-profit college agenda include campaign contributions/fundraisers 
(n=14), lobbying/Hill meetings (n=11), and grassroots efforts (n=11). Those strategies are 
further explored below. The secondary strategies mentioned by interview participants 
include consistent talking points (n=8), high level lobbying (n=8), Hill Days (n=7), 
outreach to Freshman members of Congress (n=7), use of data and statistics (n=6), 
becoming a resource to Congressional staff (n=6), and the targeting of certain members 
of the House Education and the Workforce Committee (n=5). Among the less prominent 
strategies five emerged that are worthy of further discussion, including the use of 
confusing information (n=3), the targeting of Congressional Black Caucus members 
(n=3), the hiring of Harris Miller to be president of the Career College Association 
(CCA) (n=3), the forcing of a compromise (n=2), and Congressional testimony (n=2). 
The following sections explore these strategies. 
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Primary Strategy: Campaign Contributions 
Fourteen interviewees, six non-profit lobbyists, two for-profit lobbyists, two 
Democratic Congressional staffers, one Republican Congressional staffer, and three 
reporters mentioned campaign contributions to members of Congress as a strategy of the 
for-profit-college sector during the reauthorization.   
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan, nonprofit research 
organization that tracks spending in U.S. politics using federal reporting data, higher 
education-related Political Action Committees (PAC’s) contributed a total of $848,654 to 
political campaigns during the reauthorization process. A total of 13 education Political 
Action Committees (PAC’s) gave $274,927 to political campaigns during the 2004 
election cycle (108
th
 Congress), 11 education PAC’s contributed $255,307 to political 
campaigns during the 2006 election cycle (109
th
 Congress), and 12 education PAC’s 
contributed $318,420 to political campaigns during the 2008 election cycle (110th 
Congress) (Center for Responsive Politics, retrieved from www.OpenSecrets.org). 
During each of those election cycles, the top three higher education PAC contributors 
were consistently the Apollo Group, the Career College Association, and Corinthian 
College, all organizations that were identified by interview subjects as most involved in 
the reauthorization of the HEA. Political Action Committee data do not include 
individual campaign contributions that may be made to a political candidate by 
employees or others affiliated with a for-profit college.  
 
Apollo Group PAC.   Throughout the timeframe of the reauthorization of the HEA, the 
Apollo Group contributed to the political campaigns of members of Congress, the  
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majority of whom were members of the Education and the Workforce Committee. See 
Table 1. In 2004, the Apollo Group PAC contributed $41,850 ($11,750 to Democrats and 
$30,100 to Republicans) to a total of 26 members of Congress. The top six recipients 
were Buck McKeon (R-California) ($6,000), George Miller (D- California) ($5,000), 
Dennis Hastert (R-Illinois) ($3,500), Tom Cole (R-OK) ($2,500), Rob Andrews (D-New 
Jersey), and Ed Pastor (D-Arizona) ($2,000). Of the top six recipients, McKeon, Miller, 
and Andrews were all identified by interview participants as key players in the 
reauthorization. The other 20 recipients of Apollo Group PAC monies in 2004 received 
no more than $1,600.  
In 2006, the Apollo Group PAC contributed $64,500 ($28,500 Democrats and 
$36,000 to Republicans) to a total of 22 members of Congress. The top five recipients 
were Rob Andrews (D-New Jersey), ($15,000), Raul Grijalva (D- Arizona) ($10,000), 
Buck McKeon (R- California) ($7,500), John Boehner (R-Ohio) ($6,000), and Ric Keller 
(R-Florida) ($5,000). Of the top five recipients, all but Ric Keller had been identified as 
key players during the reauthorization. Keller did, however, serve for a time during the 
reauthorization process as the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee 
on Higher Education, Lifelong Learning, and Competitiveness, which has jurisdiction 
over the reauthorization. All other recipients of Apollo Group PAC monies in 2006 
received no more than $2,500. 
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Table 1: Apollo Individual Contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
2004 2006 2008 
Total to Democrats $11,750  Total to Democrats $28,500  Total to Democrats $70,500  
Total to Republicans $30,100  Total to Republicans $36,000  Total to Republicans $32,500  
Total Contributions $41,850 Total Contributions $64,500 Total Contributions $103,000 
      
Recipients  Recipients  Recipients  
McKeon, Howard P (Buck) (R-CA) $6,000  Andrews, Robert E (D-NJ) $15,000  Boehner, John (R-OH) $7,000  
Miller, George (D-CA) $5,000  Grijalva, Raul M (D-AZ) $10,000  McKeon, Howard P (Buck) (R-CA) $7,000  
Hastert, Dennis (R-IL) $3,500  McKeon, Howard P (Buck) (R-CA) $7,500  Keller, Ric (R-FL) $6,500  
Cole, Tom (R-OK) $2,500  Boehner, John (R-OH) $6,000  Hinojosa, Ruben (D-TX) $5,000  
Andrews, Robert E (D-NJ) $2,000  Keller, Ric (R-FL) $5,000  Miller, George (D-CA) $5,000  
Pastor, Ed (D-AZ) $2,000  Wilson, Joe (R-SC) $2,500  Pastor, Ed (D-AZ) $5,000  
  Castle, Michael N (R-DE) $2,000  Mitchell, Harry E (D-AZ) $3,500  
  Hayworth, J D (R-AZ) $2,000  Hoyer, Steny H (D-MD) $3,000  
  Kline, John (R-MN) $2,000    
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In 2008, the Apollo Group PAC contributed $103,000 ($70,500 to Democrats and 
$32,500 to Republicans) to a total of 46 members of Congress. The top six recipients 
were John Boehner (R-Ohio) ($7,000), Buck McKeon (R- California) ($7,000), Ric 
Keller (R- Florida) ($6,500), Ruben Hinojosa (D-Texas) ($5,000), George Miller (D- 
California) ($5,000), and Ed Pastor (D-Arizona) ($5,000). Of the top five recipients, all 
but Ed Pastor had been identified as key players during the reauthorization. Ed Pastor 
represented a district in Arizona, the home state to the University of Phoenix, a subsidiary 
of the Apollo Group, during the reauthorization. All other recipients of Apollo Group 
PAC monies in 2008 received no more than $3,500. 
In addition to PAC contributions to individual members of Congress, the Apollo 
Group also contributed to other PAC’s that are affiliated with members of Congress. See 
Table 2. For example, Congressman John Boehner (R-Ohio) is the affiliate for the 
Freedom Project PAC. 
In 2004, the Apollo Group contributed $45,800 to a total 13 other PAC’s ($12,800 
to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $33,000 to PAC’s in support of Republicans). The 
top recipient, the National Republican Congressional Committee ($15,000), a political 
committee dedicated to maintaining and increasing the Republican majority in the U.S. 
House of Representatives (www.nrcc.org/about). The other top recipients included the 
Freedom Project ($6,500), whose affiliate is John Boehner (R- Ohio) and the 21
st
 Century 
PAC ($6,000), whose affiliate is Buck McKeon (R-California). The remaining ten PAC 
recipients received between $500 and $5,000 each from the Apollo Group PAC in 2004. 
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Table 2: Apollo Political Action Committee Contributions 
2004 2006 2008 
Total to Democrats  $12,800 Total to Democrats $21,100 Total to Democrats $10,000 
Total to Republicans $33,000 Total to Republicans $47,000 Total to Republicans $0.00 
Total PAC Contributions $45,800 Total PAC Contributions $68,100 Total PAC Contributions $10,000 
      
Recipients  Recipients  Recipients  
National Republican Congressional 
Committee 
$15,000 National Republican Congressional 
Committee 
$20,000 Solidarity PAC $5,000 
Freedom Project $6,500 Solidarity PAC $15,000 Affiliate: George Miller (D-CA)  
Affiliate: John A. Boehner (R-OH)  Affiliate: George Miller (D-CA)  Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Committee 
$3,500 
21st Century PAC $6,000 21st Century PAC $10,000 BRIDGE PAC $1,500 
Affiliate: Howard P. "Buck" 
McKeon (R-CA) 
 Affiliate: Howard P. "Buck" 
McKeon (R-CA) 
 Affiliate: James E. Clyburn (D-SC)  
HILLPAC $5,000 Straight Talk America $10,000  
Affiliate: Hillary Clinton (D-NY)  Affiliate: John McCain (R-AZ)   
AmeriPAC: The Fund for a Greater 
America 
$2,500 Freedom Project $5,000   
Affiliate: Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD)  Affiliate: John A. Boehner (R-OH)    
America's Majority Trust $2,500 Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Committee 
$3,000   
Affiliate: Rob Portman (R-OH)  Democratic Congressional Campaign 
Committee 
$2,500   
PAC to the Future $2,000 CARE PAC $1,000   
Affiliate: Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)  Affiliate: Ralph Regula (R-OH)    
Keep Our Majority PAC $1,500 National Republican Senatorial 
Committee 
$1,000   
Affiliate: Dennis Hastert (R-IL)  Democratic Party of Arizona $600 Source: Center for Responsive Politics  
New Millennium PAC $1,250     
Affiliate: Robert Menendez (D-NJ)      
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In 2006, the Apollo Group PAC contributed $68,100 to a total of 10 other PAC’s 
($21,100 to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $47,000 to PAC’s in support of 
Republicans). The top four recipients (three and four were both at $10,000) were the 
National Republican Congressional Committee ($20,000); the Solidarity PAC ($15,000), 
whose affiliate is George Miller (D- California); and, the 21
st
 Century PAC, whose 
affiliate is Buck McKeon (R-California) and the Straight Talk America PAC, whose 
affiliate is Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) ($10,000). The remaining six PAC 
recipients received between $600 and $5,000 each from the Apollo Group PAC in 2006. 
In 2008, the Apollo Group contributed $10,000 to a total of three other PAC’s 
($10,000 to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $0 to PAC’s in support of Republicans). 
The top three recipients were the Solidarity PAC ($5,000), whose affiliate is George 
Miller (D-California); the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee ($3,500); and, the 
BRIDGE PAC ($1,500), whose affiliate is James Clyburn. The Democratic Senatorial 
Campaign Committee is “the only organization solely dedicated to electing a Democratic 
Senate” (www.dscc.org/about). 
 
Career College Association PAC.  Throughout the timeframe of the reauthorization of the 
HEA, the Career College Association contributed to the political campaigns of members 
of Congress, the majority of whom were members of the Education and the Workforce 
Committee. See Table 3. 
In 2004, Career College Association PAC contributed $69,455 ($32,955 to 
Democrats and $36,500 to Republicans) to a total of 50 members of Congress. The top 
six recipients were David Wu (D-Oregon) ($5,149), Rob Andrews (D-New Jersey) 
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($5,056), Buck McKeon ($4,000) (R-California), Carolyn McCarthy (D-New York) 
($3,750), Ron Kind (D-Wisconsin) ($3,000), and George Miller (D- California) ($3,000). 
Andrews, McKeon, McCarthy, and Miller, were all identified by interview participants as 
key players in the reauthorization. The other two, Wu and Kind were members of the 
Education and the Workforce Committee during the reauthorization process. The 
remaining PAC recipients received between $500 and $2,500 each from the Career 
College Association PAC in 2004. 
In 2006, the Career College Association PAC contributed $57,918 ($29,625 to 
Democrats and $28,293 to Republicans) to a total of 30 members of Congress. The top 
five recipients were Ric Keller (R-Florida) ($6,999), Rob Andrews  (D-New York) 
($6,498), Jon Porter (R-Nevada) ($4,544), Carolyn McCarthy (D-New York) ($4,500), 
and Buck McKeon (R-California) ($4,000). All but Ric Keller and Jon Porter had been 
identified as key players during the reauthorization. The remaining PAC recipients 
received between $250 and $3,967 each from the Career College Association PAC in 
2006. 
In 2008, the Career College Association PAC contributed $64,779 ($46,799 to 
Democrats and $18,000 to Republicans) to a total of 41 members of Congress. The top 
seven recipients were George Miller (D-California) ($6,000), Rob Andrews (D-New 
York) ($5,210), Ric Keller (R-Florida) ($4,000), Jason Altmire (D-Pennsylvania) 
($3,319), Virginia Foxx (R-North Carolina) ($3,000), Carolyn McCarthy (D-New York) 
($3,000), and Joe Sestak (D-Pennsylvania) ($3,000).  Miller, Andrews and McCarthy had 
been identified as key players during the reauthorization. Keller, Altmire, and Foxx were 
all members of the Education and the Workforce Committee during the reauthorization, 
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Table 3: Career College Association Individual Contributions 
 
 
 
2004 2006 2008 
Total to Democrats $32,955 Total to Democrats $29,625  Total to Democrats $46,779  
Total to Republicans $36,500 Total to Republicans $28,293  Total to Republicans $18,000  
Total Contributions $69,455 Total Contributions $57,918 Total Contributions $64,779 
      
Recipients  Recipients  Recipients  
Wu, David (D-OR) $5,149  Keller, Ric (R-FL) $6,999  Miller, George (D-CA) $6,000  
Andrews, Robert E (D-NJ) $5,056  Andrews, Robert E (D-NJ) $6,498  Andrews, Robert E (D-NJ) $5,210  
McKeon, Howard P (Buck) (R-CA) $4,000  Porter, Jon (R-NV) $4,544  Keller, Ric (R-FL) $4,000  
McCarthy, Carolyn (D-NY) $3,750  McCarthy, Carolyn (D-NY) $4,500  Altmire, Jason (D-PA) $3,319  
Kind, Ron (D-WI) $3,000  McKeon, Howard P (Buck) (R-CA) $4,000  Foxx, Virginia (R-NC) $3,000  
Miller, George (D-CA) $3,000  Kind, Ron (D-WI) $3,967  McCarthy, Carolyn (D-NY) $3,000  
Kildee, Dale E (D-MI) $2,500  Davis, Danny K (D-IL) $3,310  Sestak, Joseph A Jr (D-PA) $3,000  
Porter, Jon (R-NV) $2,500  Peterson, John E (R-PA) $2,500  Lewis, John (D-GA) $2,000  
Musgrave, Marilyn (R-CO) $2,250  Kline, John (R-MN) $1,750  Yarmuth, John A (D-KY) $2,000  
Keller, Ric (R-FL) $2,000  Holt, Rush (D-NJ) $1,500  Mahoney, Tim (D-FL) $2,000  
Cole, Tom (R-OK) $2,000  Udall, Mark (D-CO) $1,500  Payne, Donald M (D-NJ) $1,500  
Boehner, John (R-OH) $2,000  Foxx, Virginia (R-NC) $1,500  Kline, John (R-MN) $1,500  
Petri, Tom (R-WI) $2,000  Kildee, Dale E (D-MI) $1,500  Courtney, Joe (D-CT) $1,250  
Peterson, John E (R-PA) $2,000  O'Donnell, Rick (R-CO) $1,000  Kanjorski, Paul E (D-PA) $1,000  
Source: Center for Responsive Politics 
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and Altmire was a freshman, “frontline” Democrat member during the second half of the 
process. Targeting freshmen members of Congress through campaign contributions and 
lobbying efforts was identified by interviewees as a for-profit-college strategy and is 
explained more below in a later section. The remaining PAC recipients received between 
$500 and $2,000 each from the Career College Association PAC in 2008. 
In addition to PAC contributions to individual members of Congress, the Career 
College Association PAC also contributed to other PAC’s that are affiliated with 
members of Congress. See Table 4. 
In 2004, the Career College Association PAC contributed $34,500 to a total 13 
other PAC’s ($8,000 to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $26,500 to PAC’s in support 
of Republicans). The top three recipients were the Freedom Project ($10,000), whose 
affiliate is John Boehner; the 21
st
 Century PAC ($10,000), whose affiliate is Buck 
McKeon; and, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee ($5,000). The remaining 
PAC’s received between $250 and $2,500 from the Career College Association PAC in 
2004. 
In 2006, the Career College Association PAC contributed $25,500 to a total six 
other PAC’s ($1,000 to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $24,500 to PAC’s in support 
of Republicans). The top three recipients were the Freedom Project ($10,000), whose 
affiliate is John Boehner; the 21
st
 Century PAC ($10,000), whose affiliate is Buck 
McKeon; and, the Making Business Excel PAC ($2,500), whose affiliate is Senator Mike 
Enzi (R-WY). The remaining three PAC’s received $1,000 each from the Career College 
Association PAC in 2006. 
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Table 4: Career College Association Political Action Committee Contributions 
2004 2006 2008 
Total to Democrats $8,000  Total to Democrats $1,000 Total to Democrats 
$12,500 
Total to Republicans $26,500 Total to Republicans $24,500 Total to Republicans 
$23,000 
Total PAC Contributions $34,500  Total PAC Contributions $25,500 Total PAC Contributions 
$35,500 
Recipients  Recipients  Recipients  
Freedom Project $10,000  Freedom Project $10,000 21st Century PAC $10,000 
Affiliate: John A. Boehner (R-OH)  Affiliate: John A. Boehner (R-OH)  Affiliate: Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (R-CA)  
21st Century PAC $10,000  21st Century PAC $10,000 Republican Main Street Partnership $6,500  
Affiliate: Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (R-
CA) 
 Affiliate: Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (R-CA)  Making Business Excel PAC $4,500  
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee $5,000  Making Business Excel PAC $2,500 Affiliate: Mike Enzi (R-WY)  
National Republican Senatorial Committee $2,500  Affiliate: Mike Enzi (R-WY)  BRIDGE PAC $4,000 
America's Foundation $1,000  Searchlight Leadership Fund $1,000 Affiliate: James E. Clyburn (D-SC)  
Affiliate: Rick Santorum (R-PA)  Affiliate: Harry Reid (D-NV)  Freedom Project $3,500 
Hispanic Victory Fund $1,000  IRL PAC $1,000 Affiliate: John A. Boehner (R-OH)  
Badger PAC $1,000  Affiliate: Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)  Searchlight Leadership Fund $2,500 
Affiliate: Ron Kind (D-WI)  National Republican Senatorial Committee $1,000 Affiliate: Harry Reid (D-NV)  
American Association for Homecare $1,000    HILLPAC $2,500 
Committee for a Democratic Majority $1,000    Affiliate: Hillary Clinton (D-NY)  
Affiliate: Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)    National Republican Congressional Committee $2,500 
CARE PAC $1,000    National Republican Senatorial Committee $2,500 
Affiliate: Ralph Regula (R-OH)    Connecticut for Change $1,500  
Making Business Excel PAC $1,000    Committee for a Democratic Majority $1,000  
Affiliate: Mike Enzi (R-WY)    Affiliate: Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)  
Carolina Majority PAC $1,000    Solidarity PAC $1,000 
Affiliate: Joe Wilson (R-SC)  Source: Center for Responsive Politics  Affiliate: George Miller (D-CA)  
Winning Margins $250      
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In 2008, the Career College Association PAC contributed $35,500 to a total of 12 
other PAC’s ($12,500 to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $23,000 to PAC’s in 
support of Republicans). The top three recipients were the 21
st
 Century PAC ($10,000), 
whose affiliate is Buck McKeon; the Republican Main Street Partnership ($6,500); and, 
the Making Business Excel PAC ($4,500). The remaining eight PAC’s received between 
$1,000 and $4,000) each from the Career College Association PAC in 2008. 
 
Corinthian College PAC.   Throughout the timeframe of the reauthorization of the 
HEA, the Corinthian College PAC contributed to the political campaigns of members of 
Congress, the majority of whom were members of the Education and the Workforce 
Committee. See Table 5. 
In 2004, the Corinthian College PAC contributed $19,000 ($8,500 to Democrats 
and $10,500 to Republicans) to a total of 10 members of Congress. The top six recipients 
were Bev Kilmer (R-Florida) ($4,200), David Wu (D-Oregon) ($3,000), Rob Andrews 
(D-New Jersey) ($3,000), Dale Kildee (D-Michigan) ($2,000), Max Burns (R-Geogia) 
($2,000), and Buck McKeon (D-California) ($1,800). Only two of these members of 
Congress were identified as key players in the reauthorization. It is likely that the other 
members of Congress who were not identified as key players in the reauthorization by 
interview participants represented districts in which a Corinthian College was located. 
The remaining four recipients received between $500 and $1,000 in contributions from 
the Corinthian College PAC in 2004. 
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Table 5: Corinthian Individual Contributions 
 
 
 
 
2004 2006 2008 
Total to Democrats $8,500  Total to Democrats $15,000  Total to Democrats $21,500  
Total to Republicans $10,500  Total to Republicans $7,000  Total to Republicans $5,000  
Total Contributions $19,000 Total Contributions $22,000 Total Contributions $26,500 
      
Recipients  Recipients  Recipients  
Kilmer, Bev (R-FL) $4,200  Klein, Ron (D-FL) $5,000  Miller, George (D-CA) $7,000  
Wu, David (D-OR) $3,000  Wu, David (D-OR) $4,000  McCarthy, Carolyn (D-NY) $5,000  
Andrews, Robert E (D-NJ) $3,000  Andrews, Robert E (D-NJ) $3,500  Andrews, Robert E (D-NJ) $5,000  
Kildee, Dale E (D-MI) $2,000  Kind, Ron (D-WI) $1,500  Kildee, Dale E (D-MI) $2,500  
Burns, Max (R-GA) $2,000  Price, Tom (R-GA) $1,000  McKeon, Howard P (Buck) (R-CA) $2,000  
McKeon, Howard P (Buck) (R-CA) $1,800  Drake, Ron (R-AZ) $1,000  Keller, Ric (R-FL) $2,000  
  Miller, George (D-CA) $1,000  Wynn, Albert R (D-MD) $1,000  
  Campbell, John (R-CA) $1,000  Wu, David (D-OR) $1,000  
  Tiberi, Patrick J (R-OH) $1,000  Price, Tom (R-GA) $1,000  
  Keller, Ric (R-FL) $1,000    
  McKeon, Howard P (Buck) (R-CA) $1,000    
  O'Donnell, Rick (R-CO) $1,000    
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics 
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In 2006, the Corinthian College PAC contributed $22,000 ($15,000 to Democrats 
and $7,000 to Republicans) to a total of 12 members of Congress. The top four recipients 
were Ron Klein (D-Florida) ($5,000), David Wu (D-Oregon) ($4,000), Rob Andrews (D-
New Jersey) ($3,500), and Ron Kind (D-Wisconsin) ($1,500). Only Rob Andrews had 
been identified as a key player during the reauthorization. The others, excluding Ron 
Klein, were members of the Education and the Workforce Committee. It is likely that the 
district Klein represented had a Corinthian College connection. The remaining eight 
recipients received $1,000 in contributions from the Corinthian College PAC in 2006. 
In 2008, the Corinthian College PAC contributed $26,500 ($21,500 to Democrats 
and $5,000 to Republicans) to a total of nine members of Congress. The top six recipients 
were George Miller (D-California) ($7,000), Carolyn McCarthy (D-New York) ($5,000), 
Rob Andrews  (D-New Jersey) ($5,000), Dale Kildee (D-Michigan) ($2,500), Buck 
McKeon (R-California) ($2,000), and Ric Keller (R-Florida) ($2,000). All of these 
recipients were identified by interview participants as key players in the reauthorization, 
except for Ric Keller and Dale Kildee, who were members of the Education and the 
Workforce Committee. The remaining three recipients received $1,000 in contributions 
from the Corinthian College PAC in 2008. 
In addition to PAC contributions to individual members of Congress, Corinthian 
College PAC also contributed to other PAC’s that are affiliated with members of 
Congress. See Table 6. In 2004, the Corinthian College PAC contributed $15,000 to a 
total of 5 other PAC’s ($1,000 to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $14,000 to PAC’s 
in support of Republicans). The top three recipients were the 21
st
 Century PAC ($7,000), 
whose affiliate is Buck McKeon (R-California); the Freedom Project PAC, whose 
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affiliate is John Boehner (R-Ohio) ($5,000), and the Republican Party of California 
($2,000), which works to elect Republicans to all levels of elected office in California. 
The remaining two PAC recipients received $1,000 each from the Corinthian College 
PAC in 2004. 
In 2006, the Corinthian College PAC contributed $16,750 to a total of four other 
PAC’s ($0 to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $16,750 to PAC’s in support of 
Republicans). The top three recipients were the 21
st
 Century PAC ($5,750), whose 
affiliate is Buck McKeon; the Making Business Excel PAC, whose affiliate is Senator 
Mike Enzi (R-Wyoming) ($5,000); and, the Freedom Project PAC, whose affiliate is 
John Boehner ($5,000). The remaining PAC recipient received $1,000 from the 
Corinthian College PAC in 2006. 
In 2008, the Corinthian College PAC contributed $19,500 to a total of seven other 
PAC’s ($4,500 to PAC’s in support of Democrats and $15,000 to PAC’s in support of 
Republicans). The top three recipients were the Freedom Project PAC ($7,000), whose 
affiliate is John Boehner (R-Ohio); the 21
st
 Century PAC ($5,000), whose affiliate is 
Buck McKeon (R-California); and, the HILLPAC, who affiliate is Senator Hilary Clinton 
(D-New York) ($2,500). The remaining four PAC’S received no more than $1,500 each 
from the Corinthian College PAC in 2006. 
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Table 6: Corinthian Political Action Committee Contributions 
 
2004 2006 2008 
Total to Democrats $1,000 Total to Democrats $0.00 Total to Democrats $4,500 
Total to Republicans $14,000 Total to Republicans $16,750 Total to Republicans $15,000 
Total PAC Contributions $15,000 Total PAC Contributions $16,750 Total PAC Contributions $19,500 
      
Recipients  Recipients  Recipients  
21st Century PAC $7,000 21st Century PAC $5,750 Freedom Project $7,000 
Affiliate: Howard P. "Buck" 
McKeon (R-CA) 
 Affiliate: Howard P. "Buck" 
McKeon (R-CA) 
 Affiliate: John A. Boehner (R-OH)  
Freedom Project $5,000 Making Business Excel PAC $5,000 21st Century PAC $5,000 
Affiliate: John A. Boehner (R-OH)  Affiliate: Mike Enzi (R-WY)  Affiliate: Howard P. "Buck" 
McKeon (R-CA) 
 
Republican Party of California $2,000  Freedom Project $5,000 HILLPAC $2,500 
Coastal Conservation Association $1,000  Affiliate: John A. Boehner (R-OH)  Affiliate: Hillary Clinton (D-NY)  
21st Century PAC of Texas $1,000  Buckeye Liberty PAC $1,000 BRIDGE PAC $1,500 
  Affiliate: Patrick J. Tiberi (R-OH)  Affiliate: James E. Clyburn (D-SC)  
    National Republican Congressional 
Committee 
$1,500  
    National Republican Senatorial 
Committee 
$1,500  
    Moving America Forward $500  
    Affiliate: Bill Nelson (D-FL)  
 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics 
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One non-profit-college lobbyist saw political contributions as the biggest strategy 
for the for-profit sector, and how part of the strategy was to target those monies to 
specific members of Congress: 
“They clearly used the single most winning strategy of all: money. If you go back 
and look at FEC [Federal Election Commission] data, the amount of giving was 
impressive. The single greatest strategy that they used was very generous and 
targeted campaign contributions to key allies who then carried their water.”  
A Republican Congressional staffer mentioned the role of PAC’s – Political 
Action Committees. A PAC is formed to elect certain political candidates who will 
advance certain legislation. “Because they were well financed, they had PAC’s, they were 
in a position to be supportive of campaigns.” 
A non-profit-college lobbyist explained how the for-profit-college sector’s 
visibility was due to the financial contributions made to political campaigns: “They were 
given name recognition and visibility mainly due to campaign contributions. They were 
players. And unapologetic about it.” Another non-profit-college lobbyist agreed: 
“They [for-profit colleges] have campaign contributions, which our non-profit groups do 
not have. They definitely lubricated the Hill on both sides of the aisle with campaign 
contributions. And that's an argument in and of itself.” 
This fundraising strategy provided visibility and other interviewees also identified 
this strategy as different from non-profit colleges, which traditionally do not host 
fundraisers for members of Congress or make contributions to political campaigns. As 
one Republican staffer explained: “CCA members tend to be more involved in fundraising 
and things like that than the traditional sector.” One non-profit-college lobbyist 
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explained how the non-profit, traditional higher-education sector is actually barred from 
fundraising activities: 
“We can't contribute; we're barred from contributing campaign contributions. We 
can't use any political means. So our primary approach was to educate staff on 
what we were seeing in the environment and very succinctly articulate to them 
what was important for them to do or not to do, as the case may be.” 
Another non-profit-college lobbyist also mentioned that the for-profit-college 
sector provided political contributions on a scale that the non-profit-college sector cannot. 
While individuals who work on behalf of non-profit colleges can donate to political 
campaigns, non-profit colleges cannot form PAC’s in the same way that for-profit 
colleges do. Therefore, the “scale” of providing funds to political contributions is very 
different among the non-profit and for-profit college sector, as one non-profit-college 
sector explained: “They gave political campaign contributions certainly at a scale that we 
can't.” 
As the Republican Congressional Staffer mentioned above, a reporter also 
mentioned PAC’s and how the strategy of political fundraising as a special interest-
group, rather than as fundraising as individuals, distinguishes the for-profit-college sector 
from the non-profit-college sector: “A huge thing that differentiates them from how the 
rest of higher ed[ucation] operates on the Hill is their willingness to pay with PAC’s and 
make campaign contributions as an organization instead of just individually.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist also spoke to this difference between for-profit 
colleges and non-profit colleges in the context of political fundraising, and explained how 
political fundraising was a strategy to access decision-makers. The non-profit-college 
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sector could not use political fundraising and instead utilized “good policy” arguments 
that sometimes had to compete with “good politics”: 
“Well, as far as the for-profit sector, Career College Association, CCA, seems to 
have the greatest visibility and the greatest war chest that I've ever seen to be 
able to make the case with their pocketbooks rather than with their arguments 
and the difference between them doing that just like lenders do in that they behave 
very much like lenders who were trying to preserve special allowances for their 
own bottom line best interest and to be weighed against what the other actors, 
like the Presidential associations had to offer: no PAC’s, no money , no war 
chest.  [The Presidential associations had] the power of a good argument and a 
good policy.  And sometimes it takes a longer time to influence more people to get 
them to understand good policy, which isn't always good politics, and that's 
probably the steepest hill we had to climb. Good policy does not always outweigh 
good politics, particularly when good politics is influenced by pretty substantial 
funds of campaign finance contributions.” 
A Republican Congressional staffer noted during the interview a similar comment 
that the for-profit-college sector, much like the banks and lenders, were advocating for 
their own policy agenda: 
“You never heard from outside groups weighing in on behalf of the career 
colleges from a general policy standpoint, ‘this is good for the country.’ It was 
really from their own self-interest that you received the lobbying. It struck me at 
the time. In my dealings with the lenders you saw the same thing. So it kind of 
raised a red flag as we went into these discussions and considered these issues. 
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They seemed to jive too tightly with where the lenders were coming from and their 
narrow self-interests.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer explained how political fundraisers provide 
access to members of Congress and that the intersection of a political strategy and policy 
is important to understand: 
“I think the most important thing is the politics and how the politics play into this. 
Any group can throw around money at fundraisers and get to particular members 
that way. I think that's always an interesting case study in how that happens: the 
intersection of policy and politics.”  
Another Democratic Congressional staffer how political fundraisers provided the for-
profit college sector with access to the staffer’s boss: “They definitely did a lot of 
fundraisers for people. If anything they would do these fundraisers. They did a couple for 
my boss actually. And, if anything, it would just get them in the door.” 
Congressional staffers were aware of how political contributions and policy could 
intersect. While the staffer above was aware of the for-profit-college sector fundraisers 
for the staffer’s boss, the Democratic Congressional staffer below recounted how in that 
particular Congressional office it was believed that it would not have been appropriate for 
the member of Congress to receive contributions from for-profit colleges: 
“My boss was not receiving political contributions from the for-profits. I 
contacted my chief of staff and the campaign to make sure it stayed that way. If 
perhaps they did give contribution I don't know how that played out.  If there was 
contributions offered and refused. But if we started receiving contributions I made 
clear. I made a recommendation that we shouldn't accept those contributions. So I 
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don't know how it played out on the campaign end because I was not involved in 
that. There may have been an offer and a refusal and that may have been why 
they didn't contact us any further.” 
One for-profit-college lobbyist explained how his organization’s contributions 
were targeted to those members of Congress who were already sympathetic to the for-
profit policy agenda: “And then of course on top of everything else we have the system 
that we have and so political fundraising was a component of it. You try to identify 
people who you think are sympathetic to our point of view and our positions and you 
support them.” 
Interviewees, including a Democratic staffer, made note that political 
contributions to Congress were what all special interest-groups do: “Money. 
Contributions. Everyone does it up there,” adding, “That was one thing [strategy].” A 
for-profit-college lobbyist also explained how, because the political contribution system 
is a system that already exists, they utilize it in a strategic way to support those members 
of Congress who already aligned with the for-profit-college sector: 
 “That's the system we have so we did some of that. We tried to be fairly strategic 
about it but I don't think we ever thought that that was going to carry the day for 
us by any means but it was part of the system so therefore we did it. We have a 
PAC at our company and we did some contributions through the PAC and we did 
some special fundraisers for some individual members from time to time. But 
again these were all people that we thought were supportive of our point of view, 
so then were deserving of our support.” 
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Another for-profit-college lobbyist supported the premise that for-profit colleges 
were giving contributions to those who were supportive of their policy positions:  
“The reality is I don't think you're going to find a lot of for-profit institutions 
giving to members of Congress who they know are standing in the way of issues of 
concern. They certainly are not giving to opponents. Are they giving to their 
supporters? Of course.” 
A non-profit-college lobbyist also alluded to how the political contributions are for 
“friends,” rather than for those decision-makers who may not be supportive of the for-
profit-college sector: “They certainly take care of their targeted friends with big checks 
and big, big financial incentives.” 
Several interviewees, including a non-profit-college lobbyist mentioned that while 
campaign contributions are an important part of the strategy, they are not, and cannot be, 
the only strategy to influence policy in Washington: “I think the campaign contributions 
make a difference, but I don't think they make all the difference.” Another lobbyist for the 
non-profit-college sector also explained how campaign contributions are part of a broad 
set of strategies: 
“I think they used a mixture of traditional lobbyist power broker access, 
campaign contribution, and then sort-of compelling arguments on their issues in 
the most compelling way possible.”  
A for-profit-college lobbyist agreed with non-profit-college lobbyist colleagues and 
explained how political contributions are part of an overall strategy to advance a set of 
policy ideas: 
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“We weren't under any illusion. Some people are kind of naive about this that you 
can somehow secure support by just cutting checks, but I don't think that's how it 
works. Maybe others have a different point of view, but I don't think you win 
friends just by making political contributions. I don't think that's how it works, 
and I think you're going to be sorely disappointed if that's the approach you take. 
It was an element of the strategy but only that. It was an element and it started 
with the other things. And it started with ideas.” 
The same for-profit-college lobbyist explained what happens when a political 
contribution is given to someone who ended up not being supportive of the for-profit 
college agenda: 
 “So, look, it's politics. So, it's not a perfect science and sometimes there were 
people who we thought were sympathetic and when the chips were down they 
weren't. And it causes you to then reevaluate your approach to them. There wasn't 
a lot of that. But there was the occasional situation where we thought, ‘Hmm, I 
really thought based on what we were hearing that he was more sympathetic than 
it turned out he was when it was time to cast a vote.’ So, you reevaluate at that 
point.” 
Some interviewees mentioned the strategy of targeting political contributions 
towards freshman members of the committee who may have been elected to Congress in 
2006 with a slim margin of the vote and who would have difficult elections in the future: 
“They [for-profit college sector] have PAC’s, so they were funneling a lot of money to 
these freshmen members who were very vulnerable.” 
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A for-profit college lobbyist confirmed the strategy of targeting freshman members of 
Congress (i.e. sometimes referred to “front-line” Democrats during the Democratic rule 
of Congress), and also made note that not only did the PAC of their organization support 
particular members of Congress, but they encouraged the members of their organization, 
individual for-profit colleges, to make political contributions to certain members of 
Congress: 
“When appropriate we also realize that, many of these, again these front-line 
Democrats, were in problematic seats. And often people in problematic seats 
want financial assistance.  We did what we could to, when appropriate, to support 
them financially it terms of their fundraising efforts through our PAC and 
encouraging our members, if appropriate, to support them also.”  
A reporter also observed this strategy of individuals who worked on behalf of for-profit 
colleges, and not just the PAC, providing financial support to members of Congress: 
They definitely were pouring money in. It's not just PAC money.  The important 
thing is to realize that it's not just how much the Career College Association gives 
in PAC money but the schools, Corinthian, DeVry, and Apollo. What they do is 
mobilize their schools around the country to have fundraisers for their local 
representatives and to invite them to their schools.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer explained how for-profit-college lobbyists 
would utilize the strategy of an individual’s donation to political campaigns to access a 
meeting with a member of Congress: “They'd find some random (political campaign) 
donor who lived in the member's district. Some friend from some other life. They'd 
reference people like that to get meetings.” 
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A Democratic Congressional staffer made an interesting observation that while 
the for-profit colleges were giving money to political campaigns, the banks, which were 
interested in how the student loan provisions would be modified during the 
reauthorization of the HEA, were providing much more in terms of financial support to 
Congress: “I think money certainly doesn't hurt but, when you really look at who is 
giving money, the banks were giving way more money than for-profit colleges. They were 
crushing them when it came to campaign contributions.” 
 
Primary Strategy: Lobbying: Hill Meetings 
Eleven interviewees, including two non-profit lobbyists, one for-profit lobbyist, 
four Democratic Congressional staffers, three Republican Congressional staffers, and one 
reporter mentioned the intensity of lobbying and number of meetings on Capitol Hill with 
members of Congress and their staff as a strategy of the for-profit college sector during 
the reauthorization.   
A non-profit college lobbyist explained the extent of the for-profit-college 
lobbyist presence on Capitol Hill: 
“They certainly had enormous presence on the Hill. You've got to respect that. 
They are out there in huge numbers. You could see the force of their strength from 
the two sides. And you also have to respect that there isn't a member of Congress 
who hasn't been touched by them. It's not like us: talk to committee staff and 
hopefully we're done. And on rare occasion give some money. But rather they 
leave no stone unturned.”  
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A Republican Congressional staffer described this strategy as “constant:”  “Constant 
email updates and phone calls and meetings and so forth.” As another Republican staffer 
explained, the constant contact by the for-profit-college sector was part of the job of the 
for-profit-college lobbyists: “They, like everybody else, had meetings with members. 
That's what they are here to do. That's their job. They came in very often with data and 
reports and students.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer explained how the for-profit-college sector 
requests felt like “pressure” from the for-profit-college lobbyists: 
“I was getting pressure from some of the for-profit lobbyists. They came to visit 
us all the time, or it felt like all the time. And, I was put in a position of trying to 
push back on them a little bit and explain the Congressman's position, which was 
not completely against them, but certainly not all the way with them.”  
Another Democratic Congressional staffer, like her colleague, experienced the number of 
for-profit-college sector meetings as assertive: “They were pretty assertive. They did a lot 
of meetings. A lot of educational meetings, which was smart, whether you agree with 
them or not.” The same staffer went on to explain how this intense lobbying may have 
raised questions among those members of Congress who were already wary of the for-
profit-college sector: 
“I think there was a whole school of members who thought, and particularly 
anyone who remembered the 1980s and 1990s, who were incredulous and really 
pissed off that these guys were lobbying so hard. There was a sense from a lot of 
people that the people who were lobbying the hardest were perhaps the people 
who you wanted to keep your eye on the closest.”  
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A for-profit-college lobbyist explained how these meetings were meant to be 
educational in nature and how meetings are intended to be a “continuing ” process: 
“Well, I mean it involved a lot of one-on-one meetings, a lot of leg work, foot 
work over a number of years. As you know there were several attempts at 
reauthorization, some of which just didn't quite take. It was a continuing and 
evolving process at educating members and staff and in some cases having our 
senior executives meet with leadership and selected members. So it was a 
continuous education and complex process.” 
According to a Democratic staffer, the meetings of the for-profit-college sector 
with members and staff on Capitol Hill were not limited to one-on-one meetings with 
members of staff. The for-profit college sector also hosted lunch briefings for groups of 
Congressional staff: 
“They also used to do briefings for people and pitch it was a [college] access 
lunch and have people come in and talk about the ways that universities are 
working to help lo- income students to gain access and job training to basically 
be a pitch session for the for-profits. They'd have lunch for congressional 
staffers.” 
One for-profit-college lobbyist explained that these meetings were an important 
part of the process to build relationships with members and staff who are in a position to 
influence policy issues: 
“So education was really important. We'd take an institutional client, an entirely 
on-line distance education university, for example, and pretty strategically 
introduce the institution to Hill staff or Hill staff to institutions. And, if the 
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institution is based in Minnesota, we'd go to the Minnesota delegation. We'd also 
go to other members of the education committee and subcommittee that had 
jurisdiction over higher education. Really in those first few meetings, we'd start 
with ‘Here's the institutions. Here's the type of student the institution is serving 
and in the type of public service programs. For example, a lot of those institutions 
are doing a lot of K-12 teacher education training.’ By example introducing to the 
Hill staff and members of Congress the important access that distance-education 
provides to a student who might not otherwise attend college.” 
The same for-profit-college lobbyist went on to explain this relationship-building process 
that happens as part of the strategy of Hill meetings: 
“Folks in town who are lobbyists for a good chunk of the time they worked on the 
Hill themselves. They have relationships that are pre-established regardless of 
who the lobbyist is. I've been doing this a long time; over 20 years. But, I've never 
worked on the Hill, which demonstrates that you can actually get Hill meetings 
without pre-established relationships.” 
The process is not as complicated or mysterious as some people may think, as explained 
by the same lobbyist: 
“People think it's rocket science. It's not really rocket science to develop the 
relationships to have meetings with staff and members. You start with staff and 
you work up to the member relationships in any given office. Obviously the client 
is from a particular state or district. Starting with the member's office is helpful 
and usually that member's office is interested in meeting with [his or her] own 
constituents. So it's not really me the lobbyist who is getting the meeting. I may be 
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arranging the meeting, I may be going into the meeting but it's the fact that I'm 
going in with an institution that's from the member district that's driving the 
importance of the meeting and the ability to get the meeting. And then over time… 
my first point is if you have a good issue [and] if the issue is something that the 
member of Congress is interested in or should be interested in the Hill staffers – 
I’ve  always found them quite receptive to meeting and they might not continue to 
be supportive of your issue. I've never found it particularly difficult to get that 
first meeting and once you get the first meeting and depending on how you 
conduct yourself and what the relationship is like it goes from there and then you 
can meet with that staffer for other clients and on other issues and it just develops 
over time because it's a mutual relationship of education with Hill staffers. It does 
start with picking up the phone or zapping an email and saying, ‘Hi, I represent 
so and so in your district’ (or even not in the district, but with ‘x’ number of 
students from your district) and we really think that you might be interested in 
learning about this issue and would you have time to meet?’ And then 
relationships develop from there or it doesn't. But usually the relationship 
develops from there. There's sort of this mystery about lobbying, but that's not 
really how I have ever viewed it.” 
As part of the effort to influence the process, another for-profit-college lobbyist 
also explained the importance of the process of relationship-building: 
“I used to do a ton of public speaking all around the country about federal policy 
and how you can influence the process. And there is a lot of misperception that 
you have to be an Abramoff to make a difference. And the reality is, are there 
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people like that, yea. But most of them are small folks like little agencies or 
membership associations or individual people who are just trying to get their 
voice heard. I'd try to explain to people, it's relationship building. If you like each 
other, you have a drink. If you really like each other, you have dinner. You don't 
just meet someone and get married. It's the same in the world of lobbying. Does 
the member trust you?  Are you somebody who's going to stick with it?  Because 
it's not a quick fix. It may take years before a piece of legislation is able to get 
done. I was a lobbyist for a little while. And, I was ready. And, I had my stats and 
data and the member [of Congress] had a manila folder and he looked at me and 
he looked at the folder. He opened it, and it was empty, and turned it upside down 
and he said, ‘This is how many people I've heard from back home.’ And I had 
zero credibility at that point because no one cared but me. The other thing too, 
we're asking individual members of Congress to one day talk about stop signs on 
the street and the next day talk about world peace. The gamut is pretty big. So 
people say, ‘I got stuck with staff and not them.’ Well, who do you think brings the 
issues to their attention? That's what they [the staff] are there for. To makes sure 
that their boss is fully aware of what is going on and they play a crucial role.”  
 
Lobbying Disclosure.  Organizations, such as for-profit colleges that retain 
lobbying firms, hire their own in-house lobbyist, or in some cases both, are required by 
federal law to disclose their lobbying activities and spending. Those individuals and firms 
are also required to report their lobbying activities on behalf of their clients, in this case 
for-profit colleges. The registration of lobbyists and the associated reporting requirements 
188 
 
 
 
are overseen by the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
As Section 6 of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), 2 U.S.C. § 1605, states:  “The 
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall (1) provide 
guidance and assistance on the registration and reporting requirements of this Act and 
develop common standards, rules and procedures for compliance with this Act; [and] (2) 
review, and, where necessary, verify and inquire to ensure the accuracy, completeness 
and timeliness of registrations and reports” (retrieved November 25, 2011 from 
http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.html). 
The Lobbying Disclosure Act requires lobbyists to register, and defines a lobbyist 
as: “Any individual (1) who is either employed or retained by a client for financial or 
other compensation (2) whose services include more than one lobbying contact; and (3) 
whose lobbying activities constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services’ time on 
behalf of that client during any three-month period” (Retrieved November 25, 2011 from 
http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.html). 
Activities that a registered lobbyist must report include: “Lobbying contacts and 
any efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation or planning activities, 
research and other background work that is intended, at the time of its preparation, for 
use in contacts and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.” Retrieved 
November 25, 2011 from http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.html). 
Lobbying contacts include “contacts with a member of Congress, an elected 
Officer of either the House or the Senate, or an employee, or any other individual 
functioning in the capacity of an employee, who works for a Member, committee, 
leadership staff of either the Senate or House, a joint committee of Congress, a working 
189 
 
 
 
group or caucus organized to provide services to members, and any other Legislative 
Branch employee serving in a position described under section 109(13) of the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978” (Retrieved November 25, 2011 from 
http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.html). 
Not all lobbying activities are reportable. For example, if a lobbying firm’s total 
income from a client for lobbying activities does not exceed and is not expected to 
exceed $3,000 during a quarterly period, the firm does not need to report those activities.    
And, “organizations with in-house lobbyists are exempt from registration if its total 
expenses for lobbying activities do not exceed and are not expected to exceed $11,500 
during a quarterly period.” (2011, November 25 
http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.html). 
 According to the Center for Responsive Politics, based on federal reporting, the 
three biggest overall spenders on lobbying consistently throughout the reauthorization 
from 2003-2008 were the Apollo Group, the Career College Association, and Corinthian 
College. Capella was one of the top annual spenders towards the beginning of the 
reauthorization from 2003-2005.  The Career Education Corporation became one of the 
top annual spenders on lobbying towards the end of the reauthorization process from 
2005-2008. DeVry University was a consistent spender throughout the reauthorization. 
Though one of the top spenders across the reauthorization timeframe, DeVry University 
spent the least on lobbying per year. 
 
Lobbying disclosure: Apollo Group and its subsidiary, the University of Phoenix. 
The Apollo Group, and its subsidiary, the University of Phoenix, or a lobbying firm on 
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their behalf, reported lobbying expenditures each year during the reauthorization of the 
HEA. Tables 7 and 8 show the lobbying expenditures for the Apollo Group, and the 
subsidiary of the Apollo Group, the University of Phoenix. The figures under each year 
for the Apollo Group show that the Apollo Group did not report “in-house” lobbying 
activities using their own staff.  Instead the Apollo Group hired lobbying firms (see Table 
7) to work on behalf of their company and their subsidiary, the University of Phoenix 
(see Table 8). The figures under each lobbying firm (i.e. Van Scoyoc and Associates) 
show what the lobbying firm reported as income from a client (i.e. the Apollo Group). A 
figure of $0 could mean that “zero dollars” were spent or that that total expenditure was 
under the limits explained above and did not require any reporting. Over the course of the 
reauthorization period, the Apollo Group spent a total of $2,910,000 on lobbying 
activities, not including lobbying activities on behalf of the University of Phoenix. 
Including the University of Phoenix, the Apollo Group spent a total of $3,495,000 on 
lobbying activities over the course of the reauthorization. 
While not a prominent organization in this study, Chartwell Education and one of 
its registered lobbyists, Scott Fleming, was mentioned by interviewees as part of the 
reauthorization process. 
 
Lobbying disclosure: Career College Association.  The Career College 
Association (CCA) reported lobbying expenditures each year during the reauthorization 
of the HEA. Table 9 shows the lobbying expenditures for the CCA over the course of the 
reauthorization. CCA spent a total of $1,639,456. In 2007, the year that Harris Miller 
came on board for CCA, the organization began to report in-house lobbying expenses.
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Table 7: Lobbying Expenditure for the Apollo Group during the HEA Reauthorization 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL 
Apollo Group $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Bond & CO $150,000 $0 
 
$0 $0 $60,000 $0 $210,000 
Van Scoyoc & Associates $180,000 $420,000 $360,000 $280,000 $0 $140,000 $1,380,000 
Wheat Government Relations $120,000 $120,000 $120,000 $20,000 $140,000 $170,000 $690,000 
Chartwell Education $0 $0 $0 $45,000 $120,000 $120,000 $285,000 
Palumbo & Cerrell 
 
$0 $0 $0 $25,000 $160,000 $160,000 $345,000 
TOTAL $450,000 $540,000 $480,000 $370,000 $480,000 $590,000 $2,910,000 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
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Table 8: Lobbying Expenditure for the University of Phoenix during the HEA Reauthorization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL 
University of Phoenix $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Keane Government Affairs $0 $110,000 $135,000 $120,000 $0 $0 $365,00 
Wheat Gov Relations $0 $60,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $60,000 
Bond $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $160,000 $160,000 
TOTAL $0 $170,000 $135,000 $120,000 $0 $160,000 $585,000 
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Table 9: Lobbying Expenditure for the Career College Association during the HEA Reauthorization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL 
Career College Association $0 $0 $0 $0 $37,156 
 
$222,300 
 
$259,456 
Podesta Group $0 $80,000 $0 $320,000 $180,000 $200,000 $780,000 
Podesta Mattoon $0 $0 $600,000 $0 $0 $0 $600,000 
TOTAL $0 $80,000 $600,000 $320,000 $217,156 $422,300 $1,639,456 
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Before that time, CCA only reported expenditures related to the use of lobbying 
firms. It is interesting to note that Harris Miller is a registered Democrat and that the 
Podesta Group was founded by Tony Podesta, one of the most influential Democrats in 
Washington D.C. lobbying circles and “one of Washington’s biggest players” by the New 
York Times (http://www.podesta.com/talent/tony-podesta). One the strategies mentioned 
by interviewees was the for-profit-college sector’s use of influential Democrats, which 
included the hiring of lobbying firms with access to key Democratic policy makers. 
 
Lobbying disclosure: Corinthian Colleges. Corinthian Colleges reported 
lobbying expenditures each year during the reauthorization of the HEA. Table 10 shows 
the lobbying expenditures for Corinthian Colleges over the course of the reauthorization. 
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, Corinthian Colleges spent a total of 
$3,138,000 on lobbying expenses. There was quite a jump in reporting from year 2006 to 
2007 and 2008. There may have been an error in the reporting or there could have been 
an increase in lobbying as a strategy towards the end of the reauthorization to lobby the 
new Democratic Congress and as the reauthorization process was wrapping up and key 
policy issues of interest to the for-profit-college sector were being debated and decided. 
It is interesting to note that Jefferson Government Relations, one of the lobbying 
firms retained by Corinthian Colleges, also had the American Association of 
Cosmetology Schools (AACS) as a client. AACS is reportedly a member of the CCA, 
and spent a total of $1,000,000 retaining Jefferson Government Relations during the 
reauthorization period from 2003-2008. The lobbyists registered with Corinthian 
Colleges and Jefferson Government Relations, Mark Pelesh and Tom Netting 
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respectively, were cited by interviewees as among those individuals involved in the 
reauthorization. It is also interesting to note that Mark Pelesh, before moving in-house to 
Corinthian Colleges, also worked on behalf of Capella University (discussed below). 
 
Lobbying disclosure: Capella University.  Capella University, an online 
institution of higher education, reported lobbying expenditures each year during the 
reauthorization of the HEA. Table 11 shows the lobbying expenditures for Capella 
University, which totaled $700,000 over the course of the reauthorization. It is likely that 
Capella University opted to reduce spending on lobbying when their major policy 
agenda, the elimination of the 50-Percent Rules, was accomplished in 2005 in the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005. 
Drinker, Briddle and Reath, one of the firms retained by Capella University was 
also retained by one of the accrediting bodies for career colleges, the Accrediting 
Commission of Career Schools and Colleges (ACCSC). ACCSC spent $820,000 to retain 
Drinker, Briddle, and Reath over the course of the reauthorization. Jennifer Blum, one of 
the individuals cited by interviewees as an individual involved in the reauthorization, 
worked for that firm during that time.  
 
Lobbying disclosure: Career Education Corporation.  Career Education 
Corporation reported lobbying expenditures during the reauthorization of the HEA. Table 
12 shows the lobbying expenditures for the Career Education Corporation over the course 
of the reauthorization, which totaled $1,120,000. The Career Education Corporation 
retained the same lobbying firm as the Career College Association, the Podesta Group. 
196 
 
 
 
While the Career Education Corporation did not emerge during the interviews as a 
prominent organization, the owner of the firms that lobbied on its behalf, specifically 
Podesta and PodestaMattoon, was mentioned as a for-profit-college lobbyist, and as a 
primary strategy: the hiring of high-profile lobbyists. 
 
Lobbying disclosure: DeVry, Inc.  DeVry, Inc. (also known as DeVry University) 
reported lobbying expenditures each year during the reauthorization of the HEA. Table 
13 shows the lobbying expenditures for DeVry, Inc., which spent $342,000 on lobbying 
expenses during the course of the reauthorization of the HEA.  
The Center for Responsive Politics also lists that Blakey and Associates, listed 
with DeVry, was also retained by a number of non-profit colleges and universities, 
mostly Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), though the numbers for 
each of educational institutions reported were $0, indicating that the total spent each year 
was less than the reportable limit. Similar to Career Education Corporation, DeVry, Inc. 
did not emerge during the interviews as a prominent organization; however a lobbyist for 
the firms Dean Blakely and William A Blakely & Assoc, William “Buddy” Blakely, was 
mentioned by interviewees as a lobbyist for Minority Serving Institutions and 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, which emerged as secondary organizations 
during the interviews. 
This confirms statements made by the interview participants that Blakey was 
retained by both the for-profit-college sector and the non-profit-college sector, which 
came into play during the debate of changes to the Cohort Default Rate when the for-
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profit-college sector aligned itself with HBCUs and heavily lobbied members of the 
Congressional Black Caucus. 
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Table 10: Lobbying Expenditure for the Corinthian Colleges during the HEA Reauthorization 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL 
Corinthian Colleges 
(Mark Pelesh) 
$60,000 $138,000 $140,000 
 
$140,000 $1,020,000  $1,170,000 
 
$2,668,000 
Jefferson Gov Relations 
(Tom Netting) 
$80,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $80,000 $70,000 $410,000 
Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal 
 
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $60,000 $60,000 
TOTAL $140,000 $198,000 $200,000 $200,000 $1,100,000 $1,300,000 $3,138,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics 
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Table 11: Lobbying Expenditure for Capella University during the HEA Reauthorization
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL 
Capella 
University 
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Drinker, Biddle 
& Reath  
$110,000 
(Jennifer Blum, 
Mark Pelesh) 
$100,000 
(Jennifer Blum, 
Mark Pelesh) 
$120,000 
(Jennifer 
Blum) 
$0 
(Jennifer 
Blum) 
$40,000 
(Jennifer 
Blum) 
$70,000 
(Jennifer 
Blum) 
$440,000 
Foley Hoag 
LLP 
$40,000 $0 $20,000 $0 $0 $0 $20,000 
Trimble & 
Assoc 
$20,000 $20,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $40,000 
Clark & 
Weinstock 
$100,000 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $200,000 
TOTAL $270,000 $220,000 $140,000 $0 $40,000 $70,000 $700,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics 
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Table 12: Lobbying Expenditure for the Career Education Corporation during the HEA Reauthorization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL 
Career Ed Corp $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $40,000 $40,000 
PodestaMattoon $0 $0 $100,000 $380,000 $0 $0 $480,000 
Podesta Group $0 $0 $0 $0 $340,000 $260,000 $600,000 
TOTAL $0 $0 $100,000 $380,000 $340,000 $300,000 $1,120,000 
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Table 13: Lobbying Expenditure for DeVry, Inc. during the HEA Reauthorization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL 
DeVry, Inc. $0 $0 $8,000 $34,000 $60,000 $0 $102,000 
Dean Blakely $40,000 $40,000 $20,000 $0 $0 $0 $100,000 
William A Blakely & 
Associates 
$0 $0 $20,000 $20,000 $0 $40,000 $80,000 
K & L Gates $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $60,000 $60,000 
TOTAL $40,000 $40,000 $48,000 $54,000 $60,000 $100,000 $342,000 
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Primary Strategy: Grassroots Activities 
Eleven interviewees, including one non-profit-college lobbyist, two for-profit-
college lobbyists, two Democratic Congressional staffers, four Republican Congressional 
staffers, and two reporters mentioned the grassroots efforts, such as the use of students 
who attended for-profit colleges and local for-profit higher education institutions located 
in the legislative districts of the members of Congress to visit with members of Congress 
either in their Washington, D.C. offices or District offices.   
 One Republican Congressional staffer described how the for-profit colleges 
utilized students: “They had a very effective grassroots campaign. I should add that CCA 
actually also used grassroots and had a lot of students bombard Senator Clinton's office 
and other Senate offices.” In addition to the use of students for grassroots activities, 
several interviewees mentioned that a large component of the grassroots strategy was to 
invite members of Congress and their staffs to visit for-profit colleges in their home 
districts: “They invite their members of Congress and staff to come out to visit their 
schools and do tours to see what they are doing and meet their students.” One for-profit-
college lobbyist described how these site visits, as well as local for-profit colleges visit to 
Washington D.C., are part of a strategy that recognizes that “all politics are local” and 
that visits such as these were part of a larger lobbying effort that helped to personalize the 
issues: 
“Obviously we focus on their local people, the schools in their districts to make 
sure that there's outreach there because all politics is local, as Tip O'Neil 
famously said. And so we work very hard to make sure that they got to know the 
school, visited the schools, had the school leaders visit Washington and visit with 
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them so they understood that it wasn't just my pretty face lobbying them and that 
there was a true constituent interest here being expressed. And something they 
could feel and see in terms of local interest.” 
 Another for-profit-college lobbyist explained how this was a strategy that had 
been utilized by non-profit colleges, and how this was an important strategy to educate 
members of Congress and their staff about what for-profit colleges are and meant for a 
region: 
“I think that we began to develop something that One Dupont Circle has also got 
going for it. We began to, in a very rudimentary way, develop what I'll call 
grassroots activity.  I don't mean petitions and students marching on Washington 
with signs. I mean getting people and members and staff into our campus to see 
what is going on. Making them understand that they were part of your districts 
too. We're not just some fly-by-night thing at the back of a garage. We're a 
campus with 400-500 students, a thousand students, in your district, and faculty 
and staff. And, they all vote. We're an important economic part of your 
community. We are producing people who are getting jobs from employers who 
you know or respect in your state or district. So building that kind of recognition 
and connectivity was another important part of what we did.” 
Another for-profit-college lobbyist described why this strategy was important 
because of how unfamiliar most members of Congress and their staffs are with the for-
profit-college model: 
“We tried doing some things like getting members to actually come and visit for-
profit schools because one of the hurdles that you find is that members and staff 
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have all come out of the traditional higher education sector so many of them had 
never seen a for-profit institution, had never been to one, never talked to our 
students, never talked to our faculty. So, they tended to not really have a good 
idea of what we are, what we're about, who we serve, and what a good job we do. 
One of the things that we found was the most helpful in getting people to support 
us in our policy agenda was getting them to come to our schools and talk to our 
students.  
One Republican Congressional staffer described participation in one of these site 
visits and how the elements of this strategy, including messages that were communicated 
during the site visit. This particular staffer mentioned the need to ask deeper questions 
during the visit in order to really get a sense of the issues affecting the for-profit sector, 
rather than just simply listening to the information presented: 
“The site visit. And certainly it's most helpful if staff can go see something in 
operation. And when one does that asking critical questions is of critical 
importance. So I did go down to Florida and I saw a culinary school and a 
fashion-design school and then talked to representatives from those colleges and 
students as well. They did present a picture where they were meeting a distinct 
need in that community for those kind of programs and they also talked about the 
outcomes of their students who were gaining employment after graduation and 
how they were keeping costs down. But then they talk about the burden to comply 
with 90/10 where there have been some instances where people are hundredths of 
a percentage away and they may lose their eligibility for Title IV, which is huge 
for a college if they lose that. They may go bankrupt or have to dis-enroll all of 
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their students.  But I think you do just get a one-sided view if you are simply 
visiting and not being critical and not asking questions. I found it helpful to talk 
firsthand with the leaders of the school and the organizations [and] to hear from 
their mouths what they thought of some of my boss's concerns and how things 
were playing out in their world.” 
 
Secondary Strategy: Consistent Talking Points 
The secondary strategies mentioned by interview participants include consistent 
talking points (n=8), high level lobbying (n=8), Hill Days (n=7), outreach to Freshman 
members of Congress (n=7), use of data and statistics (n=6), becoming a resource to 
Congressional staff (n=6), and the targeting of certain members of the House Education 
and the Workforce Committee (n=5). Among the less prominent strategies five emerged 
that are worthy of mentioning, including the use of confusing information (n=3), the 
targeting of Congressional Black Caucus members (n=3), the hiring of Harris Miller to be 
president of the Career College Association (CCA) (n=3), the forcing of a compromise 
(n=2), and Congressional testimony (n=2). 
Eight interviewees, including four non-profit-college lobbyists, one for-profit-
college lobbyist, one Democratic Congressional staffer, and two Republican 
Congressional staffers mentioned consistent talking points as a strategy of the for-profit 
colleges. No reporter mentioned this as a strategy. 
One Republican Congressional staffer mentioned how the talking points of the 
for-profit colleges were consistent over the several years of the reauthorization process: 
“They are very consistent in their arguments. They used those kinds of arguments 
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consistently over the years.” A non-profit-college lobbyist also explained the consistency 
of the for-profit-college sector’s talking points: “The amount of consistency. We probably 
did 20 visits just on these issues on both sides of the aisle and the verbiage that you'd 
hear coming back to you was just so similar. It was like talking to for-profit talking points 
in office after office.” Another non-profit-college lobbyist also described how not only 
were the talking points consistent, but also how the strategy included ensuring that the 
members of Congress and their staff could repeat the messages as a way to advance the 
for-profit-college agenda during the reauthorization process: 
“They certainly created a fair amount of boilerplate to advance their positions. 
They were very good at messaging. You could see the kind of messaging success. 
As a practitioner you've got to respect people for what they do well, even if it's for 
the wrong cause. I thought the ease with which they managed to place so many of 
their priorities in the mouth of a fellow who generally doesn't know what he's 
going to say until he hears it out of his own mouth (Charles Miller, on the 
Secretary's commission) is really a testament to their ability to control the 
agenda, no matter which venue. They did a good job on messaging. They did a 
good job on superficially creating a rational, seemingly rational, explanation for 
why Transfer of Credit should have been on the agenda, created a pseudo-
rational explanation of why Single Definition was only fair. They did a decent job. 
The minute you take a second look at how stupid this all is, but they did a decent 
job for the kind of attention deficit disorder nature of Congressional focus on 
things. They did a decent job to get their three sentences that a member [of 
Congress] may take home to give them what they needed on Transfer of Credit. 
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They use money and create uniform, consistent, and seemingly logical set of 
messages. They stuck to them, they sold them, they marketed them, and they 
advanced their agenda.” 
 
Secondary Strategy: High-level Lobbying 
Ten interviewees, including three non-profit lobbyists, one for-profit lobbyist, one 
Democratic Congressional staffer, one Republican Congressional staffer, and four 
reporters specifically mentioned high-level lobbying as a strategy. While similar to the 
strategy of lobbying during Hill meetings mentioned by interviewees (as explained 
above), this strategy is more nuanced in that interviewees noted that the lobbying was 
more strategic in that the lobbyist doing the lobbying was highly connected to and had 
direct access to specific members of Congress. 
One non-profit-college lobbyist described how this strategy was different from the 
lobbying capacity of the non-profit-college sector: “They have a lobbying capacity that's 
greater than ours on a day-to-day basis.” Another non-profit-college lobbyist explained 
the for-profit-college sector’s lobbying capacity was greater because the sector had the 
ability to contract out lobbying services: 
“We didn't contract out. I don't think we contracted out any of our lobbying on 
this and they contracted out lots of it. And so they would have the resources to try 
to do the kind of the lobbying, the single issue lobbying, where you hire someone 
to make a phone call. You hire somebody who is a friend or has a relationship 
with a member of Congress, to make the phone call to make the appointment.” 
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Several interviewees described how these high-level lobbying strategies included 
lobbying contact by influential lobbyists, such as Tony Podesta: “They hired some very 
influential people, [including] Tony Podesta, who obviously has very good contacts with 
Mr. Miller.”  
A Democratic Congressional staffer also mentioned the example of Tony Podesta: 
“A good example is that they hired Tony Podesta to come in and talk to George 
Miller. They moved to understanding that Democrats were now in charge and 
they hired a bunch of Democratic lobbyists and lobbying firms that had high level 
connections and that could at least get meetings.” 
Another Democratic Congressional staffer explained the influential political connections 
of Tony Podesta: 
“One of the lobbyists who did lobby for them was Tony Podesta, brother of John 
Podesta [and] former Chief of Staff to President Clinton. And they were like any 
big guys. They hire big guns to be their lobbyists and it's an access issue and an 
issue of like, ‘Oh, that person is my best friend. I don't want to disappoint them.’” 
The same Congressional staffer explained a nuance to this strategy. Since Tony Podesta’s 
political connections were with Democrats, he likely did not lobby Republicans and 
likely only, or mostly, lobbied Democratic offices: “I'm sure he didn't lobby any of the 
Republicans. He lobbied the Democrats. If he called me, I always returned his calls. It 
didn't change our policy stances, but it was a really smart thing to do.” 
In addition to hiring Tony Podesta to do “high-level” lobbying, two reporters 
noted the strategy of the Career College Association hiring Harris Miller. One reporter 
said: “I think they did a very smart thing in hiring Harris Miller. Strategically he, it, was 
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a brilliant move.” Similar to the notion that hiring Tony Podesta was a strategic move in 
accessing Democrats, another reporter mentioned the hiring of Harris Miller: 
“I think that they made a good strategic choice in choosing Harris Miller as 
president (of the Career College Association) because he had real Democratic 
credential, for lack of a better word. He gave a lot of money to Democrats, so he 
had been a longtime Democratic donor and he had been a one-time candidate for 
the Senate. So his Democratic credentials probably helped open some doors for 
the for-profit colleges once Democrats gained control of Congress.” 
 
Secondary Strategy: Hill Days 
Seven interviewees, including two non-profit lobbyists, two for-profit lobbyists, 
two Republican Congressional staffers, and one reporter specifically mentioned Hill Days 
as a strategy. No Democratic Congressional staffer specifically mentioned Hill Days as a 
strategy. 
“Hill Days” are specific dates on which members of special interest-groups fly in 
to Washington, D.C. to meet with their members of Congress to advocate or lobby on 
policy issues. As one Republican Congressional staffer explained: “They [the for-profit 
colleges] have special days and special times that they bring their college presidents in to 
talk to their respective members of Congress.” One reporter described this strategy as an 
effort of a special grassroots committee of the for-profit colleges: 
“It was the outreach committee or the grassroots committee and they were talking 
about how different members of the Career College Association should try to get 
members of Congress to come see their members in action. All the members of the 
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Career College Association would come to Washington. It was their strategy 
meeting.” 
 
Secondary Strategy: Outreach to Freshman Members of Congress 
Seven interviewees, including one non-profit lobbyist, one for-profit lobbyist, 
three Democratic staffers, one Republican Congressional staffer, and one reporter 
specifically mentioned outreach to freshman members of Congress as a strategy.  
It is important to know that the reauthorization occurred over several 
Congressional sessions. During the beginning of the process, Republicans were in the 
majority and Democrats were in the minority, and during the final phases of the process, 
Democrats were in the majority and Republicans were in the minority. This balance of 
power matters because the political party in the majority is responsible for drafting the 
legislation that is considered and eventually passed into law. The mention of the outreach 
to freshman members of Congress confirms this political situation mid-way through the 
authorization. As one non-profit-college lobbyist explained:  
“The for-profit education sector was more effective at cultivating champions 
early on in the transition to the Democratic leadership that happened in the fall of 
2006. In particular, I have memories of them doing significant outreach to 
Democratic freshmen who were on the Education committee who were sort of 
‘majority makers’ for [Speaker of the House] Nancy Pelosi and were treated with 
a lot of respect in the new Administration and so given more weight than you 
might typically think of a freshmen receiving.”  
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A reporter also explained how freshman members were a target for the for-profit 
college strategies, and additionally explaining that newer members of Congress may not 
have been as familiar with the history of for-profit-college issues: 
“In the last Congress the for-profits really made a concentrated effort to win over 
some freshman Democrats to get some new allies among Democrats because 
historically Democrats had been more skeptical of the sector because of its 
history of problems.  The thinking was, ‘Well these new freshmen were not around 
in the 1980s or 1990s when all those for-profit colleges went out of business, so 
they may not have what the for-profits saw as a bias against them.’ So that 
included people on the House Education Committee, Altmire [D-Pennsylvania], 
Sestak [D-Pennsylvania] and Yarmouth [D-Kentucky], and they were giving 
money to them. Not huge sums, but they did seem to be making some headway in 
convincing them that they had cleaned up their act and that they were reaching an 
underserved population that other colleges weren't.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer mentioned the combined strategy of targeting 
newer members of Congress who were not as familiar with the history of for-profit 
colleges and political fundraising for them: 
“They [for-profit colleges] donated a lot of money, I think, to the younger 
members who weren't really up on all of this for-profit stuff. I think the year that 
we did a lot of Higher Education Act stuff there were a lot of newer members. So 
they donated a lot of money.” 
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Another Democratic Congressional Staffer commented on how this strategy made it more 
difficult to counter the for-profit-college efforts to advance their policy agenda: “They 
were able to get to the Freshmen members of the committee so that made it very tough.” 
 
Secondary Strategy: Use of data and statistics 
Six interviewees, including two for-profit lobbyists, one Democratic staffer, two 
Republican Congressional staffers, and one reporter specifically mentioned the use of 
data and statistics as a strategy. No non-profit-college lobbyists mentioned this as a 
strategy. 
A Republican Staffer explained how providing data was a strategy to advance the 
for-profit policy agenda: 
“Oftentimes the way they [for-profit colleges] try to do that [advance their policy 
agenda] is to bring data that explains the types of students who go to for-profit 
universities. The type of results that are gains for graduates, the jobs they get and 
the career paths they head down.”  
As one for-profit lobbyist explained data was used to support the arguments 
(discussed below) they presented during meetings with members of Congress and their 
staffs: 
“So my view of lobbying it starts with substance. You've got to have good 
arguments and good data to support your arguments and the facts on your side 
and well-thought-out policy positions first and then you go about trying to figure 
out who to appeal to and how. What relationship can we develop and tap into. 
Those come next after you've got ideas.”  
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Another for-profit-college lobbyist explained how the use of data allowed for 
more “research-based” presentations, rather than “emotional” appeals: 
“We did put together the facts and figures to support our case. Primarily me and 
my staff presented that material, as a Washington lobbyist does, to the staff and 
members and presented the facts and try to make it as much of a research-based 
presentation as opposed to an emotional presentation and try to show the impact 
on the future education system of our country.”  
A Republican Congressional Staffer recalled receiving specific data for use during 
consideration of policy issues: “On various occasion we'd get pretty specific data and 
reports and they would do surveys and that kind of stuff. If they had legitimate data and 
studies to back up what they were saying it got considered like any issue would.” Specific 
data became important when for-profit colleges were attempting to shape very specific 
policy changes to the 90/10 Rule. As one for-profit-college lobbyist explained: “Well we 
tried a few things. Taking data analysis on things such as 90/10, showing that 90/10 isn't 
really a good metric for showing whether a school is a good school or not.”  
A for-profit-college lobbyist explained in detail the kind of data the organization 
presented in support of various policy issues advanced by the for-profit colleges, 
including rationale for increasing student loan limits due to the collapse of the financial 
markets, implications of raising financial aid levels for the 90/10 rule, and how changes 
to the default rate formula would affect for-profit colleges. Data were used to show 
rationale for increasing student loans limits: 
“The issues on the lending were pretty obvious. We could show that the private 
lending market had collapsed for students and people who didn't have 
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outstanding credit ratings, and there were plenty of data out there to support that 
and lenders were announcing day in and day out that they were pulling out of that 
marketplace, so it wasn't like we had to do a lot of independent research to 
bolster that case, but we did do some.” 
Data were also used to show how increasing financial aid compounded the effect 
of the 90/10 Rule on the for-profit colleges. As one for-profit-college lobbyist explained: 
“On the 90/10 issue, similarly we presented some fairly sophisticated 
mathematical analysis of the implications for increasing federal aid, not just the 
$2000 loan increase in March.  There were also two Pell increases in 2007, and 
another in 2008 and how that impacts schools. And, we did member surveys to be 
able to present to interested members of Congress to show what percentage of 
schools were having problems now and may have problems under the new 
mathematics with Pell increases and loan increases.” 
The same lobbyist went on to explain how data from other sectors were gathered 
to help bolster the for-profit-college sector argument in relation to the Cohort Default 
Rate: 
“On the default issue it was more an issue of pointing out that defaults are not 
unique to our sector. When the GAO [Government Accountability Office] 
subsequently testified in a hearing last fall we showed with a lot of data in 2007-
2008 that default rates are not a factor of institutional ownership or institutional 
quality. They are a factor of socio-demographics of your student population. If 
you look at our schools, and minority serving institutions and community colleges 
that serve lower-income populations and that do permit [students] to take out 
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federal student loans and most of them don't, but those that do allow their 
students to take out federal student loans, those default rates were virtually 
identical. And we had a study commissioned by an outside research, not 
independent research, but doing a survey of existing research came to the same 
conclusion. That high default rates were not a function of our schools being for-
profit versus other schools being not-for-profit. But more if you are going to be 
highly selective and only admitting students with high socio-demographic student. 
Obviously those schools are never going to have those default rate problems. 
Whereas our schools and community colleges and Minority Serving Institutions, 
which admitted students on a much broader array of eligibility criteria and didn't 
discriminate against them because of their low socio-economic status were going 
to have higher default rates.” 
This kind of data were clearly useful to the staff working on the reauthorization 
and determining whether to adopt the policy changes being requested by the for-profit-
college sector. One Democratic Congressional staffer recalls members of Congress and 
their staff requesting data from the for-profit colleges: 
“There was very much a discussion in conference about data and trying to get the 
for-profits to disclose data because they would make a statement that they 
couldn't do “this’ because it would hurt their students but then they wouldn't 
show us data to justify it. But I remember that was very much a discussion of 
trying to figure out when it came up with for-profits.”  
One Republican Congressional staffer described that Congressional offices would 
ask for-profit colleges to provide data in order to provide rationale for policy changes: 
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“We literally called people and say, ‘So, we're hearing that 90/10 is going to 
cause you to raise tuition. Show it to us. How does that work? Show us the 
programs that are impacted. Give us data that we can use to show us why that 
would be the case.’ There was a handful of colleges out there that could come up 
with excellent data and we relied on those guys to get us the numbers that we 
needed to show us what it would mean if something passed or didn't pass.” 
The same Congressional staffer explained that not only is the content of the data 
important, but also how the data are presented: 
“Data and all that stuff, but who has time to read it. You have no time to read all 
that stuff. You need people to sit there and give you a five-minute summation: 
what they need, why the need it, who it affects, how it affects, and get people on 
board. There were a handful of schools who actually provide really good data in 
a really good fashion that you could understand the issue and you knew why they 
were so concerned and why they were looking for things to get changed and knew 
enough to not to send you fifty pages that nobody was going to read.” 
A Republican Congressional Staffer recalled the for-profits having quite a bit of 
data, but mentioned the validity of the data and whether the data were actually helping to 
make the case the for-profits were trying to make: 
“They [the for-profit colleges] always have lots of statistics of the poverty level of 
their students. They argue all the time that their students are not the 18-year old 
kids sitting in class for eight hours a day. They are working parents. They need to 
take classes at night on random schedules. They had that kind of information at 
their fingertips. They had fairly decent information on job placement rates and 
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graduation rates, actually sometimes better than the rest of the higher ed[ucation] 
colleagues. And they could show some of those numbers. Again, this is historical. 
This wasn't just this time around. This is every reauthorization I've been through.  
They also say they are serving the poorest of the poor at most of their schools. 
User dropout rates and default rates are going to be higher. They've always used 
that kind of data to justify their case. And sometimes it's valid and sometimes you 
need to look at it and say well that doesn't necessarily mean you're doing a good 
job.” 
And while no non-profit college lobbyists mentioned this strategy specifically in 
response to this research question, in another part of the interview a non-profit-college 
lobbyist suggested that the data presented by the for-profit colleges may not have been as 
reliable as they were presented to be and that the data could not be verified by third-party 
entities: 
“The data [are] full of holes and of the issues that they used to substantiate these 
claims. Like default rates and job placement. Either are only reportable through 
their limited and subset means like Cohort Default Rate or generally not 
measurable like employment. No independent entity measures that right now on 
any meaningful scale so any employment numbers they are coming up with are 
coming out of their own back pocket.” 
In addition to questions of verification of data, one Democratic Congressional 
staffer mentioned that some data may have been used to confuse Congressional staff and 
members of Congress: 
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“They (CCA) had a few other staff people. The actual data people who would 
when we asked about 90/10 data, or when they wanted to come in and try to 
confuse people, they would bring these statisticians who were from either another 
higher education organization or a non-profit college and say ‘This person is an 
access person and they know the technical side.’”  
 
Secondary Strategy: Becoming a Resource to Congressional Staff 
Six interviewees, including four for-profit lobbyists and two Republican 
Congressional staffers mentioned for-profit colleges becoming a resource to 
Congressional staff as a strategy. This strategy is also an important piece of the 
theoretical framework used for this study. A lobbyist becomes an extension of a 
Congressional office by providing information and intelligence. One for-profit-college 
lobbyist explained that because Congressional staff are responsible for a variety of issues, 
lobbyists can serve an important role in distilling the issues for staff who are short on 
time: 
“Hill staff and certainly members are overwhelmed. If you're the member, you 
have to know about everything. If you're a staffer, you have to know about four or 
five different issue areas in pretty significant depth. And what a lot of people say 
to the shortage of time and shortage in resources.” 
At the end of the interview, one Democratic Congressional staffer noted the desire 
of any lobbyist to be seen as a resource to Congressional staff: “Any lobbyist, and this is 
true across for-profit and non-profit want to establish good working relationships with 
219 
 
 
 
staff, want to be a source of information for staff, want phone calls to be returned sooner 
rather than later.” 
One for-profit-college lobbyist explained how there were specific opportunities to 
submit policy proposals during the reauthorization process and the organization utilized 
those opportunities to be a resource to staff and position themselves at experts on given 
policy issues they were working to advance. The lobbyist noted that then going forward 
the organization was seen as an entity for staff to utilize as questions arose throughout the 
process: 
“Every time we had that opportunity we submitted our proposal and followed up 
and talked to staff about them. We also tried really hard to become a resource to 
the staff. We were really experts in accreditation and experts in quality assurance. 
We had developed and refined an accountability model that the staff seemed very 
interested in. So a lot of times while we were fairly aggressive making sure our 
proposals were being discussed among various staff, we also encouraged them to 
reach out to us if they had questions or if they were trying to resolve a certain 
issue. And they did that. We got our points across in many different ways, but the 
most effective way was helping staff on both the Senate and House sides see us as 
authorities on what we were talking about and getting them to reach out to us and 
ask questions as they were actually drafting language.” 
Another for-profit-college lobbyist also explained how being a resource to staff 
was a function of the lack of time staff have to deeply focus on one issue, and also 
explained in detail how this strategy is a process that happens over time through 
relationship-building with staff: 
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“Well I think, and this is true for any lobbying or advocacy effort, you start with a 
premise of the legislative staff, the Hill staff, is not going to know everything 
about every subject. That goes to the conversation of being spread too thin. There 
are only certain number of staffers to cover literally a ton of issues, whether it's 
education or something else. And there's only so much bandwidth of resources 
within government itself to get educated. And so the reliance on people like me to 
educate staffers on the various different topics and issues that are under 
consideration is something that I view as a very important first step. So 
introducing myself and my clients to Hill staff and educating them on the issues of 
concern to the client and then overtime as the issue gets debated and discussed 
being part of the continued conversations about how the language that's being 
crafted might look.” 
The same for-profit-college lobbyist explained the investment it takes to become a 
resource to a Congressional office: 
“It's a long process and it might include having, suggesting that, clients testify at 
hearings. It's a very long, lengthy dialogue that I would say that part, what I 
really view as most important process, is the educational process for the Hill 
staff. And I don't necessarily anticipate that after every meeting the Hill staff will 
walk away and say, ‘Oh, I really agree.’  It might be that we just educated them 
on one point of an issue. The staff will go off and hear the other side or multiple 
sides of the issue and then the staff is going to help the member decide what the 
next steps are. My role is to really stay engaged as that really develops.” 
221 
 
 
 
When speaking on this issue of being a resource to Congressional staff, one for-
profit-college lobbyist explained, as noted earlier, how Congressional staff would request 
that lobbyists who were advancing different agendas, work together to bring different, 
compromise proposals to staff to work with: “Hill staff will say, ‘Okay, I'm hearing too 
much noise. Can you all get together and work something out. We want to do something, 
but you all need to get in a room and work this out.’ We definitely did that.” 
The involvement of lobbyists as a resource was helpful to staff on particular 
issues, and at some points this strategy also involved lobbyists helping to identify 
compromise positions on certain policy issues. On the flip side, once Congressional staff 
realized different lobbyists were being resources to various members of Congress to 
advance different policy positions, a compromise would need to be worked out. One 
Democratic Congressional staffer explained from the Hill perspective how that process 
played out:  
“We'd have Mr. Grijalva and Mr. Bishop and then we'd have CBC [Congressional 
Black Caucus] members and freshman members on the other side trying to 
advocate for the for-profits. The next thing was that the Chairman said, ‘Let's find 
a compromise. Let's not play one side or the other.’ So that was a strategy 
[playing one side against another] that they were using.” 
Secondary Strategy: Targeting Certain Members of the Committee 
Similar to the strategy of targeting freshman members of the Education 
Committee, the targeting of certain members of the Education Committee was mentioned 
as a strategy by five interviewees, including one non-profit lobbyist, one for-profit 
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lobbyist, two Democratic Congressional staffers, and one Republican Congressional 
staffer.  
Various interviewees explained the rationale for the strategic targeting of different 
members for different reasons. As one Democratic Congressional staffer explained,  
targeting  members needed to happen because of the number of new members during the 
110
th
 Congress: 
“Certainly a targeting of committee members was a strategy. Particularly in the 
110th Congress, we had a lot of new members that were more moderate than had 
traditionally been on the Committee. So working with them and befriending those 
offices [was one of the strategies].” 
One for-profit-college lobbyist explained how the strategy is not to cultivate 
relationships with everyone on the Education Committee, but to develop a targeted list of 
members and staff with whom to work. In other words, to target certain members or 
groups of members: 
“Working with those offices [opponents to the for-profit college agenda] is just as 
important as working with the offices that you agree with. It's committee members 
who you are working, and really targeting [them]. That's another myth – that you 
have to have a relationship with everyone on the committee. In my view, you need 
a handful for success. You really need to work an issue with a core group of 
members. I don't, at least in my experience, I don't think it's necessary to have a 
great relationship or lobby a group of 40 members to get something done. I think 
it's much more isolated and targeted than that.” 
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Another Democratic Congressional staffer described how the for-profit colleges 
targeted committee members because of their affiliations with other Congressional 
Caucuses, such as the Congressional Black Caucus: 
“The for-profit colleges tend to target the minority caucuses heavily given that so 
many of their students are minority. So my boss was approached not only in his 
capacity as a Representative on the committee, but because of his membership in 
the Congressional Black Caucus and that is something that is consistent over the 
years with this group.” 
One Democratic Congressional staffer expressed an observation that one strategy 
was to target certain offices and that some were targeted more than others: “We weren't 
even the most targeted office. I can't imagine how some of the other members felt.” 
A for-profit-college lobbyist explained how the strategy to target certain members 
of the committee was related to a strategic effort to gain support from the Chairman on 
policy issues of concern to the for-profit colleges: 
“We worked very hard over the 2-year period running up to the final passage to 
expand our support among the Democrats. Going to some of the more senior 
Democrats who we thought were somewhat open minded. Plus working on the so-
called front-line Democrats – freshman Democrats – who hadn't had years of 
having the bad guys telling them how awful we were and were somewhat more 
open-minded. Then some of the Democrats who had been in Congress for a long 
time and probably had our opponents chew on their ears about how awful we 
were.” 
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The same for-profit-college lobbyist went on to explain how this strategy to 
influence certain members of the Committee was also part of an overall strategy to 
influence the Chairman:  
“We found that we were able to change a few minds, and more importantly, we 
were able to go to Chairman Miller [D-California] on some of the key issues and 
say now not only do we have the support of our long-standing backers on the 
Democratic side like McCarthy [D-New York] and Andrews [D-New Jersey], 
[but] we also have these eight or 10 other Democrats who were very, very 
supportive. So that gave him a chance to look at these issues with a more open 
mind rather than just saying, ‘Well, you have Republican support, but the only 
Democrats I see supporting you are McCarthy and Andrews.’ So that was key to 
showing Chairman Miller that we worked hard, we established a whole base of 
people on his side of the aisle who were supportive, and while there continued to 
still be some skeptics there was at least on his side of the aisle a substantial 
number of people he could look to and who wanted to help us on these issues.” 
This support from the Chairman was important. The for-profit colleges knew they 
would need to garner support from a variety of members on the Education Committee, on 
both sides of the aisle, throughout the process. As a Republican Congressional staffer 
explained: 
“What was interesting about that time, the HEA bill was interesting, because we 
went through one round of it before the Democrats took back the Congress and 
then again once they took it back. So we had already been through the jostling 
and the positioning in the 2006 reauthorization round. So by the time that they 
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come back, there was a sense that they'd [for-profit colleges] already won a big 
part of the battle and it was preserving those victories from Chairman Miller and 
his staff.  So it was a little bit of a different tone coming back that time [when 
Democrats were in the Majority]. [The for-profit colleges] already agreed that 
what [they] wanted is actually acceptable to Republicans and Democratic 
members and [for-profit colleges] just want to continue to have certain members 
with [them] as they were last time around.  There was a solid, Boehner-produced 
draft, if not House passed. Preserving those gains in that version. Their tone and 
strategy was coming at it from that angle. ‘Let's preserve the progress we've 
made. It's already been approved. We have Democrats on board. We have 
Republicans on board. But obviously Chairman Miller is against us and we need 
to pull a coalition together.’” 
One Democratic Congressional staffer also mentioned Chairman Miller and his 
lack of strong support for the for-profit-college agenda as a reason for the for-profit-
college strategy to target certain members and groups of members on the Education 
Committee. The staffer also mentioned that in the targeting of certain members, and 
going around Chairman Miller, the for-profit colleges were strategically aware of the lack 
of knowledge of these staff who were less engaged in the day-to-day work of the 
reauthorization: 
“They (the for-profit college sector) went around to individual members [of 
Congress] because they didn't think that George [Miller] would be with them. 
And they worked to pick people of one by one. Not shocking and they also 
definitely, true for most lobbyists, they really preyed upon staff's lack of 
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knowledge. Up on the Hill, unless you are a Committee staff member, where you 
have a luxury of focusing on one or two issues, you don't have to think about 
health care and the environment. All the other members are staffed by regular 
legislative associates. These guys have to cover anywhere from five to 20 issues at 
a time. So they preyed upon the fact that these staff didn't have time to dig into a 
lot of this tough financial stuff and spend a lot of time learning it. Prey on the 
fears. There's a fair amount of fear mongering and also just kind of 
misinformation.  It wasn't outright lying. It was just badly put. They just weren't 
telling the whole story.”  
 
Arguments 
Two primary arguments were used to advance the for-profit-college agenda 
emerged. Twenty-six interview participants mentioned the theme that for-profit colleges 
were requesting changes to certain policies in order to ensure access for low-income, 
non-traditional colleges and 11 mentioned that for-profit colleges and their students were 
being unfairly discriminated against as long as the policies that they were attempting to 
change stayed in place. Those arguments are further explored below.  
Three secondary arguments were used to advance the for-profit-college agenda 
emerged: there would be negative implications for not changing current policies, 
including the need of for-profit colleges to increase tuition that students already are 
having a difficult time affording or the potential for for-profit colleges to close their doors 
or declare bankruptcy (n=9); for-profit colleges have better student outcomes and serve 
students better than non-profit colleges (n=4) ; and, for-profit colleges are efficient (n=4).  
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Among the less prominent arguments two emerged that are worthy of noting, 
including the argument that for-profit colleges are innovators ( n= 3) and non-profit 
colleges fear competition from for-profit colleges (n=3). The following sections explore 
the primary arguments. 
 
Primary Argument: Access  
The most common argument advanced by the for-profit colleges, by far, 
according to interviewees, was that for-profit colleges provide educational access for 
low-income, non-traditional students. A total of 26 interviewees, including five non-
profit college lobbyists, two for-profit college lobbyists, nine Democratic Congressional 
staffers, seven Republican Congressional staffers, and three reporters mentioned this 
argument. 
As one for-profit-college lobbyist explained, in order for the for-profit-college 
agenda to move forward, Congress would need to be educated on the profile of the for-
profit college student: 
“Serving the non-traditional student. We consistently argued that Congress had 
to realize that they had to get the old model of college out of their head. A number 
that we keep repeating over and over again, because it appeared in Government 
Accountability Office reports and Department of Education data, was that three-
quarters of students now were non-traditional in post-secondary education. In the 
sense that they didn't graduate from a suburban high school and immediately go 
off to a four-year college with parental support. That's the old model. That's 
about 25 percent of post-secondary population now.” 
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A Republican Congressional staffer explained how consistent the for-profit-
college sector was in advancing this argument and how their lobbyists used data to 
demonstrate the argument and provide rationale for the policy changes they sought: 
“They are very consistent in their arguments. They mainly serve the lower-income 
population that is not going to a four-year college. So they always have lots of 
statistics of the poverty level of their students. They argue all the time that their 
students are not the 18-year-old kids sitting in class for eight hours a day. They 
are working parents. They need to take classes at night on random schedules. It 
[the argument] always focused on those kind of issues, about who the students are 
[and] who they are enrolling. They look at those populations and use that for the 
criteria for why they need this and why they needed that.” 
For-profit colleges also described to Congressional staffers the profile of the 
“non-traditional” student who enrolled. As another Republican Congressional staffer 
explained: 
“They [for-profit colleges] would obviously talk about the population they were 
serving. Often times talking of their student profile of single mother with kids 
working three jobs and trying to do this part time. And, despite their best 
intentions they can't have graduation rates like traditional colleges.” 
This argument also served to justify continued participation of for-profit colleges 
in federal student financial aid programs, according to a Democratic Congressional 
staffer: 
“They were trying to make the case that they were educating high poverty 
students, a large number of students and generally making the case that they 
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reach a population in need and that they should be included [in federal 
programs] as such.” 
One Democratic Congressional staffer explained how this argument was also 
made as a way to argue that those members of Congress and staff who did not support the 
for-profit colleges and their agenda were therefore not supporting, and in fact, 
discriminating against, non-traditional students: “They also used the argument that they 
served low-income, minority students and people who didn't support them were basically 
discriminating against those kinds of students.” 
Not only are for-profit colleges serving low-income, non-traditional students, they 
argued, but also they are serving students that traditional universities are not serving or 
cannot serve in the same ways as for-profit colleges. In addition, for-profit colleges made 
the argument that they were serving students in geographic locations that non-profit 
colleges were not, according to a non-profit-college lobbyist: “First and foremost they 
said they were serving people that traditional institutions weren't serving. That is to say, 
lower-income students. And serving students in places where there wasn't any one else.” 
Another non-profit-college lobbyist stated that the for-profit colleges were also 
suggesting that not only were non-profit colleges not serving non-traditional students, but 
also that these were students who non-profit colleges were rejecting or who did not even 
consider applying to non-profit colleges: “They [for-profit colleges] would take students 
we considered and rejected or who never considered applying. I'd say the access 
argument is the one that prevailed most.” 
And, it was not just the non-profit-college lobbyists who mentioned this contrast 
made by the for-profit-college sector in their arguments. One reporter noted the 
230 
 
 
 
effectiveness and accuracy of the argument, and how this particular argument was 
strategic in garnering support from Democrats who may have not have been swayed by 
the more business-oriented messages and arguments: 
“They have fairly successfully argued that they are serving populations that 
traditional higher ed[uD.C.ation] has shortchanged, if not ignored. And I think 
that continues to be effective and in some ways accurate. When you look at their 
enrollment numbers they make a reasonably strong case that they are serving the 
financially-needy and minority students in greater proportions than traditional 
institutions. They are not stupid. They adopted arguments that, especially in a 
Democratic Congress, especially resonate. They can't just say, ‘Crap, we need 
this money to keep our businesses alive.’" 
A non-profit-college lobbyist added that the for-profit-college sector, in the use of 
this argument, contrasted the access they provided to non-traditional students against the 
access provided by the non-profit-college sector: “Their overwhelming argument was 
that they were the ones serving low-income students. And that they were serving students, 
non-traditional students, in a way that the traditional sector was sluggish.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist did not disagree that the for-profit-college sector 
may be providing more access than some selective non-profit colleges, but questioned 
how well those students are being served by the for-profit-college sector: 
“The first, most insidious and most frustrating, claim was that they serve a 
population of students that traditional colleges don't serve and won't serve. That 
was the first tactic that they took. The concern with that approach was that we 
had no disagreement that they enroll a lot of low-income students. More than a 
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lot of selective colleges do. But the question is, ‘Are they being served well?’ 
Clearly they are being enrolled, but they are leaving with a ton of debt, a dubious 
educational offering and credentials. So that was their big push: ‘We serve 
students that traditional colleges won't touch because they are low-income, adult 
learners, non-traditional.’ They threw a lot of things at Congress that sounded 
like pretty good arguments.” 
Interviewees also mentioned that for-profit colleges claimed that because they 
served this particular population, special consideration should be given to any policies 
guiding institutional access to financial aid, such as accountability measures like the 
Cohort Default Rate and the 90/10 Rule. One Republican Congressional staffer noted that 
this argument was used for rationale on a number of issues: “I think a standard message 
was that they were educating someone who may not otherwise be educated. That they are 
dealing with a population of students that others don't want. Who they serve was an 
argument for a lot of stuff.”  Another Republican Congressional staffer explained how 
this argument was used by the non-profit sector in relation to the accountability efforts 
coming out of Congress: 
“There were folks that argued that since there were so many federal dollars that 
we needed to treat [for-profit colleges] differently and regulate [for-profit 
colleges] more. But the for-profit [sector] would say that when you're holding 
[the for-profit sector] accountable understand that the types of students that we 
serve our non-traditional students, are poorer, skew more towards women and 
minorities than regular traditional schools.  When you measure [for-profit 
colleges] keep that in mind. It's an argument that also happens in the K-12 world, 
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where schools in underserved districts and high-poverty districts complain that 
they are being held to the same standards as the rich guys. It's the same thing 
here. The for-profits for the most part actually serve a higher need population 
than non-profits without the benefit of other state and local dollars that the [non-
profit sector] gets.”  
In making their case about the Cohort Default Rate, the for-profit-college sector 
alluded to the similar argument of serving a largely underserved-student population. As 
one reporter recalled: 
“The first one, their biggest argument that they've had for awhile is that they are 
serving a population that would otherwise go unserved. That even Community 
Colleges aren't serving. That's the defense they used in defending their higher-
than-average cohort default rate. We're serving these high-risk students and they 
are more likely to default because they are high-risk. That had some traction with 
lawmakers that they were reaching this underserved population.” 
Several interviewees mentioned how this argument was also useful for the for-
profit-college sector during debates about the 90/10 Rule. As one Democratic 
Congressional staffer explained: “I remember them focusing on especially talking about 
the 90/10 Rule. Focusing on the importance of getting aid to students and how they 
served a non-traditional population and focusing on the students.” 
Another Democratic Congressional staffer noted that making changes to the 90/10 
Rule about access to college for low-income students was a more successful argument 
than making the argument that those changes to the 90/10 Rule would financially benefit 
the for-profit-college sector: 
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“It's always about the students. 90/10 wasn't about their bottom line revenue.  It 
was about access for students. [Their argument] would always go back to how it 
would impact the students rather than going back to them as corporations, which 
is what they were essentially, which got irritating after a while. If they really 
cared about these issues, they'd be fighting for more Pell. You never saw them 
lobbying for more Pell money. All they really wanted was these small, minute 
details that only affected them and no one else in higher education.” 
The for-profit-college sector also would argue that the combination of their 
student demographics and federal regulations would force a rise in tuition and would 
prevent for-profit colleges from serving even larger numbers of low-income students who 
wanted to access a college education. As a Democratic Congressional staffer explained: 
“The strategies and arguments that were presented on their end were really 
talking about the population of students they serve. You'd hear the argument on 
90/10 of, ‘We can't go into poor communities because 100 percent of those 
students need to be on 100 percent of federal aid.’ Or, ‘We have to raise our 
tuition in order to be able to address those students.’ All of those issues, it was 
really targeting of ‘we serve low-income, non-traditional students who really 
need access to higher education and these (rules) are hindering our ability to do 
so.’” 
Another Democratic Congressional Staffer also explained how the for-profit 
colleges argued that the 90/10 Rule prevents them serving more low-income students:  
“‘90/10 prevents us from helping poor minority kids and we'd open up more schools in 
these poor neighborhoods but it prevents us from doing that’". A Republican staffer 
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commented on how for-profit colleges further nuanced the argument for the 90/10 Rule 
debate to explain that lower-income students needed to be able to attend college on 100 
percent financial aid: 
 “And for 90/10, if you're enrolling the poorest kids they don't have money to put 
towards their education so of course they are going to violate 90/10 because they 
are all coming to your school using federal aid money. They used those kinds of 
arguments consistently over the years.”  
One Democratic Congressional staffer during the interview read out loud 
comments explaining how the 90/10 Rule would deny access to low-income students, 
which were emailed to the Congressional Office by an individual employed by a career 
college in the member of Congress’s district: 
“‘The students can't afford to pay 10 percent of the tuition. I own two career 
colleges in the district. They train predominately inner-city residents in [name of 
city]. At our allied health campus most of the students are single females who 
have children. On 90/10 the rate on our campus is 95 percent. The students can't 
afford to pay 10 percent of tuition. Institutional scholarships and loans let them 
attend school and get employed in their field in training.’” 
Several interviewees pointed out that the 90/10 Rule debate was often discussed 
in the context of what percentage of the tuition a low-income student may be able to 
afford, however, the 90/10 Rule is not about what percentage of the tuition a student can 
pay; the 90/10 Rule regulates the percentage of federal aid dollars a for-profit higher 
education institution can have as part of their total revenue. As Democratic Congressional 
Staffer went on to explain: 
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“So that was the rationale for why institutional aid should count in the 10 
percent, that their students are so poor that they can't pay the 10 percent. So the 
next piece of the argument is then so if we have to shut down my schools. Then 
that leaves schools out of training and those students are mostly low-income and 
minority so you are disenfranchising these students and that's actually what the 
next email says, ‘If [changes to] 90/10 go[es] forward I'll have to shut down my 
second school leaving many students out of training.’” 
One for-profit-college lobbyist explained the connections among low-income, 
non-traditional students, their ability to pay tuition, and the debate regarding the 90/10 
Rule:  
“Our view was that [the 90/10 Rule] had not lived up to its intended purpose, 
which was to be a proxy for educational quality and integrity. Rather, we thought 
it had turned out to be a rule that really just reflected the socio-economic 
circumstances of the students you serve which in turn dictated how much federal 
student aid they would qualify for, which in turn would drive your 90/10 ratio. 
And so at a certain point if you served too many of those kinds of students who 
were consuming that much aid, you would be in peril of violating the rule. And so 
our view was that that either had the effect of forcing, you're creating incentive, 
an inappropriate incentive, for institutions to stop serving students with the 
highest need, which in turn cuts against the access aim of student aid programs. 
Or, it created incentive to raise your tuition so that you'd always have that 10 
percent that the rule said you had to get, which of course was another thing that 
loomed throughout this whole reauthorization process was the concern about 
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college cost. So here we have a rule that was creating an incentive to increase 
college costs. And so on those basis we thought the rule ought to be revoked.” 
 
Primary Argument: Discrimination  
A total of 11 interviewees, including one for-profit-college lobbyist, one non-
profit-college lobbyist, three Democratic Congressional staffers, four Republican 
Congressional staffers, and two reporters said that for-profit colleges used that argument 
that they or their students were being discriminated against or treated unfairly when it 
came to federal policies in the HEA. As a Republican Congressional explained: “It was a 
matter of fundamental fairness, they would say, and that they shouldn't be treated 
differently than other institutions. They always said that they were being treated lesser 
than the traditional state and private colleges.” 
When it came to federal regulations, for-profit colleges wanted to be treated the 
same as non-profit colleges. According to a Democratic staffer, the for-profit sector 
would mention, “The unfairness. ‘If you're gonna treat us like that then treat the non-
profit sector the same.’” 
As one reporter explained, for-profit colleges made the arguments about how 
federal policies affected their students, rather than focusing on institutional affects:  
“ ‘[Federal policy] was discriminatory.’ Their colleges were ‘treated differently’ 
than other colleges. In fact, they didn't say colleges, they said it was 
discriminating to their students that they weren't eligible for all of the same 
money as the non-profits. That was [in regards to] Single Definition.  On 90/10 
they were arguing that this was discriminatory and also that it was hurting their 
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efforts to serve low-income students to work in urban environments. On Transfer 
of Credit, they thought it was extremely unfair that colleges could just decide that 
they wouldn't take credits form a school just because they were nationally 
accredited.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer also mentioned how the for-profit college 
sector made the fairness argument in regards to students who attend for-profit colleges, 
rather than it being a fairness issue for the for-profit colleges as institutions. In fact, 
several interviewees mentioned the use of the phrase “second-class” by for-profit-college 
sector lobbyists to describe the experience of their students under current federal law:  
“They [for-profit colleges] never framed the debate about themselves. They would 
never say, ‘We're an institution of higher education just like everyone else so 
based on only our institutions there should be a single definition and not two 
standards of how it is.’ They'd always say, ‘Our students are just as qualified and 
educated as students from this university except they are considered second class 
students because they don't graduate from the university that's of another 
definition.’” 
A reporter mentioned how this argument was likely troubling to those in opposition to the 
for-profit-college sector, namely the non-profit college sector: 
“They [for-profit colleges] very much focused on, certainly focused on, fairness 
issues. ‘Students are choosing us in increasing numbers. It's not fair to them, to 
our students, to be treated as second class citizens.’ I saw them very much as 
‘good government fairness.’ ‘Don't discriminate against us and our students.’ 
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There's definitely a self-consciousness to that, but also a social equity set of 
arguments that probably drive the opponents mad.”  
A Democratic Congressional staffer also used the phrase “second-class” to explain the 
use of this argument and suggested that this particular use of the fairness argument was 
successful: “The other thing that for-profits always brought up was fairness. They 
wanted an equal, level, playing field. They didn't understand why they were treated like 
second-class citizens. Which is an interesting argument that clearly worked with a lot of 
people.” 
The policy issue of Transfer of Credit, in particular, brought to bear the argument 
of fairness and discrimination. As one for-profit-college lobbyist explained: 
“Basically our argument was for equity and economy. Restricting Transfer of 
Credit solely on accreditation status where the two schools in question were 
accredited and accredited by agencies equally recognized by the US Department 
of Education was just patently wrong and unfair.” 
Others interviewees went on to suggest that the for-profit-college sector was 
advancing an argument of fairness and discrimination, particularly in regards to Transfer 
of Credit, because the non-profit sector did not want any competition. According to a 
non-profit-college lobbyist: 
“On Transfer of Credit, that was universal on all of those issues of innovation, 
assistance to the poor, and on Transfer of Credit they used another interesting 
one, which was that they were being discriminated [against]. The concept of 
almost a closed shop that they were being discriminated against by the closed 
shop of the higher-education community that just didn't want any competition.” 
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As a Democratic Congressional staffer explained: “Transfer of Credit related to the 
Career College Association point of view. They felt that they were being discriminated 
against like the new kid on the block, or they felt it was almost like anti-competitive 
behavior.” 
 
Successes and Failures 
4. and 5. In what ways was the for-profit education special interest-group successful and 
not successful in its influence of the final legislation that resulted in the 2008 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
 
The fourth and fifth guiding questions sought to find out how successful the for-
profit colleges were in advancing their policy agenda during the HEA reauthorization 
process. To answer these questions, I collected data from interviews from key players and 
then based on those findings analyzed other data sources, including the Congressional 
Record, to further identify the specific ways in which the for-profit college sector was 
successful in advancing its policy agenda.  The interview participants mentioned 
successes and failures that I organized into themes for a total of 19 successes and a total 
of 14 failures. Of the 19 successes, one emerged as a primary theme, five emerged as a 
secondary theme, and 13 emerged as less prominent. Of the 14 failures, one emerged as 
primary, three emerged as secondary, and 10 emerged as less prominent. The successes 
and failures mentioned included specific policy agenda items, as well as general 
successes and failures. 
The findings indicate that the for-profit-college sector was successful in 
advancing some of their policy agenda and not as successful in advancing other elements 
of their agenda. In summing up the level of success for the for-profit colleges, one non-
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profit college lobbyist stated: “I would say they were more successful than not. I'd say 
they got legislation that protected them against further oversight. They were able to 
continue the relaxing of some of the policies that they were under before we went into 
reauthorization.” 
A Republican Congressional staffer noted that the for-profit colleges were equally 
successful and not successful in advancing their policy agenda and explained that some 
of their success was in having a strategy that promoted incremental change to policies, 
even when their preference was to see the policy completely eliminated: 
“They are running fifty-fifty. They've gotten really good at recognizing that you 
don't try to get the whole loaf, as I call it. You don't come in and say repeal 90/10, 
because it's not going to happen. They've figured out how to work around the 
edges and make improvements that helps them manage their business and I think 
they got very good at that. I give them an A+ in figuring out that, if you ask for 
everything, you're not going to get anything. So you might as well figure out 
incrementally what you can do. I think that helped them and they had some 
success with that kind of strategy. In a perfect world for them all of these rules 
would be gone and they wouldn't have special rules or separate rules from the 
rest of the non-profits. And obviously that hasn't happened. So, on that one they're 
not battling too well. But in trying to incrementally change some of these 
provisions to make their lives run a little better, I think they've been fairly 
successful.” 
The following sections explore the specific policy issues that the for-profit college 
sector was able to successfully change, including the 90/10 Rule and the 50-Percent 
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Rules, and those issues that the for-profit colleges were not seen as successful in, 
including Single Definition, Transfer of Credit, and Cohort Default Rate. General 
successes and failures are not included in this discussion given that the scope of this 
study was to investigate the specific policy agenda items of the for-profit colleges. 
 
Successes 
The one primary success mentioned is the policy change to the 90/10 Rule (n=16). 
That success is explored further below.  
The five secondary successes mentioned by interview participants include the 
policy change to the 50-percent rules (n=9), the ability of the for-profit colleges to be on 
the offensive rather than on the defensive (n=5), the for-profit colleges were more 
influential and strategic than the non-profit colleges (n=5), the for-profits were able to 
make the argument that they serve low-income students (n=4), and that they were able to 
mitigate policy changes to the cohort default rate measure (n=4). Among the less 
prominent successes three emerged that are worthy of noting because they relate to 
strategies discussed earlier in this paper, including the ability of the for-profit colleges to 
gain visibility (n=3), the ability to provide data to Congressional staff (n= 3), and the 
ability to adjust and change their lobbying asks (n=2).  
  
Primary Success: 90/10 Rule 
The 90/10 Rule is a provision within Title I of the HEA. Title I, among other 
sections, includes Section 101 and Section 102, which provide for the definitions of 
“institution of higher education” (IHE). Section 101 of Title I of the HEA defines IHEs 
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generally. Section 102, primarily for expanding the definition to include for-profit 
institutions, creates a separate definition of IHE for purposes of participating in Title IV – 
student financial aid programs. And within Section 102, prior to the enactment of this 
most recent reauthorization, there was a provision that required that in order to be 
considered an institution of higher education for purposes of participating in Title IV 
federal financial aid programs, proprietary schools must have obtained at least 10 percent 
of the school’s revenue from non-Title IV funds, which provide federal student financial 
aid to students attending colleges accredited by an agency recognized by the US 
Department of Education. The 90/10 Rule, which was implemented by the 1998 HEA 
Amendments (P.L. 105244), replaced its predecessor, the 85/15 Rule, which was 
authorized by the 1992 HEA Amendments (P.L. 102-235: CRS, 2005). The 90/10 Rule 
was one of the provisions in the HEA that could have that effect of restricting 
institutional access to the federal student financial aid program. If an institution was 
found to be in violation of the 90/10 Rule they would lose access to Title IV funds.  The 
rule was put in to place to ensure that for-profit colleges did not receive all of their 
income from the federal financial aid programs. 
A review of the Congressional Record revealed that the 90/10 provision was 
eliminated as a condition of institutional eligibility by removing it from Title I and 
thereby as part of the definition of IHE, but the reauthorization retains the effect of the 
provision by including it in the Title IV, Part G of the act – the Program Participation 
Agreement. Part G of the reauthorization included a variety of institutional requirements 
for Title IV participation, including the addition of the 90/10 Rule for proprietary 
institutions of higher education and the specification of revenue sources that may be 
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counted towards the provision of the 90/10 Rule that 10 percent of revenues must be from 
non-Title IV sources (Pub. L. 110-315). 
By moving the 90/10 Rule to the Program Participation Agreement and out of 
Title I, the 90/10 Rule is no longer a condition of institutional eligibility to participate in 
Title IV financial aid programs. If a proprietary institutional violates the rule, they do not 
lose their Title IV legibility; instead, they will be placed on “provisional eligibility status” 
for two years. Those institutions that stay in this status for two consecutive years will lose 
their Title IV eligibility for at least two years, depending on their ability to regain 
eligibility (Pub. L. 110-315).  
The Program Participation Agreement further stipulates what revenue sources 
may be counted as the 10 percent of non-Title IV sources. While many of these sources 
were allowed prior to the enactment of the reauthorization, for-profit colleges may now 
count certain other revenues towards the 10 percent revenue that were not previously 
permitted. For-profit colleges may now count revenue earned from non-Title IV eligible 
programs of study, as long as the program of study is approved by the state, accredited, or 
provides an industry-recognized credential or certificate.  This means that a for-profit 
college could have its Title IV eligible programs of study fully funded by Title IV 
revenue if the other 10 percent of its total revenue is derived from non-Title IV programs 
of study.  
In addition, as a way to address the for-profit-college sector’s concern that a 2008 
increase in student loan limits would put many of their institutions in violation of the 
90/10 Rule, the reauthorization allowed for-profit colleges to count only proceeds of the 
Unsubsidized Stafford Loans based on loan limits prior to the 2008 increase to loan 
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limits. These increased loan limits were created by a difference piece of federal 
legislation, The Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 (a piece of 
legislation passed in response to the 2008 meltdown of the US financial market). This 
was a temporary provision in the reauthorization that expired July 1, 2011, in order to 
give for-profit colleges time to modify their revenue plans. In effect, for-profit colleges, 
for a time, were not required to count certain revenues from federal loans in their 90/10 
calculations. 
A total of 16 interviewees, including six non-profit-college lobbyists, four for-
profit-college lobbyists, two Democratic Congressional staffers, two Republican 
Congressional staffers, and two reporters said that these changes to the 90/10 Rule were a 
success for the for-profit colleges. 
While the changes to the 90/10 Rule were generally viewed as a success, some 
interviewees noted that, while there were changes made to the provision, the for-profit 
colleges had been advocating for more of a change to the rule than what was ultimately 
enacted into law. As one for-profit-college lobbyist explained:  “Well we had some 
moderate success. We got some change in a positive direction in the 90/10 area.” A 
Republican staffer concurred with the for-profit-college lobbyist: “The 90/10 Rule wasn't 
a complete win, but there was some progress on that issue.” 
While the changes were seen as progress and a move in the positive direction by 
some interviewees, other interviewees, mostly non-profit-college lobbyists, thought that 
the changes to the 90/10 Rule were an unfortunate success. As one non-profit-college 
lobbyist stated: 
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“Well, on the 90/10 Rule they were able to convince a lot of people on the Hill 
that the rule in fact prohibited them from serving low-income students, which is a 
complete catastrophe, as far as I'm concerned. It's a sham that they were able to 
do that. But they did. Not entirely, but they did get some pretty significant 
loopholes carved into the 90/10 Rule.” 
One non-profit-college lobbyist considered the changes more than the creation of 
loopholes that benefit for-profit colleges: “They were successful in completely 
eviscerating 90/10.”Another non-profit-college lobbyist also used the word “eviscerate” 
to describe the changes to the 90/10 Rule, but because the changes did not include a 
complete repeal, the lobbyist noted it as a “50-percent victory”: 
“On 90/10, I'd give them a 50-percent victory. I do think they managed to 
eviscerate it. And I give them a 50 percent because they themselves couldn't 
demonstrate a reason for repeal. They would have gotten it. They had infiltrated 
the Democrats deep enough that they could have gotten it. But the thing would 
have become a joke. It would be very difficult going around saying they 
themselves needed a more complicated message: count this dollar as a federal 
dollar. They managed to eviscerate it, but it's still on the books, preserving the 
principle.”  
The 90/10 Rule was viewed by many as a safeguard against fraud and abuses in 
the for-profit sector, and one reporter noted that changes made to the provision no longer 
made it a safeguard: 
“I think they were very successful. They would have liked to have seen the 
elimination of 90/10, but they got it so substantially weakened that it's barely a 
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safeguard anymore. They really stripped it of most of its – they took the teeth out 
of it mostly.” 
A Democratic Congressional staffer also described one of the successes as a watering 
down of the 90/10 Rule, but that the for-profit college sector was not completely 
successful in advancing their agenda: 
“Well, I would say they made an inroad. I wouldn't say that they won 100 percent. 
I think there could be a perception like in rewriting history. They could think that 
because 90/10 was amended and watered down to some extent that they won. I 
wouldn't say that they completely won because some of the things that they 
wanted to be able to count such as institutional aid and certain programs still 
observed those things. They can't do tuition discounting. Some programs still 
have to remain and have some sort of secondary review. So I'd say it would be a 
mixed bag for them.” 
A non-profit-college lobbyist put the success of the changes to the 90/10 Rule a little 
more simply: “They got 90/10 completely watered down.” 
While repealing the 90/10 Rule was the goal of the for-profit colleges, several 
interviewees noted that the changes made to the rule, while not ending up in a complete 
repeal, was still a success for the for-profit colleges: “I think that the changes to 90/10 
were a big success for the for-profit institutions. The ultimate changes did not go as far 
as they wanted to, but they certainly changed the measure in their favor from what it was 
previously.” A for-profit-college lobbyist described how policy success can be measured 
in stages, even if the policy did not change exactly as desired, which in this case would 
have been a complete repeal of the 90/10 Rule: 
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“Clearly the changes to the 90/10 Rule were of extreme importance to the 
proprietary sector. Obviously they'd prefer to have the rule repealed. But 
obviously you measure success in sort of stages and what you compromise. I 
would view the 90/10 provisions and how they turned out as successful 
accomplishments by the sector.” 
A Democratic Congressional Staffer explained that while the for-profit colleges may 
have ultimately wanted a full repeal, their strategy to adjust and make modifications to 
the rule might have effectively gotten them what they wanted: “Sometimes you don't 
have to repeal something, you just have to change how stuff is calculated. And oftentimes 
the most effective lobbyists do that because the net result is the same and more 
subterraneous.” 
A for-profit-college lobbyist explained the strategy of adjusting the ask in order to get 
some of what you may want: 
“We had to move off repeal. But, what we did get were a number of modifications 
to how the Department of Education has been interpreting and applying the rule 
in ways that we thought were really unduly and restrictive and narrow. And so 
that was certainly a very positive outcome and then with the loan crisis we needed 
a couple of more things and this was where Chairman Miller had an open mind, 
heard our arguments, was persuaded and supported us. And once he did, he's a 
bull dog. He hung in there right through conference. The things we needed, 
because private loans evaporated for lower-income students, we needed the 
ability to make our own loans to students. We were willing to step to the plate, put 
our own money at risk, make our own loans, but we need to be able to count those 
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loans towards the 10 of the 90/10.  That required a legislative change and we got 
that.” 
Another for-profit-college lobbyist described the importance of incremental 
changes and that a long-term solution can still be pursued: 
“On 90/10, I think we ended up with some improvements and not a long-term 
solution. One improvement is a 2-year window if the school does violate the 90/10 
threshold to get back into compliance rather than, as the law previously was, 
automatically falling in to ineligibility plus some temporary fixes until 2011 will 
at least make it less likely that schools will violate the 90/10 provisions. It doesn't 
give a long-term solution, but it gives us 2 or 3 years to work on a longer-term 
solution.” 
Moving the 90/10 Rule provision from one section of the law to another section of 
the law, according to a Republican Congressional staffer, was part of the success on the 
90/10 Rule for the for-profit colleges: “I would also say that making any changes to 
90/10 is a huge change in federal law and they did manage to make changes by moving it 
over to program participation agreement.” 
One Democratic Congressional staffer explained how the 90/10 Rule as a success 
was due to a legislative and lobbying process that included compromises on both sides of 
the issue: 
“Particularly with 90/10 the balance was on recognizing some of the changes in 
business practice while upholding the base integrity of the measure. 90/10, for 
example, that compromise really came together in conference. So piecing 
together, ‘I'm comfortable if we go here. I'm comfortable if we go there.’ And, we 
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ended up on a middle line. They [the for-profit colleges] were looking for ways to 
calculate the measure so it was easier to meet the 90/10 thresholds. There were a 
couple of particular things they were concerned with. For example, we raised 
loan limits, the amount of money that students can borrow. And that made it more 
difficult for them to meet the 90/10 Rule because more students could borrow 
federal aid. So one particular thing, they fought hard for an exemption for those 
additional funds from the 90/10 Rule.  Where the compromise ended up, those 
funds were exempted for a three-year period of time in order to allow them to 
adjust for that. Institutional aid prior to the reauthorization was not able to be 
counted and can now be counted under certain circumstances. So there were just 
ways that they do business now, more, that we now allowed for them to count for 
them to more easily reach the 90/10 threshold.” 
 
Secondary Success: 50-Percent Rules 
The 50-Percent Rules were also provisions in Section 102 of Title I of the HEA 
and stated that if an institution offered 50 percent or more of its coursework by 
correspondence, which was also understood to include online courses, or if 50 percent of 
its students were enrolled in correspondence courses, than it was not considered an 
institution of higher education for purposes of participating in the student financial aid 
programs authorized by Title IV.  These provisions were completely eliminated, not in 
the 2008 reauthorization of the HEA, but during the timeframe under investigation as part 
of a budget reconciliation bill that moved through Congress in 2005 – the Higher 
Education Reconciliation Act (HERA), passed as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 
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2005 (P.L. 109-171). In addition to eliminating the 50-Percent Rules, the legislation 
extended several authorization provisions within the Title IV of the act. 
A total of nine interviewees, including three non-profit-college lobbyists, three 
for-profit-college lobbyists, one Democratic Congressional staffer, and two Republican 
Congressional staffers indicated that these changes to the 50-Percent Rules were a 
success for the for-profit colleges.  One for-profit-college lobbyist explained how the 
changes to the 50-Percent Rules were not part of the 2008 overall reauthorization: 
“It happened really suddenly that 50-Percent Rules were repealed and it was 
[done] under budget reconciliation.  There were all sorts of issues attached to 
funding and cost analysis. None of the safeguard provisions were put in. So, it 
was just a repeal of the 50-Percent Rules and it was actually unintended by us, 
which is kind of funny. There was some criticism around that and we worked for 
the next two years between that and the reauthorization to continue to work on the 
quality control provisions that did end up in the Higher Education Act 
reauthorization. Once that was done we could claim that things worked out well.” 
 
Failures 
The one primary failure mentioned by twelve interview participants is the policy 
change to a Single Definition. That failure is explored further below. The three secondary 
failures mentioned by interview participants include the policy change to Transfer of 
Credit (n=9), the policy change to the Cohort Default Rate measure (n=7), and that the 
for-profit colleges were not able influence Congress to address all of their policy asks 
(n=4). Among the less prominent failures, three emerged that are worthy of mention, 
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because they were related to themes that were mentioned as successes that emerged as 
primary or secondary themes, including the inability of the for-profit colleges to make the 
argument to and build general support with everyone (n=2), the inability of the for-profits 
to overcome bad publicity (n=2), and the 90/10 Rule (n=2). 
The following sections explore the specific issues that the for-profit-college sector 
was not able to successfully advance, including a change to Single Definition, changes to 
Transfer of Credit, and preventing changes to the Cohort Default Rate. There was general 
consensus on what the for-profit-college sector was not successful at achieving. As a non-
profit-college lobbyist explained: “On the particulars they were much less successful. 
Although they got 50-Percent Rules [eliminated] and they got 90/10 completely watered 
down. They were not successful on Transfer of Credit.” 
One Democratic Congressional staffer wondered if the for-profit-college sector 
strategically put forward a number of policy requests that they knew would not be 
successful in order to use as leverage to have success on policy issues that mattered most 
to the for-profit-college sector: 
“I think some of their bigger ticket items like Single Definition and Transfer of 
Credit and some other things that they were really going for we said, ‘No, there's 
no way,’ and I'm not sure if that was more bait-and-switch then if that was them 
actually genuinely caring about these issues. I don't know if they were putting 
these little things forward saying, ‘Oh, we want Transfer of Credit.  We want 
Single Definition.’  Knowing that they'd be told no. So that they'd say, ‘Fine, well 
if you're not going to do that then just give us 90/10.’ I think a large portion of 
their legislative agenda for HEA didn't get included.” 
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As discussed and mentioned by other interview participants below, there may have been 
some reality to the view that some of the for-profit-college agenda, such as Single 
Definition, may have been used as negotiating fodder in exchange for accomplishing 
larger agenda priorities, such as the 90/10 Rule. 
 
Primary Failure: Single Definition 
Single Definition refers to a proposal to amend current law to combine the two 
separate definitions of “institution of higher education” in Title I of the HEA in sections 
101 and 102 (20 U.S.C. 1001, 1002).  Section 101 defines an institution of higher 
education for purposes other than Title IV of the Act (which authorizes federal financial 
aid) and does not include proprietary institutions.  Section 102 defines institution of 
higher education for purposes of participation in title IV of the Act and does include 
proprietary institutions. A single definition would have erased distinctions between not-
for-profit and for-profit institutions of higher education. Erasing the distinction would not 
have only created one definition, but it would also have provided access to other federal 
funding and opportunities, such as other titles of the HEA, specifically Title III and IV, 
which provide funding to Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Hispanic 
Serving Institutions; provide access to federal research dollars authorized through various 
federal agencies; and, affect current tax code related to institutions of higher education. 
Current law retains two definitions of institution of higher education, one for 
general purposes of the act and one for participation in Title IV of the act. These 
definitions are referenced in other federal laws involving Institutions of Higher 
Education, such as the tax code. 
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A total of 12 interviewees, including four non-profit-college lobbyists, two for-
profit-college lobbyists, two Democratic Congressional staffers, two Republican 
Congressional staffers, and two reporters mentioned the inability of the for-profit colleges 
to successfully change federal law to a Single Definition of institution of higher 
education. 
One Democratic Congressional staffer explained how Single Definition had been 
a priority for the for-profit-college sector early on in the process, but by the end of the 
process, it was not included as a policy change: “There ended up being very, very limited 
changes to the definition of institution of higher education and certainly not a Single 
Definition. So that was something that had been identified as a priority early on and was 
not included by the end.” 
Several for-profit-college lobbyists explained that they strategically eliminated 
Single Definition from their policy asks once it was clear that it would not be possible to 
move forward it in the legislative and political process: “We were even signaling to 
Republican friends, for example, when they were in control, ‘Look, if Single Definition is 
a stumbling block, let's just remove it.’ It wasn't that big of deal to us at this time.” 
Another for-profit-college lobbyist explained that removing Single Definition from their 
policy asks was a strategy to ensure the likelihood that other policy changes would move 
along in the process, such as modifications to the 90/10 Rule and the elimination of the 
50-Percent Rules: 
“We could spend our time battling them and probably not be successful in order 
to get a Single Definition or we could focus our energies on something that could 
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be potentially politically doable and that was gaining some additional flexibility 
on 90/10 and of course the elimination of the 50-Percent Rules.”  
Another for-profit-college lobbyist explained in detail how policy issues become 
prioritized and how other policy agenda items may trump a policy issue, such as Single 
Definition:  
“When you start the reauthorization process you start with a list. ‘Here are things 
we might want to accomplish.’ Some issues fall off the list very quickly because it 
becomes clear that you're not going to get it. I am very focused on provisions that 
were addressed and measuring whether they were successful. There are some 
things on the cutting room floor. For example a very early on example is Single 
Definition. I want to emphasize that nobody, aside from a couple of institutions, 
really pushed it. My clients gave it up very early on, on that discussion. That's an 
issue that I'm going to be optimistic, that some day there will probably be an 
adjustment there. But it was neither the time nor the place. So it's a good example 
of you have a list, here's the Pollyanna, and here's what I really want.  Before I 
even go to the Hill, you say to a client, ‘Okay, what do you want? What does your 
list look like even before you go to the Hill?’ You can advise a client.  This one is 
a reach. This one is within reality. This one we can do that. You prioritize. You 
may start off trying to get all of the missions accomplished and then you quickly 
figure out okay that's not happening.  Single Definition is not happening. Let's 
focus on 90/10 and 50-Percent Rules. So clearly we still have two definitions. So 
very clearly not success there, but I don't even look at that as failure because I 
took that off of the client's agenda pretty early on. So from my own personal how I 
255 
 
 
 
did on behalf of the client, I feel like I advised the client very well. Part of the 
work is telling the client, ‘You're not getting this. Move on.’ Hill staff do the exact 
same thing. A member of Congress will have x, y, and z list of issues and they 
have to pick and choose.  My job is to keep my issues on that member's list.”  
 
Secondary Failure: Transfer of Credit 
The Transfer of Credit issue refers to the for-profit-college sector’s concern that 
traditional, regionally accredited, non-profit colleges seemed to be automatically and 
systematically denying credits and degrees from institutions simply because those 
institutions, that for the most part are for-profit, are nationally accredited, rather than 
regionally accredited. Federal law does not mandate policies regarding the Transfer of 
Credit, and until the most recent reauthorization of the HEA had been silent on the issue 
of Transfer of Credit between institutions. While the enacted legislation did not mandate 
policy regarding the actual transfer of credit, the act did include an addition to Part G of 
Title IV that requires institutions that participate in Title IV to disclose or report certain 
information. Under the Transfer of Credit disclosure provisions, such institutions are 
required to “publicly disclose” their transfer of credit policies, including criteria for 
determining whether to accept credits at other institutions and listing those institutions 
with which there are articulation agreements (Higher Education Opportunity Act of 
2008). 
Early drafts of the reauthorization included language that would have prohibited 
colleges from denying Transfer of Credit based solely on what accrediting body 
recognized the sending institution. But, like Single Definition, Transfer of Credit was 
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superseded by other policy issues as the reauthorization process became prolonged, 
political control switched parties, and other policy issues emerged as priorities, such as 
modifications to the 90/10 Rule. 
A total of nine interviewees, including three non-profit-college lobbyists, two for-
profit-college lobbyists, one Democratic Congressional staffer, one Republican 
Congressional staffer, and two reporters indicated the inability to modify Transfer of 
Credit policies.  Like Single Definition, the policy change to Transfer of Credit was seen 
as a policy agenda where the for-profit-college sector was not successful. As one for-
profit-college lobbyist explained, the sector was pleased that it was debated at all: 
“Transfer of Credit: that was a bit of a disappointment too, but we still got 
something. At least we got recognition that it was an issue worthy of 
Congressional attention and to be addressed in the Higher Education Act.  What 
we got was more disclosure. We didn’t get the prohibition that we wanted, which 
was you can't just turn down credits just based on accreditation. That was a 
disappointment.” 
The same lobbyist explained how this issue ignited great debate on both sides of the 
issue: 
“The passions that that issue excited were rather astonishing. I've made a lot of 
jokes about it over the years but, listening to some our opponents talk about it, we 
were by simply raising the Transfer of Credit issue, we were threatening western 
civilization, as we know it. Quite something. The rhetoric was quite astonishing 
and silly.” 
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A non-profit-college lobbyist explained that the Transfer of Credit issue was so 
critical to traditional higher education because of the importance of academic autonomy 
in this area of institutional governance, and the extent to which some in the traditional 
higher education sector may have been willing to compromise early on in the 
reauthorization: 
“They were soundly defeated on their desire to federalize Transfer of Credit, for 
which I take a disproportionate amount of the credit and which to this day blame 
my colleagues in the presidential associations who engaged in what I call 
‘strategery.’  Which is to say that they always have bigger fish to fry then take a 
stand on something that is fundamental to their members. I thought that ACE 
[American Council on Education] sold us down the river when it agreed to 
accommodate McKeon's insistence of Transfer of Credit in exchange for dropping 
of price controls. I see that as a fool's trade, because price controls were so 
untenable that we should have called the fucker's bluff. We should have 
challenged Buck McKeon right there because his position was so untenable. 
There was no need to trade anything. He had taken out the thermal nuclear 
weapon and he was threatening to hold up the bank with it. And it wasn't even 
going to happen. There was no necessity and more importantly, it has done 
wonders for my career needless to say. Not everything is a point of principle by 
the way. I'm very practical. There are things to trade on. But if there are 
fundamental positions that are central to your members’ autonomy, then those 
should be non-negotiable even if that results in people taking an unkind view of 
you personally. And, the reason is that we are not here to be loved. We are here to 
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get the job done. But there so much mutual self among the staff, a permanent 
revolving door of lobbyists, that nobody was willing to take a position within the 
mainstream organizations. So Transfer of Credit went our way no thanks to ACE 
or anybody else. To some extent, NAICU [National Association of Independent 
Colleges and Universities] was helpful.” 
 
Secondary Failure: Cohort Default Rate 
Since 1998 Section 435(l) of the HEA had included a 270-day threshold for 
delinquent federal student loans to be considered in default.  Before the 270- day 
threshold, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-272) 
changed the definition of a default on federal education loans from a delinquency of 120 
days to 180 days. The 1998 reauthorization of the HEA changed the 180-day threshold to 
270 days. Under the law prior to the amendments made by the 2008 reauthorization of the 
HEA, the Cohort Default Rate was defined as the percentage of borrowers entering 
repayment in one fiscal year who default by the end of the following fiscal year (March 
31, 2011). This is commonly known as the 2-year default rate, and the U.S. Department 
of Education has a set of regulations regarding this statute (34 CFR 682.200(b)). 
The final reauthorization included provisions that changed how the Cohort 
Default Rate was measured, as well as penalties when those measurements reach a certain 
percentage.  The measurement was changed from the 2-year measure as described above 
to a 3-year measure. In addition the establishment of a “life of cohort default” that 
measure on a year-by-year basis, the cumulative percentage of those who default on their 
loans was included in the final reauthorization. This new measurement is just for 
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informational purposes and not for use to determining eligibility for participation in the 
Title IV programs. 
In addition to these new measurements, beginning in FY2012, colleges could lose 
eligibility if their rates equal or exceed 30% for 3 consecutive fiscal years (versus the 
previous measure of 25% for 3 consecutive years).  The enacted law also includes 
appeals processes that take into account exceptional circumstances that may have led to 
high default rates.  The law also requires those institutions with high default rates to 
develop plans for reducing high default rates. 
A total of seven interviewees, including three non-profit-college lobbyists, three 
Democratic Congressional staffers, and one reporter mentioned the Cohort Default Rate 
as an unsuccessful outcome for the for-profit-college sector.  Unlike the other issues that 
appeared on the for-profit-college sector’s agenda, the Cohort Default Rate was not a 
proactive issue that the for-profit-college sector was seeking to change, but rather it was 
an issue that was placed on the agenda by others and the for-profit-college sector was put 
on the defensive. While many saw this policy change as a loss for the for-profit-college 
sector, one for-profit-college lobbyist thought the sector was able to mitigate the change’s 
effect, despite it being an issue that seemingly came out of the blue for the sector: 
“There was one more issue that popped up at the very end. It was not an issue on 
our agenda but it was one we had to react to and it was courtesy of our pal 
Congressman Bishop. He had a sort of a middle-of-the-night amendment that he 
offered during the mark-up in November of 2007 that changed the way Cohort 
Default Rates were calculated. The amendment just went through bing-bang and 
it was just accepted on a voice vote and it was like, ‘Whoa, what just happened?’  
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And it turned out that that had some pretty large ramifications and we had to get 
some modifications to that amendment and again Chairman Miller and his staff 
were willing to listen to our arguments. He heard our arguments and worked with 
us to achieve some compromises that we felt at the time were going to make it 
manageable. It came on suddenly and we reacted to it swiftly and we were able to 
get through working with Chairman Miller and his staff what we thought was an 
acceptable outcome. I mention it because it certainly occupied everyone's time 
and attention very strongly there for about a three month burst towards the very 
end. So yea we were, and I think certainly the amendment stands on it own, had it 
gone through as is it would have definitely been in the lose column. We were able 
to move it into a neutral column.” 
A non-profit-college lobbyist explained how while the Cohort Default Rate issue 
may have come out of the blue for the for-profit sector, it was intentionally placed on the 
agenda by the non-profit-college sector for the for-profit-college sector to have to 
respond and react to. The reaction of the for-profit-college sector to the potential change 
in the Cohort Default Rate confirmed that it would be a contentious issue. One non-
profit-college lobbyist explained: 
“The Cohort Default Rate came back as a way to counter [the for-profit 
colleges]. It was like they [the for-profit colleges] were so polished.  They were 
going to be varying degrees of success on their short list because they could out-
lobby you, but it led those of us who had concerns about them to say, ‘Look 
they've made these arguments that we think are kind of twisted policy issues on 
these four issues but we've got to try to find an issue that makes the point about 
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these issues.’  So that was the response to, ‘Look let's put them on the defensive. 
They put on us on the defensive on these issues.’ Let's put them on the defensive 
on something we're hearing. And only when it came up, they were really 
contentious. Only with the reaction in the mark-up did we know that we were on 
to something.” 
Several interviewees, including Democratic Congressional staffer explained how 
the for-profit sector was able to work to mitigate some of the effects of the changes to the 
Cohort Default Rate calculation: 
“And then with Cohort Default Rate, I think it came out in a wash. They would 
have certainly have preferred the two-year measurement and so in that way they 
were not successful in that we did go to a three-year measurement. But with the 
back-end safeguards and the implementing the new measure over time, they were 
pretty good at making sure there were other options.” 
A non-profit-college lobbyist also explained how the for-profit-college sector was able to 
include modifications to the policy proposal that mitigated the impact of the policy 
change on their institutions: “Congress eventually got lobbied heavily by the for-profit 
sector and blended a compromise that allowed the three-year look back, but it raised the 
threshold level [for penalties]. So it's one of these win -lose situations.” 
 A Democratic Congressional Staffer explained how one of the ways to mitigate 
the effect of the change in calculation on the for-profit college sector was to offer more 
support to institutions that may be negatively impacted by the change: 
“We tried to actively shape the cohort default rate in a way that would not overly 
penalize the institutions and would try and get at the goal of accurately looking at 
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Cohort Default Rate, but also providing support to institutions in addressing it 
because the Department of Education's capacity to help institutions lower their 
Cohort Default Rate or keep it low was minimal.” 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the for-profit higher education 
industry attempted to influence changes to federal higher education policy during the 
most recent reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA). Access and influence 
theories, including “lobbying as a legislative subsidy,” provide the framework for this 
study (Hall and Deardorff 2006). While the theory of lobbying as legislative subsidy 
encompasses the related fundamentals of the policy process that includes issue definition, 
agenda setting, and influence, it also suggests that lobbying subsidizes the limited 
resources of specific legislators, namely those legislators who already sympathize with a 
special interest-group’s policy agenda. Interest-groups are able to provide this legislative 
subsidy through access and influence.  
In addition to reviewing relevant Congressional records and other data sources, 
such as advocacy materials, I conducted interviews with Congressional staff, lobbyists 
for for-profit and non-profit colleges, and higher education news reporters, all of whom 
had a role in the policy process of reauthorizing the HEA. The interviews and data 
sources provided empirical data on how, and to what extent, the for-profit colleges 
influenced the reauthorization of the HEA.  
 The first part of this chapter summarizes the study’s results. Implications for 
policy, practice, and theory; limitations; and, suggestions for further research are also 
discussed. 
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Summary of Results 
The research question at the core of this study (how and the extent to which the 
for-profit higher education industry attempted to influence federal higher education 
policy, specifically provisions in the most recent reauthorization of the HEA) is 
supplemented by a set of five guiding questions in order to ascertain the specific policy 
agenda items that for-profit education, as a special interest-group, were most concerned 
about during the development of reauthorization legislation, to understand what methods 
for-profit education used to place their policy items on the reauthorization agenda, and to 
determine the effectiveness of for-profit education in advancing its preferred policy 
agenda.  
 
For-Profit Policy Issues 
What policy issues did the for-profit education special interest-group attempt to 
place on the agenda of the Higher Education Act reauthorization? 
 
 
Results from this study indicate that the for-profit-college sector attempted to 
influence five major policy issues during the reauthorization process: a) changes to rules 
governing the ratios of revenue required for for-profit colleges to participate in the 
federal financial aid programs (90/10 Rule); b) changes to how the federal government 
defines an institution of higher education in the HEA (Single Definition); c. rules 
governing online education (50-Percent Rules); d) rules pertaining to transfer of 
academic credits from one institution to another (Transfer of Credit); and, e) 
measurements related to the percent of students who default on their student loans post 
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graduation and penalties levied on colleges based on those measurements (Cohort Default 
Rate). Each of these issues affected whether, and how, a for-profit college, and the 
students who attend them, can access federal financial aid. A student’s ability to access 
federal financial aid affects a for-profit college’s profit margins. 
 
Individuals and Organizations 
Which organizations and individuals were most involved in the for-profit college 
policy agenda for the discussion, development and passage of the legislation that 
resulted in the 2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
Results from this study demonstrate that there were eight primary individuals, sets 
of individuals, or organizations that were most involved in discussing and influencing the 
policy issues of most import to the for-profit sector. The individuals included 
Congressman Howard “Buck” McKeon (R-California), Congressman Robert Andrews 
(D-New Jersey), Congresswoman Carolyn McCarthy (D-New York), Congressman Tim 
Bishop (D-New York), and the cadre of for-profit-college lobbyists. The primary 
organizations cited were the Career College Association, the University of Phoenix, for-
profit colleges generally, and the non-profit, traditional higher education sector.  
 
Strategies and Arguments 
How did the for-profit education special interest-group attempt to influence policy 
makers during the 2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
The for-profit colleges utilized three main strategies and two main arguments to 
advance their policy agendas with decision makers. Those three strategies consisted of 
political contributions, meetings with Congressional offices, and grassroots efforts. The 
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two main arguments included making the case that for-profit colleges provide access to a 
higher education for low-income students that otherwise would not have access to a 
college education and that current federal policies discriminated against for-profit 
colleges, and the students who attend them. 
 
Successes 
In what ways was the for-profit education special interest-group successful in its 
influence of the final legislation that resulted in the 2008 reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act? 
 
The for-profit college sector had one primary success cited by most of the 
interview participants: changes to the 90/10 Rule. This policy success grants for-profit 
colleges more flexibility in the ratio of revenue they are required to have for purposes of 
participating in federal financial aid programs. This policy success helps to ensure for-
profit colleges can enroll students who qualify for federal financial aid and ensure that 
colleges can utilize federal financial aid programs to subsidize their profit margins.  
Less prominent successes cited by some of the interview participants included 
two of the policy issues on their agenda – the elimination of the 50-Percent Rules and 
mitigating changes to the Cohort Default Rate that would have potentially 
disproportionately penalized for-profit colleges.  
 
Failures 
In what ways was the for-profit education special interest-group not successful in 
its influence of the final legislation that resulted in the 2008 reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act? 
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 The for-profit college sector had one primary failure cited by interview 
participants – the inability to convince Congress to adopt a Single Definition of 
institution of higher education.  A success in this policy area would have erased any 
distinction between for-profit and non-profit status in various federal laws, including, but 
not limited to the HEA. Interview participants also noted the inability of the for-profit 
colleges to convince Congress to add policies related to Transfer of Credit. Changes to 
the Cohort Default Rate measure were also cited as a policy failure for the for-profit-
college sector. 
 
Discussion 
This study found that the for-profit-college sector was able to access and 
influence Congressional offices through a variety of strategies, such as political 
contributions and lobbying, in order to advance their policy agenda and ultimately make 
some changes that were favorable to and included some of the for-profit-college sector’s 
policy agenda for the reauthorization Higher Education Act. Using Hall and Deardorff’s 
(2006) model of “lobbying as legislative subsidy,” this study shows how a special 
interest-group was able to use their access to specific members of Congress to influence 
specific policy changes to the 2008 reauthorization of the HEA. 
 
Interest Groups and Allies 
In the legislative subsidy process interest-groups provide allies with information, 
political intelligence, and legislative labor in order to achieve shared goals (Hall and 
Deardorff, 2006). This study revealed the key players, including those players who were 
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part of the for-profit-college sector interest-group and the Congressional allies, primarily 
those members on the House Education and the Workforce Committee, who supported 
the sector’s agenda.  The study also revealed those key players who were not allies, and 
who tried to counter the for-profit college sector agenda. 
In addition, the interviews and data sources revealed the information, political 
intelligence, and effort (i.e. legislative labor) that the special interest-groups provided to 
their allies, as well as those who were not their allies. The study further revealed that the 
interest-group was able to access their allies, and foes, through lobbying and political 
contributions. Ultimately this process led to changes in federal law. 
In this particular study, the interest-group was the for-profit college sector, and 
the interviews specifically revealed that the major players within that interest-group were 
the Career College Association and the Apollo Group, which owns the University of 
Phoenix. Additional data from lobbying reports and political contributions also pointed to 
Corinthian College as a major player.  Allies, for this particular study, are defined as 
those who advanced the agenda of the interest-group. This study, through the interviews, 
revealed that the key allies included Congressman Howard “Buck” McKeon (R-
California), Congressman Robert Andrews (D-New Jersey), and Congresswoman 
Carolyn McCarthy (D-New York). Another main player was Congressman Tim Bishop 
(D-New York), though he was not seen as an ally for the for-profit sector. Rather, he was 
an ally for the non-profit sector, which could be viewed as the counter-lobby to the for-
profit sector.  In interviews, participants made it clear that though not an ally of the for-
profit sector, Congressman Bishop was very much involved in the policy discussions 
related to the for-profit-college sector.  The literature supports this phenomenon of 
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interest groups also working with those who are not supportive of their positions or 
policy agendas. Austen-Smith and Wright (1987) found that interest groups lobbied both 
legislators that were supportive and oppositional, and had considerable influence in 
changing the minds of legislators, not just reinforcing positions. In addition, they 
suggested that when groups lobby their “friends” they are being strategic and 
counteractive. In other words, interest-groups had to “counteract the influence of 
opposing groups who lobbied the same” members of Congress (1994, p. 42).   
In the case of this study, the for-profit-college sector did focus their lobbying 
efforts on allies, as well as those who were in opposition to their agenda, to counteract 
some of the efforts by the non-profit sector. The clearest example in this particular study 
is in relation to the proposed changes to the Cohort Default Rate, which was an agenda 
led by the non-profit-college sector to target the for-profit-college sector. The for-profit-
college sector had made sure to reach out to their allies, whom they had reached out to 
early on in the process, to ensure they understood the implications for this policy change 
in an effort to “counteract” the influence of their opponents. According to Hojnacki and 
Kimball (1999) decisions about whom to lobby show that counteractive lobbying is more 
prevalent at later stages in the legislative process and that groups strategically target their 
friends who serve on committees of jurisdiction towards the beginning of the legislative 
process in order to influence early drafts of legislative language and to counter unfriendly 
amendments that may occur further down the process.  This study revealed similar efforts 
and processes. While the Cohort Default Rate issue arose later in the legislative process, 
the for-profit-college sector was able to draw on the relationship-building they did 
towards the earlier part of the process to counter the unfriendly amendment. 
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In another study of how interest-groups decide whom to lobby in Congress, 
Hojnacki and Kimball (1998) found that interest groups first lobby those members on 
committees of jurisdiction who are friendly to their policy position on an issue. This 
study affirms that tendency; the for-profit-college sector clearly approached their allies 
on the Education and the Workforce Committee first, through political contributions and 
lobbying strategies. This use of access and influence was particularly important when the 
Democrats were in control towards the end of the reauthorization process, given that, 
historically, Democrats were not seen as generally supportive of the for-profit-college 
sector and given that they were in charge of Congress. Those “friendly” members of 
Congress, such as Congressman Andrews, then in turn lobbied their colleagues, such as 
Congressmen George Miller and Tim Bishop. Previous studies have found that groups 
not only attempt to persuade decision makers to take a certain position, but groups also 
attempt to actively participate and work in support of the group with their colleagues 
(Hall and Wayman, 1990; Scheier and Gross, 1993). Furthermore, Hojnacki and Kimball 
(1998, 1999, and 2001) found that those interest-groups with more resources, especially 
those that have an affiliated Political Action Committee, are better able to and more 
likely to expand beyond those members friendly to their positions and reach out to 
undecided committee members and even those legislators who are oppositional to their 
policy positions, especially when groups have existing and strong support in other 
Congressional districts, in the form of lobbying and grassroots engagement of an elected 
official’s constituents. In other words, interest-groups that are resourced enough to 
provide PAC contributions are able to access not only the members of Congress who 
receive those contributions, but also other members of Congress. This study 
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demonstrated that the for-profit-college sector interest-group was not only able to access 
their allies, such as Buck McKeon and Rob Andrews, but the sector was also able to 
access those who were not as friendly, such as Tim Bishop, who was forced to 
compromise his position due to Rob Andrews and other members of his political party 
who were sympathetic to the for-profit-college agenda. Campaign contributions, 
therefore, supported the for-profit-college sector’s ability to access and influence allies in 
such a way as to be supportive of the for-profit-college sector agenda by either helping to 
advance the for-profit-college policy agenda items or encouraging their colleagues to be 
more supportive of a particular policy issue, such as in the example of the changes to the 
90/10 Rule. The sector was also able to utilize access and influence to counter the 
influence of their opposition, such as in the example of the Cohort Default Rate issue 
where the sector was able to make the original version of the amendment less damaging 
to the sector. Campaign contributions as a strategy to access allies are further discussed 
below. 
  
Access and Influence: Campaign Contributions 
The study further revealed that the key players of the interest-group were also the 
largest contributors to the political campaigns of those cited as the key allies in advancing 
the for-profit college agenda. Allies, such as Congressmen McKeon and Andrews 
appeared at or near the top of the recipient list of the largest contributors, the Career 
College Association, the Apollo Group, and Corinthian College. Campaign contributions 
were a key strategy of the for-profit-college sector’s attempts to advance their policy 
agenda. Hall and Deardorff (2006) acknowledge the role of moneyed interests in the 
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influence process by hypothesizing that Political Action Committee contributions 
“indirectly facilitate the process of subsidizing legislators by buying access” (p. 80). They 
suggest in their own studies the need to further understand the consequences of this kind 
of access, which this study attempted to do.  The consequences of access allowed 
consideration of certain policy issues that arguably may not have otherwise been 
considered during the reauthorization. This concept is further explained below. In 
addition, this access appeared to influence not only the policy issues under consideration, 
but also how the policy issues were framed and ultimately included in the final law. This 
concept is also further explored below.  
Past research indicates that influence over the legislative process can be at least 
partially understood through the investigation of moneyed interests and the financial 
relationship between an interest-group and their allies. This study adds to the 
understanding of the role of political contributions in the influence of the legislative 
process by showing how the key allies who advanced the policy agenda of the for-profit 
college-sector were the same members of Congress receiving political contributions.  
Another interesting note about the campaign contributions made to their allies 
during the reauthorization is the value of their “investment.” For example, over the 
course of the entire reauthorization process, the Apollo Group, one of the largest 
contributors, gave just over $200,000 to individuals and approximately $115,000 to 
Political Action Committees. This is a relatively small number given the billions of 
dollars in student financial aid at stake and the tens of millions of dollars in federal 
subsidies that flow through students who are enrolled at the University of Phoenix. 
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In their legislative subsidy model, Hall and Deardorff (2006) hypothesize that one 
of the consequences for making financial contributions is an opportunity for a lobbyist to 
offer assistance rather than to ask for something such as a vote on a specific piece of 
legislation. This legislative subsidy suggests that the use of money to buy access works 
best and perhaps only when legislators and interest-groups share a position on an issue 
and have a common objective. In this study, the common objective was to include policy 
changes in the reauthorization of the HEA that furthered the ability of the for-profit-
college sector to grow, expand and be seen as a legitimate part of the U.S. higher 
education system. This common objective was mutually beneficial to the sector that 
would benefit from the policy change and to the policy makers who could take credit for 
advancing a policy they believed in or that benefited their home district. 
As stated earlier, the allies, in this particular study, were members of Congress on 
the Education and the Workforce Committee.  In their studies of Congressional 
committees, Hall and Wayman (1990) found that moneyed interest-groups are more 
likely to affect committee decision-making processes than floor votes.  This study 
supports those earlier findings; most of the decisions about what to include in the 
reauthorization in relation to the for-profit-college sector agenda were made during the 
committee process.  What is most likely to be affected by moneyed interests is the 
legislative involvement of a member of Congress, not his or her vote. Hall and Wayman 
(1990) also found evidence that members are more influenced by organized business 
interests than by unorganized voters. Their findings underscore Wright’s (1990) claim 
that though there seems to be little connection between PAC contributions and floor votes 
(part of the legislative process that comes later in the process after committee action), 
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there may be influence in the committee process, amendment development, and access.  
This study confirms earlier studies that moneyed interests have influence at the beginning 
of the legislative process when bills are being first drafted by committee staff. The 
following section explores the kind of influence the for-profit-college sector had during 
committee consideration of the reauthorization, including influence during the drafting 
and the discussion of various policies, as well as what changes were ultimately included 
in the final passage. 
 
Access and Influence: Providing Information 
In the legislative subsidy model, it is also assumed that in exchange for financial 
contributions, special interest-groups gain access to members of Congress to ask for 
support of certain legislation, to vote a certain way, or to take a specific position on a 
policy issue. This exchange can be seen in the relationship between the list of members of 
Congress who received contributions and those members who were cited by interview 
participants as most involved in the for-profit-college sector agenda. The influence of the 
process can be understood when one realizes that policy issues that may not have 
otherwise been considered during the reauthorization, given the obscurity of such policies 
and the very specific nature of the issues to the for-profit sector, are part of the debate and 
discussion and ultimately end of up the final legislation. Further, this access influences 
not only the policy issues under consideration, but also how the policy issues were 
framed and ultimately included in the final law. 
The for-profit-college sector provided information to their allies and others first in 
the form of advocacy materials, which listed the policy agenda they worked to advance 
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during the reauthorization. The sector used these materials during lobbying visits with 
members of Congress and Congressional staff and in responses to inquiries from 
Congressional offices regarding the sector’s priorities or positions for various provisions 
in the reauthorization. As the interviews noted, the reauthorization process was kicked off 
with Congress asking the higher education community what their priorities were for the 
bill. Around this same time, as political contributions were coming in (access), the for-
profit college sector used that opportunity to influence the reauthorization by sharing 
information with specific, friendly members of Congress. As some interviewees noted, 
these were issues about which a typical member of Congress would not have known 
much nor would they necessarily know or understand how current law may have been 
affecting the for-profit-college sector. The for-profit-college sector would have to provide 
that information to the members of Congress in order for Congress to do anything in 
regards to such issues as a Single Definition, Transfer of Credit, the 50-Percet Rules, or 
the 90/10 Rule. The lobbying as legislative subsidy model helps to reveal how a lobbyist 
sharing this information becomes an extension of the elected official’s legislative staff by 
the very act of bringing awareness to the issue and then providing information about 
those issues as the legislative process moves along.  
Once the sector provided the information, the member of Congress who was the 
ally on an issue became the champion and “expert” on the issue within Congress and 
during the debate and discussion of the legislation. For example, as the interviews 
revealed, Congressman McKeon was seen as a main champion on the 90/10 Rule from 
the beginning, and his staff relied on the sector to provide additional information as the 
discussion developed over the entire process. As the process moved along, other 
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members also became allies, and their staff relied on, and in fact requested, the for-profit-
college sector to provide data and information so that they could continue to be an ally, or 
not, during the process. Through this process and exchange, the lobbyist became an 
extension of the Congressional offices.  
Once the policy agenda items had been established as a priority for both the for-
profit-college sector and for members of Congress, the interest-group continued to 
provide data and additional information and particulars during lobbying visits to 
Congressional offices. These visits would provide the information to be used to justify 
the inclusion of the policy issue in drafts of legislation and in any debate and discussion 
that resulted in the development of compromises on issues where there was disagreement, 
of which there was a lot during the debate of the policy issues on the for-profit-college 
agenda. In this way, lobbyists, on both sides of the issues, are extensions of a 
Congressional office. Sometimes, Congress would even tell lobbyists that they needed to 
work out compromises and then bring those ideas back to Congressional offices. For 
example, on the 90/10 Rule, Congressional offices requested that those lobbyists 
representing interest-groups most involved in support and in opposition to changes to the 
90/10 Rule work together to come up with a compromise solution. The literature reflects 
this phenomenon in the process. Constain and Constain (1981) argued that interest-
groups, as aggregators of various policy demands, narrow the number of policy options 
and therefore the alternatives presented to Congress. An important activity of interest-
groups is to then resolve conflict about an issue making it more likely that Congress will 
add the issue to its agenda. In other words, the interest-groups, as extensions of a 
legislative office, provide actual labor and do some of the work of Congress. In some 
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instances this study showed that this work was provided because of lack of time and 
resources on the side of Congress, as explained by the Hall and Deardorff (2006) model, 
but also this labor was provided sometimes out of sheer frustration when the various sides 
could not come to agreement on an issue, such as on the 90/10 Rule. 
 In addition, Hall and Deardorff (2006) have found that lobbyists are extensions of 
a Congressional office in that they provide political intelligence and information about 
constituent views and perspectives. Some of the interviewees shared how the for-profit-
college sector would provide various offices with information about the policy positions 
of other Congressional offices, of other special interest-groups, such as the non-profit-
college sector, and of constituent groups, such as for-profit colleges in their district. This 
intelligence would assist Congressional offices in knowing the extent to which their 
willingness to be an ally to the for-profit-college sector on certain policy issues would 
benefit them or not. All members of Congress want to be able to advance policy issues 
that gain them favor among their colleagues and their constituencies. Taking positions on 
issues related to the for-profit-college agenda had the potential to position them as policy 
makers concerned with student access and workforce development in their home states 
and districts. 
The findings demonstrate how access and influence matter when attempting to 
make policy changes to federal law, and that the for-profit-college sector was able to 
utilize a set of strategies and arguments to access and influence a set of decision makers. 
Further, this study shows how lobbying can be understood as a legislative subsidy. In the 
lobbying as legislative subsidy model those legislators who already sympathized with the 
for-profit-college sector policy agenda were more apt to be seen as supporters of the for-
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profit-college sector and therefore more apt to utilize the for-profit-college sector’s policy 
positions and related data as a resource to take policy positions and to take subsequent 
actions to move that position forward in the form of committee votes and other legislative 
activities, such as the formation of bill language. Further the issues identified by 
Congressional staffers and lobbyists as most important to the for-profit-college sector 
were also those issues found in the for-profit-college sector’s advocacy materials, and 
those issues that were either identified as successes or failures, depending on their fate in 
the legislative process. This relationship among the issues presented by the sector, 
discussed during the legislative process, and found in the final legislation, underscores 
the element of the lobbying as legislative subsidy model that suggests the importance of 
shared policy objectives among the interest-group and allies. 
In this study, data revealed that policy actors, policy positions, and policy actions 
were connected through access and influence. For example, those identified as most 
involved in shaping policy issues of concern to the for-profit-college  sector were either 
giving (i.e. University of Phoenix) or receiving political contributions (i.e. Congressman 
Buck McKeon). The legislative subsidy model suggests that the policy issues and 
positions between for-profit colleges and certain decision makers are shared. Those same 
for-profit colleges were accessing and influencing the same decision makers through 
political contributions and lobbying through Hill meetings.  This study shows that when a 
special interest-group identifies allies, figures out how to access them, and then 
influences them by providing information and legislative subsidy, they are more likely to 
achieve at least some version of their policy agenda. 
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Implications 
The findings reveal a number of implications for theory, policy and practice. In 
regards to theory the possibility of a revised framework is discussed in more detail below. 
In addition, the findings suggest a number of policy and practice implications for higher 
education as a sector and how higher education as an interest group can access and 
influence Congress in regards to federal higher education laws.  
 
Implications for Theory 
This study was guided by the lobbying as legislative subsidy framework 
developed by Hall and Deardorff (2006), which describes how an interest-group 
identifies allies, gains access through such strategies as political contributions, and 
attempts to influence policy by providing information to the allied Congressional office. 
This process results in the special interest-group becoming an extension of the legislative 
office, which becomes a “legislative subsidy” to the resource-constrained Congressional 
office. 
One of the gaps and contradictions in this area of political science research that 
Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) framework has attempted to fill is the difficulty that the 
political science field had had in understanding, much less proving, how access and 
influence occur in relation to the Congressional process. This framework applied to this 
study helps explain and provide a better understanding of how access and influence occur 
alongside and serve as catalysts for policy change at the federal level. The research 
questions applied to this framework helped to demonstrate not only how, but that when a 
special interest-group identifies allies, figures out how to access them, and then 
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influences them by providing information and legislative subsidy, they are more likely to 
achieve some of their policy agenda. This study helps to show examples of access and 
influence and the results of the application of those strategies and arguments on the 
formation and outcomes of policy. Findings of the study suggest there would be a benefit 
to slightly revising the framework for future studies in this area. 
 
Original Framework 
The framework used for this study, as shown in Figure 1, assumes that the special 
interest-group/lobbyist and the legislator have a shared policy. This shared policy 
objective is demonstrated when the special interest-group, through the use of a lobbyist, 
gains access to a legislator through financial contributions. The same special interest-
group, through the use of a lobbyist, persuades a legislator through legislative subsidy. 
The combination of access and influence ultimately turns a shared policy objective into 
legislation action. 
 
Revised Framework 
Results of the study suggest that there is value in looking at a revised framework 
for future studies in access, influence, and legislative subsidy.  Findings related to the key 
players involved in the reauthorization showed that those in opposition to the for-profit-
college sector, both members of Congress and other special interest-groups, had an effect 
on the ability of allies and interest-groups to move a policy agenda forward. A framework 
that takes those actors into consideration could provide a more robust picture of how an 
interest-group influences the process through legislative subsidy.  
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One of the areas that would be helpful to explore further in the application of this 
framework to future studies in access, influence, and lobbying as legislative subsidy is 
the extent to which the allies’ Congressional colleagues and other interest-groups work in 
opposition to a special interest-group’s policy agenda and how those actions affect policy 
debate and formation.  See Figure 3 for a revised framework that includes this 
modification. Such a framework may prompt questions that help demonstrate how the 
special interest-group and allies adjust their strategies and arguments to continue to 
advance a policy agenda despite opposition, and whether and how allies on certain policy 
issues utilize Congressional colleagues. 
 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 The findings of this study demonstrate several implications for policy and practice 
for for-profit and non-profit higher education lobbying activities, particularly as the next 
reauthorization of the HEA approaches. First, for the non-profit higher education sector: 
take a cue from the for-profit-college sector and develop a clear advocacy agenda as an 
entire sector (instead of sub-sectors, such as just community colleges or just private, non-
profit colleges) with specific asks aligned with specific allies. While the for-profit-college 
sector may not be able to incorporate financial contributions into their access strategy, 
there is some indication that their traditional role and influence may not require the same 
financial contributions. For example, it is possible that what the for-profit colleges 
provide in financial contributions to gain access, the non-profit colleges may provide in 
reputation to gain access and influence. With this kind of access, the non-profit sector
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Figure 3: Revised Conceptual Framework for Persuasion and Legislative Subsidy 
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should develop a clear advocacy agenda with specific asks on which the entire sector is 
able to lobby Congressional allies.  A clear, focused agenda that is in alignment with a set 
of allies would enhance the effectiveness of the non-profit-college lobby. In addition, the 
non-profit-college sector would also benefit from taking a cue from the for-profit-college 
sector’s key messages and adopt similar ones that from a policy perspective of student 
access and success and efficiency of taxpayer dollars, make the non-profit-college sector 
appear responsive and relevant to the changing higher educational needs of the country 
while being the “better deal” for taxpayers, students, and society. 
An implication to consider for the for-profit-college sector is to continue to 
identify the key policy issues that need to be addressed in the next reauthorization and 
determine the individuals and organizations that will attempt to counter those policy 
changes.  
And, finally, an implication in regards to Congress is to consider the process of 
ensuring that all sides of a policy issue are considered so that the data and information 
informing policy is from a variety of sources. If the for-profit-college sector and the non-
profit-college sector both have concerns regarding a policy solution related to the HEA, it 
very well may be the best compromise to accomplish the stated policy goal. 
 
Limitations 
This research project had several limitations.  First, this study was an analysis 
only of data related to the U.S. House of Representatives and does not include analysis of 
data related to the U.S. Senate or the U.S. Department of Education, both entities that 
were involved in the reauthorization. Second, interviewees were asked to remember 
284 
 
 
 
discussions and debates of policy issues that had taken place more than one year before 
the interviews and in some instances from as long as five years before.  Given that 
interview participants were those most involved in a reauthorization process that took 
place over an extended period of time, this limitation was not expected to negatively 
influence the quality of data. Third, this study was focused on one reauthorization. A 
study that compares more than one reauthorization may reveal more about the influence 
of the for-profit-college sector over time. Finally, while not necessarily a limitation, it 
should be revealed that I had personal experience as a Congressional staffer and lobbyist 
during the time period under investigation. 
 
Directions for Further Research 
This study provides a number of insights into how the for-profit-college sector 
advanced their policy agenda during the most recent reauthorization of the HEA. Several 
ideas for future research are suggested. 
First, this study only examined the lobbying efforts in regards to one law, but 
there are several federal laws that affect and benefit for-profit higher education, including 
the G.I. Bill, which provides funding for student veterans and their dependents to receive 
a subsidized college education. Recent news reports have described concerns related to 
the amount of federal funds made available to for-profit colleges to enroll student 
veterans.  A study to examine how federal funds that are distributed through the G.I. Bill 
for student veterans to attend for-profit colleges affect, if at all, other policy issues, such 
as enrollment, graduation rates, career placement, and debt levels, among other policy 
issues, would be valuable. 
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Second, one of the rationales for this study was the news reports related to various 
fraud and abuse scandals related to for-profit colleges’ participation in the federal student 
financial aid programs. A study to look at the amount of fraud and abuse in the federal 
financial programs would be helpful in order to see how these lobbying activities and 
access and influence have affected policy changes that may have led to the decline of the 
integrity of the financial aid programs. 
Third, a similar study to this one to look at the lobbying efforts of for-profit 
colleges and non-profit colleges during the next reauthorization would be an interesting 
follow-up study, particularly if the study incorporates the role of the U.S. Senate and the 
U.S. Department of Education. A similar framework could help compare and contrast the 
efforts of the for-profit and non-profit higher education sectors. 
Fourth, a study to look at how these moneyed interests have contributed to the 
growth the for-profit college sector’s participation in the federal financial aid programs 
and whether any shift has affected for-profit-college enrollment and graduation rates, as 
well as the for-profit-college contributions to workforce development, would be valuable. 
Fifth, a study to examine the role of the States in the oversight and funding of for-profit 
colleges would be helpful in providing a bigger picture of the efficiencies and 
effectiveness of public resources allocated to the for-profit-college sector and the benefits 
related to those investments in for-profit colleges. Finally, a study to determine whether 
financial contributions are necessary for access and influence or just merely more helpful 
would be an interesting follow-up to this one. 
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Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the role and influence of the for-profit 
college sector on the 2008 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA) given the 
growing scrutiny and simultaneous growth of the for-profit-college sector during a time 
of increased competition for resources for higher education institutions and financial aid 
for the students who attend them. Using the “lobbying as legislative subsidy” model, 
interviews with key participants were conducted, and special interest-group data and the 
Congressional Record were analyzed. Results suggest that special interest-groups, 
through a combination of access to and influence of members of Congress who sit on 
relevant committees of jurisdiction, can – and did – successfully advance their policy 
agendas particularly when they set forth a clear set of priorities with specific messages 
and strategies early in the legislative process aimed at decision makers who are already 
sympathetic to their view point and to whom they likely provide political contributions. 
This process allows special interest-groups to become an extension of a Congressional 
office, earning access and influence to the legislative process by providing information 
and political intelligence. In turn, these “allies” not only become proponents of the policy 
agenda, but also are willing to influence their colleagues who either agree with the policy 
agenda or who have concerns with the policy agenda. 
 While special interest-groups may encounter individuals and organizations that 
oppose their policy agenda, early access and influence in the legislative process, as well 
as consistent contacts with those members of Congress who support, as well those who 
do not support the particular policy agenda, can provide a bit of an inoculation against 
“counter lobbying.” 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Interview Protocol: Congressional Staff 
 
1a. Before we dive in, please tell me a little about yourself and how you came to work in 
the position you were in during the most recent reauthorization of the Higher Education 
Act?  
1b. Are you still in the same position? 
 
2. What policy issues did you consider the most important policy issues debated during 
the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
3. What individuals and groups were involved in the shaping of those policy issues – both 
on the Hill and off the Hill? 
 
4a.What policy issues did the for-profit colleges care most about? 
4b. Did you work on any of those policy issues? 
4c. Did you or your boss want to accomplish anything related to those policy issues? 
 
5. Of those policy issues related to the for-profit colleges, what individuals and/or groups 
were involved in those policy issues both on and off the Hill? 
 
6. Are you aware of attempts to influence you and/or your boss and/or other 
Congressional Offices on those policy issues? If so, please describe the strategies and the 
arguments they used to advance their policy goals. 
 
7. In your experience, in what ways were the for-profit colleges successful in their 
attempt to advance their policy goals? 
 
8. In your experience, in what ways were the for-profit colleges not successful in their 
attempt to advance their policy goals? 
 
9. What organizations did the for-profit colleges align with? 
 
10. What organizations impeded or attempted to impede for-profit college efforts? 
 
11. Looking back, in what ways do you feel like you or your boss supported or impeded 
policy changes related to the for-profit college’s policy agenda? 
 
12. Are there any other questions on this issue that I should be asking? 
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 APPENDIX B 
 
 
Interview Protocol: Higher Education Special Interest-groups/Lobbyists- Non-profit 
 
1a. Before we dive in, please tell me a little about yourself and how you came to work in 
the position you were in during the reauthorization?  
1b. Are you still in the same position? 
 
2. What policy issues did you consider the most important policy issues debated during 
the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
3. What individuals and groups were involved in the shaping of those policy issues – both 
on the Hill and off the Hill? 
 
4a. What policy issues did your organization care most about?  
4b. And, what did you want to accomplish?  
4c. How did you go about accomplishing those goals? 
 
5a. Are you aware of the policy issues that the for-profit colleges cared most about?  
5b. How did these issues compare to your organization’s goals? 
 
6. Of those policy issues related to the for-profit colleges, what individuals and/or groups 
were involved in those policy issues both on and off the Hill? 
 
7. Are you aware of attempts to influence Congressional Offices on those policy issues? 
If so, please describe the strategies and the arguments they used to advance their policy 
goals. 
 
8. In your experience, in what ways were the for-profit colleges successful in their 
attempt to advance their policy goals? 
 
9. In your experience, in what ways were the for-profit colleges not successful in their 
attempt to advance their policy goals? 
 
10. What organizations did the for-profit colleges align with? 
 
11. What organizations impeded or attempted to impede for-profit college efforts? 
 
12. Looking back, in what ways do you feel like your organization supported or impeded 
policy changes related to the for-profit college’s policy agenda? 
 
13. Are there any other questions on this issue that I should be asking? 
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 APPENDIX C 
Interview Protocol: Higher Education Special Interest-groups/Lobbyists- For-profit 
 
1a. Before we dive in, please tell me a little about yourself and how you came to work in 
the position you were in during the reauthorization?  
1b. Are you still in the same position? 
 
2. What policy issues did you consider the most important policy issues debated during 
the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
3. What individuals and groups were involved in the shaping of those policy issues – both 
on the Hill and off the Hill? 
 
4a. What policy issues did your organization care most about?  
4b. And, what did you want to accomplish?  
4c. How did you go about accomplishing those goals? 
 
5. What other individuals and/or groups were involved in those specific policy issues 
both on and off the Hill? 
 
7. In what ways did your organization attempt to influence Congressional Offices on 
those policy issues? Please describe the strategies and the arguments you used to advance 
your policy goals. 
 
8. In your experience, in what ways was your organization successful in your attempt to 
advance your policy goals? 
 
9. In your experience, in what ways was your organization not successful in your attempt 
to advance your policy goals? 
 
10. What organizations did your organization align with? 
 
11. What organizations impeded or attempted to impede your organization’s efforts? 
 
12. Are there any other questions on this issue that I should be asking?  
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APPENDIX D 
Interview Protocol: Higher Education Reporter 
 
1a. Before we dive in, please tell me a little about yourself and how you came to work in 
the position you were in during the reauthorization?  
1b. Are you still in the same position? 
 
2. What policy issues did you consider the most important policy issues debated during 
the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act? 
 
3. What individuals and groups were involved in the shaping of those policy issues – both 
on the Hill and off the Hill? 
 
4a. Are you aware of the policy issues that the for-profit colleges cared most about?  
4b. How did these issues compare to other special interest-groups following the 
reauthorization? 
 
5. Of those policy issues related to the for-profit colleges, what individuals and/or groups 
were involved in those policy issues both on and off the Hill? 
 
6. Are you aware of attempts to influence Congressional Offices on those policy issues? 
If so, please describe the strategies and the arguments they used to advance their policy 
goals. 
 
7. In your experience, in what ways were the for-profit colleges successful in their 
attempt to advance their policy goals? 
 
8. In your experience, in what ways were the for-profit colleges not successful in their 
attempt to advance their policy goals? 
 
9. What organizations did the for-profit colleges align with? 
 
10. What organizations impeded or attempted to impede for-profit college efforts? 
 
11. Looking back, in what ways do you feel like your organization supported or impeded 
policy changes related to the for-profit-college’s policy agenda? 
 
12. Are there any other questions on this issue that I should be asking? 
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 APPENDIX E 
Data-Collection Protocol 
 
General Guidelines for Document Searches 
 
1. Documents reviewed will be dated January 1, 2003-December 31, 2008 
2. An excel spreadsheet will be created to record all collected data: 
a. Date that search was conducted 
b. Data source (i.e. Campaign Finance Reports, Congressional Record, etc) 
c. Search Strings- keywords or URL 
d. Findings- YES or NO. If yes, information will be saved as explained for 
each data source below. 
 
 
Searching Campaign Finance Reports 
 
This search involves the collection of information pertaining to political contributions of 
for-profit college special interest-groups to members of Congress on the House Education 
and Workforce Committee. This information will be gathered from www.opensecrets.org 
– a non-partisan, independent research website run by the Center for Responsive Politics 
that tracks money and its influence on elections and public policy.  
 
Search Steps 
 
1. Go to www.opensecrets.org . Choose “PAC’s” under “influence and lobbying” 
tab. 
2. Use keywords in the search function to find which special interest-groups gave 
what amount to which members of Congress.  
3. Record information in excel spreadsheet: 
a. Year of contribution (2003-2008) 
b. Name of special interest-group 
c. Amount of contribution 
d. Name of Member of Congress who received contribution 
 
 
 
Searching Federal Lobbying Reports 
 
This search involves the collection of information pertaining to amount of money spent 
by for-profit college special interest-groups on lobbying activities. This information will 
be gathered from www.opensecrets.org – a non-partisan, independent research website 
run by the Center for Responsive Politics that tracks money and its influence on elections 
and public policy.  
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1. Go to www.opensecrets.org . Choose “lobbying” under the “influence and 
lobbying” tab. 
2. Use keywords in the search function to find which lobbying firms and special 
interest-groups lobbied for for-profit colleges.  
3. Record information in excel spreadsheet: 
a. Year of lobbying activities (2003-2008) 
b. Name of special interest-group or lobbying firm 
c. Name of lobbyist 
d. Name of for-profit college 
e. Amount of lobbying activities 
 
 
 
Searching Special Interest-group Websites 
 
This search involves collecting information from interest-group websites of those groups 
named in interviews, interviewed, named in Congressional Record, or found through 
search of PAC contributions and lobbying reports. 
 
Information gathered from these websites will include documents posted that include 
group’s position on or statements about the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. 
Documents may include: talking points, newsletters, policy positions, news releases, 
advocacy positions statements, etc. 
 
Search steps: 
 
1. Some of the websites will have search features to locate documents and others 
may have advocacy/government relations pages with relevant documents. 
2. When relevant documents or information is found, the data will be saved in an 
excel document: 
a. Name of organization 
b. URL 
c. Type of document 
d. Policy position 
 
Searching the Congressional Record and the  
House Education and Workforce Committee Website 
 
This search involves collecting information from Thomas and the House of 
Representatives websites.  Information gathered from these websites will include data on 
bills and amendments to bills, statements made by members in committee, committee 
hearings and mark-ups, Dear Colleague letters, and press releases relevant to the 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. Key word searches will facilitate the 
gathering of information.  
 
Search steps: 
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1. Go to http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
● On Thomas homepage and click on Congressional Record and select 
Congress (108
th
, 109
th
, 110
th
). 
● Two searches will be conducted.  
○ First: any legislation related to the reauthorization. 
○ Second: statements made by members of the House Education and 
Workforce Committee about the reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act. 
● Relevant data on the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act will be 
saved as its own file and recorded in the excel spreadsheet. 
2. Go to http://edlabor.house.gov/ 
● On committee website search for documents relevant to the 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, including hearings, hearing 
statements, member statements and extension of remarks, and press 
releases. 
● Relevant data on the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act will be 
saved in its own file by source and recorded in the excel spreadsheet. 
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APPENDIX F 
IRB Approval 
1002E77635 - PI McCarthy - IRB - Exempt Study Notification 
1 message 
 
irb@umn.edu <irb@umn.edu> Fri, Feb 19, 2010 at 8:20 AM 
To: brittny.mccarthy@gmail.com 
The IRB: Human Subjects Committee determined that the referenced study is exempt 
from review under federal guidelines 45 CFR Part 46.101(b) category #2 
SURVEYS/INTERVIEWS; STANDARDIZED EDUCATIONAL TESTS; 
OBSERVATION OF PUBLIC BEHAVIOR. 
 
Study Number: 1002E77635 
 
Principal Investigator: Brittny McCarthy 
 
Title(s): 
Reauthorizing the Higher Education Act: An Analysis of the Role of the For-Profit 
Higher Education Sector 
________________________________________________________ 
 
This e-mail confirmation is your official University of Minnesota RSPP notification of 
exemption from full committee review. You will not receive a hard copy or letter. 
This secure electronic notification between password protected authentications has been 
deemed by the University of Minnesota to constitute a legal signature. 
 
The study number above is assigned to your research.  That number and the title of your 
study must be used in all communication with the IRB office. 
 
Research that involves observation can be approved under this category without 
obtaining consent. 
 
SURVEY OR INTERVIEW RESEARCH APPROVED AS EXEMPT UNDER THIS 
CATEGORY IS LIMITED TO ADULT SUBJECTS. 
 
This exemption is valid for five years from the date of this correspondence and will be 
filed inactive at that time. You will receive a notification prior to inactivation. If this 
research will extend beyond five years, you must submit a new application to the IRB 
before the study?s expiration date. 
 
Upon receipt of this email, you may begin your research.  If you have questions, please 
call the IRB office at (612) 626-5654. 
 
You may go to the View Completed section of eResearch Central at 
http://eresearch.umn.edu/ to view further details on your study. 
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The IRB wishes you success with this research. 
 
We have created a short survey that will only take a couple of minutes to complete. The 
questions are basic, but will give us guidance on what areas are showing improvement 
and what areas we need to focus on: 
 
https://umsurvey.umn.edu/index.php?sid=36122&lang=um 
 
 
 
